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ABSTRACT
Nixon and Carter: A Comparative Analysis of
American Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East exeunines 
the Nixon Administration's policies and objectives toward 
the Middle East, particularly its handling of the October 
1973 Arab-Israeli war, and contrasts them with the Carter 
Administration's policies, which culminated in the peace 
talks at Camp David. This examination focuses on how 
these two very different presidents approached a dilemma 
which has been central to American Middle Eastern policy 
since the creation of Israel; how can the United States 
achieve a balance between the competing interests of 
protecting Israel and maintaining access to Middle East 
oil?
Ill
table of contents
ABSTRACT........................................iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................  v
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION..........................  1
Purpose.................................... 2
The Level of Analysis of the Study..........  11
The Domestic Environment.................... 14
The International Environment...............  21
Framework of the Study...................... 24
Chapter Notes..............................  28
CHAPTER 2 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT...............  29
The Arab-Israeli Dilemma.................... 29
U.S. Middle East Policy Development.........  37
Summary.................................... 69
Chapter Notes..............................  75
CHAPTER 3 THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION.............  78
Context.................................... 80
Foreign Policy Objectives................... 102
Summary.................................... 134
Chapter Notes.............................. 138
CHAPTER 4 THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION.............144
Context.................................... 147
Foreign Policy Objectives................... 161
Summary.................................... 197
Chapter Notes.............................. 202
Chapter 5 THE ESSENCE OF A DILEMMA............. 206
Comparative Analysis........................208
Toward Future Policy........................219
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................... 222
IV
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to recognize several faculty members of 
the Political Science Department at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas, for their invaluable assistance in this 
endeavor. First and foremost. I'd like to thank the 
members of my committee: Dr. Robert M. Bigler, Dr. James
W. Leunare, and Dr. Jerry L. Simich, for helping me to stay 
on the right track. I'm also deeply grateful to Dr. 
Douglas Imig and Dr. Allison Drew for their comments 
during the initial phases of this project, which helped me 
to find the track in the first place. Finally, I'd like 
to thank Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, whose advice on how to 
approach such a large project proved to be very timely and 
right on the mark.
I would also like to thank Dr. Donald E. Cams and 
Dr. David R. Dickens, of the Sociology Department, for 
their valuable assistance and insight.
CHAPTER 1 
IHTRODDCTIOH
On October 6 1973, when Egypt and Syria launched a 
coordinated surprise attack against Israel, they managed 
to catch not only Israel, but to a certain extent both of 
the superpowers, off guard. The regional conflict that 
ensued had global implications because it highlighted the 
tenuous boundaries of the international system which had 
evolved during the Cold War, a system in which the two 
major players, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
sought to satisfy their respective national interests 
while avoiding potentially disastrous confrontations 
(Craig and George 1990, 119). In this respect, the Middle 
East, one region among several which had become 
increasingly important to American foreign policy during 
the post war era— was suddenly thrust to the fore. The 
October War of 1973 was really only the latest in a series 
of conflicts in the Middle East; it posed a challenge to 
the Nixon administration, but it also presented President 
Nixon and his staff with an opportunity to make progress 
toward some form of Arab-Israeli settlement.
Five years later, amid the isolation of Camp David, 
President Jimmy Carter had the unprecedented opportunity 
to participate in 13 days of intensive negotiations 
between Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel. 
"By all accounts Carter himself played the decisive role 
in the negotiating process" (Bradley 1981, 30). In order 
to do so, he faced several challenges before, during and 
after the negotiations. Meanwhile, President Carter met 
the continuing need to fashion a Middle East policy within 
the context of an ever-changing relationship with the 
Soviet Union, and against the backdrop of a nation which 
was being consumed by an expanding energy crisis.
Purpose
This thesis will examine the Nixon Administration's 
policies and objectives toward the Middle East, 
particularly its handling of the October 1973 War, and 
contrast them to the Carter Administration's policies, 
which culminated in the peace talks at Camp David.
Nixon's basic challenge was to assure the continued 
security of Israel and to maintain U.S. access to oil, 
while avoiding potential confrontations with the Soviet 
Union. Carter sought to reconcile Arab-Israeli 
differences in an enduring manner which would compromise 
neither Israeli security nor American oil interests.
The coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel in 
1973 created an immediate challenge that required an 
immediate response. Carter's challenge was much less 
urgent, but nonetheless extremely important. This 
analysis will explore the similarities and differences in 
the challenges facing these two very different presidents 
to determine what lessons can be drawn for future Middle 
Eastern policy. Similarly, this examination will focus on 
the methods each president used in dealing with this vital 
area of the world. Most importantly, after establishing 
the nature of the challenge posed to Nixon and Carter, and 
determining how each chose to respond to Middle Eastern 
issues, this thesis will turn to outcomes, the end results 
of each president's respective policies, to determine how 
and why they differed.
This study has benefitted from a well developed and 
extremely varied body of literature. Each of the 
administrations in question has provided fertile grounds 
for scholars studying a number of issues, running the 
gamut from general foreign policy orientations to the 
decision making styles of the presidents themselves. Both 
Nixon and Carter, as well as several prominent members of 
their administrations, have proven to be prolific authors, 
particularly with respect to foreign policy issues. 
American foreign policy toward the Middle East is itself a
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very broad subject, as the plethora of books and articles 
devoted to it demonstrates. The goal of this thesis has 
been to lift out from each of these broad subject areas 
the key facets needed to establish a valid basis of 
comparison for Nixon and Carter's policies toward the 
Middle East.
Several general features of American foreign policy 
development provide a broader understanding of specific 
approaches taken toward the Middle East. Much of the 
recent literature devoted to the study of foreign policy 
is inexorably linked by a haunting question; is it 
possible for the United States to fashion and maintain a 
coherent foreign policy (Kegley and Wittkopf 1988, 1)?
The post World War II era, particularly the years 
following the Vietnam conflict, has been characterized by 
an expanding body of literature which asserts that in 
order to solve this dilemma, we must develop a more 
extensive knowledge of how domestic stimuli interact with 
each other and with external factors resulting in specific 
foreign policy outcomes (Kegley and Wittkopf 1988, 2).
The traditional boundaries separating domestic and foreign 
policy agendas are no longer distinct. Groups within the 
private sector as well as domestically oriented government 
agencies have become increasingly involved in attempts to 
shape foreign policy (Keohane and Nye 1977).
This interplay between domestic and external factors 
results in the specific foreign policy context in which 
individual decision makers must operate. American 
scholars and policy makers have become increasingly aware 
of the fact that foreign policy cannot be successfully 
crafted in a vacuum; context— whether shaped primarily by 
domestic factors such as public opinion, interest groups 
and the media, or external factors, such as relations with 
third-party states— has become a vital consideration.
This is particularly evident in the case of the Middle 
East. The creation of Israel was facilitated by President 
Truman's support, brought about by strong pressure from 
American Jewry. For years, Truman's decisions regarding 
Palestine vacillated from side to side, according to the 
prevailing political climate. Eventually he and his aides 
perceived that the domestic political consequences 
associated with alienating the Jewish vote were too much 
for Truman to ignore (Snetsinger 1974, 139).
The precedent set during the Truman administration 
has continued to the point that today both Arab and 
Israeli interests are well represented by organized, 
active lobbying groups. Of the two, the Israeli lobby, 
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), 
clearly wields more resources^. Mitchell Bard points out 
that American Jews, fearful of the consequences for Israel
and within the United States if they do not have political 
power, "have devoted themselves to politics with almost 
religious fervor" (Bard 1988, 58). His study revealed 
that Jews have a higher voter turnout than any other 
ethnic group. Although a very small percentage of the 
total American population, Bard found that Jews were 
concentrated in twelve key electoral college states (Bard 
1988, 59).
The formal Arab lobby, the National Association of 
Arab Americans (NAAA), also possesses considerable 
resources, but lacks the unity and organization of its 
Jewish counterpart^. Like AIPAC, the Arab lobby bases 
requests for pro-Arab programs on the grounds that such 
programs are in line with U.S. national interests. Bard 
suggests that framing issues in terms of national interest 
is a key facet of AIPAC's strategy because it allows the 
Jewish lobby to generate broader support than could ever 
be possible if it were perceived to represent only Israeli 
interests (Bard 1988, 60). For its part, the NAAA argues 
that aid to Israel is a waste of the American taxpayer's 
money and emphasizes the potential benefits of closer ties 
between the United States and the Arab states.
Studies conducted to determine the relationship 
between the Israeli and Arab lobbies' activities and U.S. 
policy indicate that neither lobby has proven to be
particularly capable of directly influencing policy (Bard 
1988; Quandt 1977). Rather, their significance lies in 
their ability to generate congressional support for their 
respective agendas (Bard 1988, 64), and in their ability 
to couple this support with "informative" campaigns 
directed at the American public, campaigns which often 
influence and define the context in which decisions are 
made (Quandt 1977, 20). Furthermore, their consistent 
attempts to convince decision makers that U.S. interests 
are inextricably linked to their own agendas takes 
advantage of, and exacerbates, the United States' apparent 
inability to consistently reconcile a set of highly 
competitive interests in the Middle East.
The interests themselves have not only been clearly 
defined, but have actually become quite well accepted, the 
result of years of policy development that will be briefly 
outlined in Chapter 2. Tillman suggests that the United 
States has sought to promote four fundamental goals in the 
Middle East, "the most important single region in the 
world from the standpoint of American interests— and the 
most dangerous." First, policymakers have sought to 
maintain reliable access, at a reasonable cost, to the 
region's oil. Second, they have taken steps to ensure the 
continued survival and security of Israel. Third, the 
United States, throughout the post World War II era, has
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sought to build a relationship with the Soviet Union which 
avoids confrontation and enhances cooperation^. Finally, 
American foreign policy has been aimed at fulfilling, to 
the greatest extent possible, specific principles such as 
the peaceful settlement of international disputes, 
intolerance for the forceful seizure of territory, and the 
rights of the various peoples in the region to self- 
determination (Tillman 1982, 51).
In many respects, the first two goals represent not 
only competing, but diametrically opposed, interests. The 
desire to maintain reliable access to oil requires some 
degree of friendly relations with the oil-producing 
countries of the Arab world; yet, the American commitment 
to Israel, at times "more the result of affiliation than 
of specific strategy to promote American interests" 
(Tillman 1982, 52), has often left the United States at 
odds with the Arab community.
It is indeed difficult to determine which interest 
should take precedence over the others. Economic 
necessity in the form of the growing need for oil has 
certainly given more weight to arguments that the United 
States must maintain viable relationships with the oil- 
producing Arab nations. Conversely, it has opened the 
door to fears that frustrated Arab leaders might try to 
use coercive diplomacy, or "economic blackmail," to force
the United States to abandon its support for Israel 
(Quandt 1977, 2). In fact, both Nixon and Carter were 
forced to deal with the threat of potentially disrupted 
oil supplies during their presidencies. Moreover, many 
scholars argue that reasoning which links Israel's 
survival to American interests is faulty, that it was not 
necessarily in the United States' interest to support the 
creation of Israel (Snetsinger 1974). While this point 
still generates debate, it has in essence been made moot 
by the years of cooperation that have punctuated U.S.- 
Israeli relations; Israel has received financial and 
military support and the United States has received a very 
strategic ally in the region, an ally which has proven to 
be quite adept at providing exceptional intelligence 
information as well as advice on how to improve the 
capability of U.S. military hardware, field tested through 
years of conflict (Quandt 1977, 9).
American policy toward the Middle East has proven to 
involve much more than simply choosing one side over the 
other in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The resulting dilemma 
has led to repeated diplomatic attempts by many 
presidents, most notably Carter, to find a solution to the 
"seemingly intractable" Arab-Israeli conflict, a solution 
which is also in line with American regional interests 
(Bradley 1981, 1). Meanwhile, the process of maintaining
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American Middle East policy has been one of trying to 
reevaluate and, more importantly, to prioritize American 
interests in the region. The relative weight afforded to 
each interest will therefore serve as a major basis of 
comparison for Nixon and Carter's policies.
Because of the very nature of these American 
interests, a combination of ideological and pragmatic 
concerns, the strategic, or national interests approach to 
explaining foreign policy toward the Middle East falls 
short of providing a complete understanding of why 
decision makers may have chosen specific options under 
given circumstances. The national interest perspective is 
largely "based on the assumption that foreign policy is 
essentially a rational adaptation of means (resources) to 
ends (national interests). Nation-states seek security, 
well-being and prestige, and to attain these goals, they 
employ power, whether in its military or economic form" 
(Quandt 1977, 4). Policy making is viewed as a process in 
which the costs and benefits of potential courses of 
action are compared. Barring irrationality or error, 
decision makers are expected to select the course of 
action that best promotes the national interest at an 
acceptable cost. Quandt argues that the decision making 
process is not nearly so clear-cut. While the interests 
themselves may be completely tangible to the foreign
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policy analyst who is seeking after-the-fact to explain why 
a particular decision was made, this may or may not have 
been the case during the decision making process itself. 
Therefore, policy does not necessarily flow directly from 
interests, nor do those interests necessarily remain 
constant (Quandt 1977, 14).
Thus, while their respective prioritization of 
national interests in the Middle East should reveal a 
great deal about Nixon and Carter's policies, Quandt's 
reasoning suggests that to stop there would amount to 
barely scratching the surface. Policy makers must operate 
in a subjective environment, where the perception of 
national interests is what matters; moreover, the manner 
in which conflicting interests are resolved and policies 
devised can have a decisive impact on the decisions 
themselves (Quandt 1977, 15).
The Level of Analysis of the Study
Quandt's emphasis on looking beyond national 
interests to see how other factors affect foreign policy 
formulation highlights the fact that one of the first 
hurdles which must be overcome in the study of 
international relations, as with any area of scholarly 
inquiry, is the selection of a viable level of analysis for 
the phenomena in question*. To many who study
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international relations, the most appropriate level of 
analysis has been the systemic level. Often, the 
international system has been likened to a billiard table, 
and:
the units of the system— states—  
are likened to billiard balls whose 
reactions are determined exclusively 
by the impact of each unit on the 
others as they collide in an endless 
action-reaction sequence of events.
What occurs inside the balls, 
and how that might propel them in 
one direction or another is beyond 
the purview of the 'billiard ball' 
model of international politics 
(Kegley and Wittkopf 1988, 2).
While this approach may provide the means to develop 
a better understanding of the system as a whole, a growing 
number of scholars, like Quandt, contend that foreign 
policy depends not only on the interactive processes among 
nations, but on those within the various nations 
themselves. This has led several researchers to focus on 
the level of the national state, yet, the vastness of the 
subject area has left room for several interpretations 
regarding how to further break it down for study. Jervis 
proposes four levels which deserve attention— the level of 
decision-making, the level of the bureaucracy, the nature 
of the state and the workings of domestic politics, and 
the international environment. (Jervis 1976, 15) Jervis' 
inclusion of the fourth category, the international
13
environment, is significant because it displays a keen 
awareness of the interplay which occurs between the 
domestic and international environments in the formulation 
of foreign policy. Various elements from each of these 
environments can affect decision-makers, depending upon 
the specific circumstances in question. To ignore the 
international environment in a study of domestic 
influences over foreign policy would equate, perhaps 
somewhat loosely, but equate nonetheless, to ignoring the 
processes which occur inside the billiard balls when 
taking a systemic approach.
Kegley and Wittkopf group "perceptions about the 
multitude of influences on foreign policy-making" into 
three basic categories which they depict as forming 
separate, yet interrelated layers of influence. The 
broadest level consists of the societal environment, which 
is impacted primarily by the political culture of the 
United States, "the basic needs, values, beliefs and self- 
images widely shared by Americans about their political 
system." Below this level rests the institutional 
setting, the various branches of the government, as well 
as the departments and agencies responsible for decision 
making and management. Finally, foreign policy must pass 
through the level comprised by decision makers and their 
policy-making positions. The personalities, psychological
14
predispositions, perceptions and role responsibilities of 
decision makers can have a decided impact on the policy­
making process and, ultimately on foreign policy outcomes 
themselves (Kegley and Wittkopf 1988, 5).
Kegley and Wittkopf's model suggests that a specific 
policy outcome may be affected by elements from each of 
these three layers of influence. The third layer, that 
comprised by decision-makers and their policy-making 
positions, will serve as the "stable point of focus" 
(Singer 1961, 78) for this thesis, which afterall is a 
comparative analysis of how two different presidents chose 
to approach a vital area of the world. Yet, in order to 
fully appreciate why each of them chose to pursue 
particular options, how they established their respective 
priorities and what caused them to form specific 
perceptions, it is necessary to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the context in which these 
decision makers operated.
As alluded to previously, two elements make up the 
broad contours of this context; the domestic environment 
and the international environment.
The Domestic Environment
While it may have once been a widely held belief that 
"politics stop at the water's edge," that national
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interests are considered before personal and partisan 
interests when it comes to foreign policy, Kegley and 
Wittkopf, like Quandt, suggest that this is no longer the 
case. Domestic considerations, which are themselves 
affected by the political culture of the United States, 
have begun to play at least as prominent a role in foreign 
policy formulation as the international strategic 
situation (Kegley and Wittkopf 1988, 11). Public opinion 
has become the litmus test by which a president's foreign 
policies are judged (Craig and George 1990, 60).
Throughout the post war era, presidential authority, 
once nearly unquestioned in the realm of foreign policy, 
has waned considerably. Hans Morgenthau's insistence that 
statesmen should never allow their decisions to be 
influenced by public opinion (Morgenthau 1973), has proven 
to be an elusive goal. Politics have intruded into the 
decision making process, decreasing the ability of 
presidents to make foreign policy decisions without 
considering the impact those decisions may have on their 
political future (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984, 18). 
Destler, Gelb and Lake assert that the resulting 
"breakdown" in foreign policy has led to the very 
inconsistency and incoherence that has come to typify the 
American approach to world affairs since Vietnam. Over 
time, the United States has lost the ability to frame "a
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coherent sense of national interests, the enduring purposes 
that flow from values, geography, and our place in the 
hierarchy of world power" (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984, 
18). Whereas in most nations, it takes a revolution to 
redefine the overarching perception of what constitutes 
the national interest, in the United States, significant 
change can, and often does, result from a presidential 
election (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984, 18).
Richard Nixon's presidency was pivotal in terms of 
domestic influences over foreign policy. It began and 
ended with significant events, Vietneun and Watergate, both 
of which led to increased congressional and popular 
involvement in the foreign policy decision making process. 
Holsti and Rosenau point out that from 1945 to 1965, 
before the foreign policy consensus was shattered by the 
Vietnam War, the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy 
Administrations could count on support from Congress, the 
media, other leaders and the informed public, as long as 
they pursued policies based on an accepted set of 
principles about foreign affairs and the role of the 
United States in the world^. After Vietnam, the near 
consensus between elite and public opinion regarding the 
direction which should be taken in foreign affairs began to 
erode; in the absence of this consensus. Congress and the 
Executive Branch each became less sure of the other's
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position®. Meanwhile, the prevailing anti-communist 
ideology, since World War II the defining characteristic 
of American foreign policy, began to dissipate, decreasing 
the willingness among policy makers to make deals that fit 
both national and party interests (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 
1984, 18).
Presidential authority reached its apex, and even 
began to diminish, during the aftermath of the Vietnam 
War. The period since has been characterized by a 
continual fluxuation in presidential authority. In spite 
of this trend, Richard Nixon, like many of his 
predecessors, enjoyed a nearly complete freedom to 
maneuver in foreign affairs. In fact, it was after 
Nixon's presidency, and to a large extent because of it, 
that the authority of the executive branch became the 
subject of broad scrutiny in the face of a growing 
accusation that abuses had occurred which threatened the 
very system of checks and balances envisioned by the 
Founders (Schlesinger 1973). Critics charged that several 
presidents, Nixon among them, had abused their right to 
secrecy as a means to protect and preserve their national 
security power (Cronin 1988, 151). Thus, successive 
presidents, particularly Ford and Carter who came into 
office at the height of this critical period, were forced 
to operate in an environment punctuated by a popular and
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congressional impulse to restrict presidential authority, 
even in foreign affairs. The degree to which additional 
constraints affected Carter's freedom to maneuver in 
foreign affairs will serve as an interesting basis of 
comparison to Nixon's presidency.
Holsti and Rosenau's study demonstrates the depths of 
the chasms which divided opinion over the directions 
foreign policy should take in the 1970s and 1980s. Their 
findings also underscore the fact that domestic issues and 
foreign policy are often viewed as competing interests. 
Public opinion surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations (CCFR) indicate that the pendulum has 
swung back and forth several times, favoring one broad 
category of interests, then the other. Three studies, 
conducted in 1974, 1978 and 1982, demonstrated a 
preoccupation with domestic issues, reversing the public 
opinion trend which had held from 1940 to 1973 (Reilly 
1987, 45). A fourth poll, taken in 1986, indicated a 
swing back toward greater sensitivity in foreign affairs 
(Reilly 1987, 46). This was accompanied by a significant 
shift in the way that both the public and leaders 
perceived the United States' role in world affairs.
Reilly attributes these changing attitudes to the drop in 
inflation which took place from 1978 to 1986, the easing 
of unemployment from 1982 to 1986, and increased
19
confidence among Americans with respect to the U.S.-Soviet 
military balance (Reilly 1987, 48).
The "pendulum effect" exhibited in these successive 
surveys would seem to indicate an unwillingness on the 
part of the American people to support active involvement 
in world affairs during periods of domestic uncertainties. 
This limits a president's ability to enact and sustain 
far-reaching policies; domestic, particularly economic, 
upheaval can lead the public to reel in any slack it may 
have given the administration in the foreign policy arena, 
expecting attention to be diverted from politics among 
nations back toward problems at home. This competition 
can exact a heavy toll on the president (Destler, Gelb and 
Lake 1984, 20). In fact, Quandt suggests that Jimmy 
Carter pulled back on his efforts toward a Middle East 
peace initiative in the fall of 1977 because the domestic 
political price he was paying had become too high (Quandt 
1988, 94).
The structure of the electoral cycle compounds this 
problem. Quandt builds an extremely convincing case in 
which he asserts that the present electoral cycle is 
preventing the United States from realizing the full 
potential of the presidency, and therefore from 
establishing a consistent and effective foreign policy. 
Because most newly elected presidents have very little
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foreign policy experience, they spend the first year of 
their first term simply gaining that experience. During 
the third and fourth years, the administration is apt to 
become increasingly preoccupied with re-election, placing 
foreign policy on the back burner. In essence, then, the 
only opportunities for first term in-roads into foreign 
policy occur during the second year. The first year and a 
half of the second term are the best for foreign policy 
initiatives. Late in the second year, however, domestic 
issues are likely to again take precedence over foreign 
policy concerns. Midterm congressional elections become 
an increasingly important determinant of how much power 
the president will have during his last two years (Quandt 
1988, 93-94).
Quandt's argument highlights a fundamental difference 
between the Nixon and Carter presidencies. Unlike Carter, 
Nixon brought a wealth of foreign policy experience to the 
office. Therefore, one would expect Richard Nixon to have 
made more headway in the Middle East during the earlier 
stages of his administration. As Chapter 3 will 
demonstrate, however, this was not necessarily the case.
To understand why Nixon's extra foreign policy experience 
did not translate into an early proactive involvement in 
the Middle East requires a move out of the domestic 
contextual environment into the international; the first
21
several years of President Nixon's first term were 
overshadowed by the American involvement in Vietnam.
The International Environment
The second broad component of the foreign policy 
decision-making context in which presidents must operate 
is comprised by the international environment. For years, 
American leaders sought to conduct affairs as if the 
United States were not affected by circumstances in the 
world around it. Following World War II, however, several 
prominent leaders, Franklin Roosevelt among them, became 
convinced that the United States had to move away from its 
isolationist tendencies toward a more active foreign 
policy directed at helping to establish and strengthen an 
effective international system which would, in turn, avoid 
breakdowns such as those which had caused both world wars. 
Although his "Great Design," a variation of the 
balance-of-power system based on cooperation between the 
United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, 
was not adopted, Roosevelt was instrumental in terms of 
placing American foreign policy on a new track, a path 
which would allow successive presidents to remain heavily 
involved in world affairs (Graig and George 1990, 103- 
106).
After World War II, American leaders began to 
perceive that a solid European recovery was in the United
22
States' best interests. During this period, Soviet 
actions in Eastern Europe were viewed with a wary eye.
The initial belief that the Soviets were pursuing limited 
objectives which could be justified in terms of their 
security needs eventually gave way to concern as more and 
more territory came under Soviet influence (Craig and 
George 1990, 117). By the time American leaders had 
become alarmed, however, a great deal of territory was 
controlled by Stalin. Under the auspices of the Hitler- 
Stalin Pact, the Russians had already annexed Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia, and sizeable portions of Poland and 
Romania by 1939. After the war, Stalin installed 
Communist puppet governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria and Romania. Soviet 
expansion continued with the annexation of four Japanese 
islands and a series of attempts to establish Communist 
regimes in several countries throughout the world (Nixon 
1990, 16-17). The view of Soviet intentions steadily 
darkened as they brought strong pressure against several 
governments in the Middle East, while pursuing their own 
set of occupation policies in Germany (Craig and George 
1990, 117).
Against this backdrop of perceived Soviet expansion, 
anti-communism became one of the most persistent driving 
forces in post-war American foreign policy. In fact.
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several presidents were heavily influenced by the desire 
to prevent the spread of Communism throughout the world.
A bipolar relationship developed between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, a relationship which eventually 
became known as the "Cold War" (Craig and George 1990,
119).
The ensuing U.S.-Soviet rivalry unquestionably 
exerted a determining influence over world affairs and 
beccune a defining characteristic of American foreign 
policy. More importantly, however, it gave a very 
distinct complexion to American Middle East policy. When 
the new dimension of Soviet-American competition was added 
to the equation, a very complex situation became even more 
difficult. Attempts to fashion a cohesive, enduring 
Middle East policy became even more problematic.
Interestingly, Nixon and Carter gave different 
emphasis to this Soviet-American competition, in general, 
and particularly with respect to the Middle East. Thus, 
each president's respective prioritization of Middle East 
affairs, as applied to the Soviet-American competition, 
stands out as another interesting basis of comparison.
Although Soviet-American competition is the most 
prominent feature of the international context in which 
American decision-makers operated under Nixon and Carter, 
the international environment also influenced Middle East
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policy formulation in other, more subtle ways. First, 
crises in other areas of the world, depending on their 
scope and intensity, diverted attention away from the 
Middle East for extended periods of time. Such was the 
case with the Vietnam conflict under Johnson and Nixon. 
Second, and perhaps just as important, changes in the 
dynamics of the situation within the Middle East itself, 
when recognized, may have caused leaders to re-evaluate 
their policies.
These three facets of the international environment: 
the Soviet-American competition, crises which developed in 
other areas of the world, and changes in the dynamics of 
the Middle East, particularly with respect to the Arab- 
Israeli dispute, will be examined in the chapters which 
follow in order to determine their impact on Nixon and 
Carter's Middle East policies.
Framework of the Stn^
As the preceding indicates, the basic framework of 
this study is challenge and response, determining what 
faced each administration and how each chose to act given 
a particular set of circumstances.
Because context has often proven to be a determining 
factor in how the United States has approached the Middle 
East, this examination will compare the contexts in which
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Nixon and Carter operated. Specifically, it will focus on 
the domestic political pressures faced by each, the 
effectiveness of information and advice available to each, 
and the individual outlooks of the decision-makers 
themselves. Moreover, this examination will consider how 
external factors, such as U.S.-Soviet relations, affected 
decisions made vis-a-vis the Middle East.
This exploration of context will form the most basic 
layer of the study, establishing a backdrop against which 
we can then determine the nature of the challenges posed 
to Nixon and Carter during their administrations. This 
will in turn provide a foundation to support an analysis 
of each administration's policy objectives, both in terms 
of overarching foreign policy and with respect to the 
Middle East. The former, overarching policy, will serve 
as a bridge to link the analysis of context to the 
discussions of specific Middle Eastern policy. After all, 
each president dealt with the Middle East as one portion 
of a broader canvas. To the extent that circumstances 
allowed, Nixon approached his policy in terms of his 
overarching detente goals. Carter within the framework of 
human rights.
Once this foundation has been built and the 
undergirding supports added, analysis will focus on the 
actual methods employed by each president in attempts to
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achieve specific objectives in the Middle East. How much 
did each rely on the use of force, economic coercion and 
other tools of statecraft? Which tools, if any, proved to 
be more effective than others? To what extent did 
specific contextual elements impact the effectiveness of 
the methods employed? This line of questioning will prove 
particularly instructive, facilitating an analysis of the 
relationship between the methods employed and the end 
results. If the outcomes of the presidents' policies 
prove to be significantly different, our task will be to 
determine what caused this difference— the methods 
employed, the contextual elements, or some unexpected 
factor? If the differences prove to be negligible, the 
question that will remain is whether or not, in the case 
of the Middle East, context is such a complicating factor 
that it simply interferes with the impact of traditional 
tools of statecraft.
For the sake of simplicity, this study will address 
each of the major areas of interest: the context, the
nature of the challenge, the methods used, and the policy 
outcomes, of each administration separately, in Chapters 3 
and 4. These separate analyses will be followed by a 
chapter devoted to strict comparison in order to draw 
conclusions to the many questions outlined above. In 
order to fully appreciate the scope of the issues that
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were dealt with by Nixon and Carter, however, it is 
necessary to begin with an overview of the Arab-Israeli 
dilemma itself, and with a brief survey of the development 
of U.S. Middle Eastern policy. Certain aspects of their 
inheritance proved to be critical to the development of 
policy by both Nixon and Carter. Chapter 2 will address 
these issues.
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Beliefs of American Leaders, 1976-1984," in The Domestic 
Sources of American Foreign Policy; Insights and 
Evidence. eds. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf 
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1988), 30-44. Holsti and 
Rosenau found these principles to include; active 
involvement in efforts to create a just and stable world 
order; involvement in a broad range of international 
organizations; support for the creation of peacetime 
alliances; liberalization of foreign trade; foreign aid 
programs; and containment, as the most effective means to 
counter Soviet expansion.
6. Holsti and Rosenau categorized American leaders 
as; Cold War internationalists, who perceived a world of 
conflict with the primary challenges linked to the 
division of the United States and the Soviet Union; Post 
Cold War internationalists, who were more strongly 
oriented to those issues dividing the world along a north- 
south line; or, semi-isolationists, primarily concerned 
with domestic issues.
CHAPTER 2 
THE HISTORICAL COHTEZT
The historical context of the Middle East provides a 
rich and vivid backdrop against which policy makers must 
make contemporary decisions. Failure to understand the 
depths of the chasms which divide Arabs and Israelis can 
lead to policy decisions which fail to garner sufficient 
support from regional actors. Failure to appreciate how 
American Middle Eastern policy has evolved to its present 
stage of development can lead to unrealistic expectations 
among contemporary decision makers, who are often forced 
to channel the momentum of past decisions into their own 
foreign policy agendas.
The Arab-Israeli Dilemma
The state of Israel arose out of a 
conflict between two peoples— Arab 
and Jewish— occupying the same 
general territory and unable to 
satisfy their differences within it.
Following WWII, the British passed 
the Palestine problem to the United 
Nations, which partitioned it into 
separate Arab and Jewish states. The 
inequitable distribution of lands
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and resources provoked the Palestinian 
Arabs to war, but they were no match 
for the well-organized force of Jewish 
WWII veterans. The remnants of Arab 
lands were annexed by bordering Arab 
states who came to suffer the 
destabilizing effects of over one 
million Arab refugees. Israel was 
thus born in conflict and it has ever
since had to remain on the alert
because of oft-repeated threats that 
she would be annihilated (Aker 1985, 4).
When it began, the October 1973 War, known to 
Israelis as "the Yom Kippur War," and to Arabs as "the War 
of Ramadan," was merely the latest explosion between two 
peoples with a history of volatile relations (O'Ballance 
1978, 7). A basic knowledge of the historical context is 
vital to understanding the war because it, like each of
the clashes which came before, was brought about as the
result of a deep-rooted dispute between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors, a dispute that began long before the state 
of Israel was established. Frank Aker's description of 
Israel's origins is brief, yet it captures the essence of 
the perpetual conflict which has pitted Arab and Jew 
against one another for decades.
The major impetus for the establishment of the Jewish 
state was provided by the Zionist Movement, "the strongest 
unifying force among world Jewry" (Peretz 1983, 21).
During the late 1800s, several different Zionist movements 
coalesced into a single. World Zionist Organization, which
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held the first World Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland 
in 1897. Among the chief accomplishments of the congress 
was the formal establishment of an overriding goal for the 
movement; "to create for the Jewish people a home in 
Palestine secured by public law" (Peretz 1983, 19). 
Particularly in its infancy, the movement suffered from 
internal division and external criticism; however, 
support for the Zionists eventually grew as the extent of 
the atrocities committed against Jews during the Holocaust 
became clear.
Peretz (1983) traces the historical evolution of 
Israel from its earliest stages, when the Yishuv (Jewish 
community) constituted a very small percentage of the 
population in Palestine, up through the present era. His 
description illustrates a crucial point that should not be 
overlooked when considering the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Since the beginning, when Arab and Jew first came into 
contact with one another, external forces have exerted a 
determining influence over Palestine. During the first 
World War, the predominant influence was British. In 
1917, the British publicly demonstrated support for the 
creation of a national home for the Jewish people in 
Palestine by issuing the Balfour Declaration. After the 
war, the League of Nations adopted a policy known as the 
British Mandate for Palestine. The Mandate formally
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recognized the Zionist Movement; however, during the 
mandatory era, the region was handled as if it were a 
British crown colony. Efforts were made to create self- 
governing institutions in the region, but these were 
defeated by the conflicting objectives of the three major 
communities that occupied the area: the Yishuv, with
their Zionist nationalism; the Arabs, who were striving 
for self-determination following the break up of the 
Ottoman Empire; and the British, who sought to protect 
their own imperial interests while somehow maintaining a 
balance between their obligations to both Jews and Arabs 
(Peretz 1983, 45).
The end of World War II brought an end to the British 
Mandate in Palestine. Great Britain, exhausted by the 
war, suffered from tremendous financial pressures and 
began to pull out of its most expensive imperial outposts, 
especially those which had become troublesome to maintain. 
In Palestine, Jewish nationalism intensified as the 
Zionist movement began to lean toward militant activism. 
The Yishuv demanded that restrictions imposed on 
immigration and expansion of the Jewish homeland be 
lifted. Clashes between the Yishuv and British forces 
became more frequent. "In desperation. Great Britain 
turned the problem over to the new United Nations (UN) 
Organization in 1946" (Peretz 1983, 46).
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At the same time, Arab opposition to a Jewish 
homeland occupying all of Palestine was very strong. To 
accommodate this opposition, the UN General Assembly put 
forth a compromise partition resolution. It divided the 
country into a Jewish state, an Arab state and an 
international enclave around Jerusalem. Intense emotional 
reactions to the partition resolution led to civil war in 
Palestine. While Jews fought Arabs, the British resolved 
to leave the region by the last official day of the 
Mandate with as little trouble as possible. As soon as 
the UN adopted the partition resolution, Arab leaders 
began organizing local militia forces to prevent the 
establishment of the Jewish state. The state of Israel 
itself was actually established during the ensuing 
conflict, on May 14, 1948. The war ended in 1949, with 
separate armistice agreements between Israel and each of 
the Arab countries involved. Thus, Israel emerged "in a 
land that Arabs insist belongs wholly to Arabs" (Sobel and 
Koset 1974, 1).
The second Arab-Israeli war took place in 1956 after 
President Nasser nationalized, then closed, the Suez Canal 
leading to an Anglo-French invasion of Egypt (O'Ballance 
1978, 1). Israel took advantage of Egypt's preoccupation 
and moved troops accross the Sinai desert. These Israeli 
columns met light opposition and were able to press almost
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as far as the canal itself, gaining control of virtually 
the entire Sinai Penninsula. Months later, however, the 
Israelis grudgingly withdrew to their foinner boundaries, 
bowing to pressure from the UN and the United States in 
particular.
The "Six Day War" was fought in June 1967. Unable to 
remain idle in the face of increasing Arab threats and 
military preparedness, the Israelis opted to launch a 
preemptive strike on Arab airfields (Aker 1985, 5).
Within six days, the military capabilities of the Arab 
states had been effectively neutralized. "The Israelis 
managed to destroy the air force of Jordan, almost destroy 
that of Egypt, and badly maul those of Syria and Iraq.
Left without air cover, the Arabs were disastrously 
defeated" (O'Ballance 1978, 2). In fact, the victory was 
so decisive that it raised serious doubts about the war- 
fighting capability of Arab military personnel, "no matter 
how well armed or trained" (Aker 1985, 5).
In addition to their military defeat, the Arabs 
suffered crucial territorial losses as a result of the 
war. In the north, Syria lost the Golan Heights, with its 
commanding view of the valleys in northern Israel and of 
the road to the Syrian capital, Damascus. Jordan lost the 
West Bank, including the Christian and Islamic temples of 
Jerusalem. Egypt, in spite of its 90,000-man army, lost
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over 20,000 square miles of land east of the Suez Canal, 
the Sinai Penninsula. "Arab humiliation was so great that 
the Arab states refused to negotiate any kind of 
settlement. The stage was irrevocably set for another 
clash" (Aker 1985, 5).
The Egyptian armed forces wasted little time. 
Regrouped and resupplied with Soviet material, they 
launched President Nasser's "War of Attrition" later the 
sfune year. The resulting battles were fought accross the 
Suez Canal, which now served as the dividing line between 
Egyptians and Israelis. On the ground, the battles 
included heavy artillery duels, mortar barrages and 
commando raids. In the skies above, aircraft were used 
for strategic bombing and close air support of ground 
troops. Soviet supplied surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) 
increased the effectiveness of Egyptian air defenses.
Since the June defeat in the Six Day War, when most of 
Egypt's planes had been destroyed on the ground within a 
matter of hours, the Israelis had been enjoying virtual 
freedom of action in the skies above Egypt. The 
introduction of the Soviet SAMs severely limited that 
freedom, and forced the Iraelis to install electronic 
countermeasure (ECM) pods on their aircraft to warn pilots 
of incoming missiles, thereby enabling them to take 
evasive action. Technological advances, in the form of
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electronics that could potentially give one side the edge 
over the other, soon becaune a coveted prize. Edgar 
O'Ballance describes a "mad scientists' war" which 
escalated "as on the ground, radar-directional, searching 
and tracking equipment improved, and in the air, more 
advanced ECM pods enabled the pilot to jam, counterjam and 
even deflect missiles aimed at him" (O'Ballance 1978, 2). 
When the War of Attrition ended on August 7, 1970, neither 
side had gained a clear advantage over the other. Israeli 
aircraft had, however, lost control of the skies over 
Egypt and their activities were confined to the Suez Canal 
Zone.
Opinion is divided as to whether or not the battles 
fought from 1967 to 1970 actually constituted a "war." 
Nonetheless, this period of repeated confrontations, 
sometimes referred to as "No Peace, No War" (Aker 1985,
9), had a decisive impact on the ensuing conflict, which 
began on Saturday, October 6, 1973 when six Syrian jets 
attacked Israeli defensive positions along the Golan 
Heights (Aker 1985, 20).
By nightfall, the Israelis had lost the southern 
Golan. Meanwhile, the Egyptians launched a coordinated, 
all-out attack against Israeli positions in the Sinai, 
striking airfields and mounting an artillery barrage 
involving two thousand guns. Using available broad, flat
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terrain as a staging area, the Egyptians mounted a 
"blitzkrieg-like attack" (Shazly 1980, 222). The Israelis 
were caught off guard by the simultaneous offensives, 
especially in the Sinai.
How could Israel, a "geopolitical island" (Aker 1985, 
17) in the midst of antagonistic neighbors, allow itself 
to be caught off guard? What led the Egyptians and 
Syrians to launch their coordinated attacks? The answers 
to these questions may be found in a closer examination of 
the foreign policy context in which the Nixon 
administration operated. Before turning to this subject, 
however, it is important to mention some of the milestones 
of American Middle Eastern policy that are relevant for 
later discussions.
O.S. Middle East Policy Development
The literature concerning American foreign policy is 
imbued with the sense that it, like so many other facets 
of the American political system, has undergone an 
evolutionary process. The United States was able to 
remain distanced from foreign affairs for quite some time, 
following a tradition of isolationism articulated by 
George Washington who urged in his farewell address that 
the new state's interests would best be served by never 
taking part in the internal quarrels of Europe, and by 
steering clear of "permanent alliances with any portion of
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the foreign world̂ .*' This tradition prevailed even after 
victory in the Spanish-American War resulted in new 
overseas interests and responsibilities, and even after 
the pivotal role the country played in World War I.
The precept which guided American political thought 
and foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth 
century held that the United States should restrict its 
involvement to a well-defined area in the Western 
Hemisphere. Of course, the nation would protect its 
citizens and interests in these areas, but these interests 
were primarily commercial, philanthropic and cultural (De 
Novo 1963, 3-4). In the case of the Middle East, this 
pattern of development is particularly apparent. For 
years the United States remained "politically 
disinterested" (De Novo 1963, 7) in the region, content to 
concentrate efforts in Central America. The six European 
powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria- 
Hungary, and Russia), on the other hand, were deeply 
interested in the Middle East, primarily because of its 
strategic location. American leaders sought to avoid the 
international competition among the European powers and 
chose to fashion a policy based on the traditional 
guidelines of non-intervention (Bryson 1977, 45).
This non-intervention, although it was the norm in 
the case of the Middle East, was by no means absolute.
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The necessity of establishing an expanded market place, 
vital to the survival of the new republic, prompted the 
United States to begin efforts at Middle East diplomacy as 
early as 1784, when Congress appointed a special 
commission consisting of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams and 
Thomas Jefferson to negotiate treaties with the Barbary 
States (Bryson 1977, 2-3). In a sense, it was in the 
national interest of the new nation to pursue economic 
expansion. In March 1815, for exeunple, the United States 
declared war on Algiers for the protection of American 
economic interests in the Middle East (Bryson 1977, 6). 
Furthermore, it was the need for economic expansion which 
drove early efforts at diplomacy and which eventually led 
to the establishment of American naval power, developed to 
safeguard vital shipping routes (Bryson 1977, 7). The 
continued assurance of "freedom of the seas" thus became 
another guiding principle used by American diplomats when 
dealing with the Middle East.
The full evolution of American Middle Eastern policy 
can be traced through several stages. From 1784-1920, 
although there were a number of commercial interests in 
the area, U.S. diplomats devoted most of their attention 
toward protecting the various missionary and educational 
interests which had penetrated into many parts of the 
region (Bryson 1977, vii; De Novo 1963, 19).
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Over time, the missionary lobby wielded considerable 
influence not only in the Department of State, but in the 
White House and the halls of Congress as well. The lobby 
actually became so powerful that in 1900 diplomat Lloyd 
Griscom delared that "the missionaries had been among the 
first to learn how to exert pressure in politics— even the 
head of our State Department used to quake when the head 
of a Bible society walked in" (Griscom 1940, 134). De 
Novo points out that the national support of missionary 
activities serves as a reminder that American isolation 
did not extend to cultural endeavors. By 1900, American 
missionaries were operating in Anatolia and European 
Turkey, Syria, Persia, Egypt and the Persian Gulf region 
(De Novo 1963, 8).
The missionaries were at the height of their power 
during the Wilson administration. Woodrow Wilson, the son 
of a Presbyterian minister, was raised amid clergy and 
missionaries; as president, he maintained personal 
contact with several missionary lobbyists. Needless to 
say, this direct contact with Wilson, coupled with 
contacts with influential members of Congress and the 
State Department, afforded the missionaries considerable 
access to official Washington. They used this access to 
promote various agendas; most notably, they were actively 
involved in pressuring the United States government to act
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on behalf of Armenia. In fact, although they failed to 
make it a reality, "their all-consuming goal was to 
realize American acceptance of a mandate for Armenia" 
(Bryson 1981, 4).
When the American missionaries first arrived in the 
Levant in 1820, they discovered that the Muslim population 
was not at all receptive to Christianity (Bryson 1981, 3). 
Finding little success in evangelizing the Muslims, they 
directed their religious efforts primarily toward the 
native Christians in the region, the Armenians, Greeks, 
Nestorians, Copts, and the Christians in Lebanon (Bryson 
1981, 2). At the same time, they redirected much of their 
remaining energy and resources toward education and 
medicine. As educators, they emphasized the importance of 
cultural traditions and native languages, thereby fanning 
the embers of what has since become the flame of modern 
Arab nationalism, and stimulating the emergence of 
nationalism among the peoples of Armenia (Bryson 1981, 3). 
Through institutions such as Robert College, founded in 
1863, Syrian Protestant College, founded in 1866, and 
Constantinople Women's College, founded in 1871, the 
missionaries trained many of those who would eventually 
become leaders in the modern Middle Eastern nation-state.
Exposure to western political theory, the writings of 
Locke, Jefferson, and Hume for exemple, strengthened
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nationalist sentiments and actually awoke in the subjects 
of the Ottoman Empire, the Arabs, Armenians, Bulgarians, 
Greeks, and Cretans, the desire to pursue unique national 
destinies (Bryson 1981, 3). The United States served as 
an example for those who sought to achieve self- 
determination. However, as various movements got 
underway, requests for actual assistance were denied on 
the basis of the long-standing policy of non-intervention 
and the Monroe Doctrine, first put forth in 1823. In 
spite of this official stance, the missionaries were 
committed to assisting these national movements in their 
struggles for self-determination.
Early American involvement in the Middle East 
highlights the often conflicting duality of American 
foreign policy, the realistic, pragmatic desire to further 
the national interest, and the idealistic, crusading zeal 
to spread democracy throughout the world. In the case of 
early Middle Eastern diplomacy, the former was typified by 
the pragmatic decision to resist becoming involved in the 
various struggles for self-determination which began to 
take root. The latter was promoted primarily via the 
missionary influence in terms of the short-term gains the 
lobby was able to bring about by pressuring the American 
government.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, commercial
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interests began to compete in earnest with the 
missionaries for a voice in the shaping of U.S. Middle 
Eastern policy (Bryson 1977, 44). Prior to World War I, 
however, the missionaries remained the strongest interest 
group in the region (Bryson 1977, 45). During this 
period. Great Britain devoted a great deal of effort 
toward securing Middle Eastern oil, whereas the United 
States did not. In fact, the State Department did not 
exert any pressure during the pre-war years to support 
those Americans who were seeking oil concessions in the 
Middle East (Bryson 1977, 56-57). By the 1920's, this had 
changed somewhat as U.S. diplomats began to employ the 
Open Door policy^ to secure American access to Middle 
Eastern oil reserves.
The preceding decade was also crucial in terms of 
economic endeavors in the Middle East. President Taft, an 
avid proponent of Dollar Diplomacy, placed the pursuit of 
economic interests at the top of his list of priorities. 
The desire to find new commercial opportunities was so 
great during this time frame that officials within the 
administration were willing to violate the traditional 
guidelines of non-intervention in order to pursue economic 
interests^ (Bryson 1977, 49-50).
Although the basic desire to gain access to Middle 
East oil had existed for quite some time prior to World
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War I, U.S. diplomats tended to defer to British supremacy 
in the region. This began to change during the inter-war 
period as competition developed over oil in the Middle 
East. From 1919 to 1939, with the support of the U.S. 
government, American oil companies successfully challenged 
British control of Middle East oil. By World War II, 
American oil interests had gained substantial holdings in 
Kuwait, a monopoly in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and 
approximately one-fourth of the Iraq Petroleum Company 
(Bryson 1977, 96). By 1939, approximately 15 percent of 
the oil produced in the region was for American oil 
companies. American participation in Middle East oil 
production not only promised enormous profits, but 
eventually led to a reliance on the importation of Middle 
East oil (Bryson 1977, 109).
The pre-and inter-war periods were crucial in Middle 
Eastern diplomacy in the sense that the American 
government became increasingly responsive to another very 
influential group, American oil interests. U.S. oil 
companies were not content to stand idly by, while the 
British cornered the oil market. They pressured American 
officials for assistance in the nsune of the Open Door, and 
of Free Trade. World War II served as a point of 
departure for US-Middle East relations as American policy 
makers began to perceive the importance of maintaining
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access to the region's rich oil supplies. After the war, 
this oil was also perceived as vital to the recovery of 
Europe which was, in turn, viewed as vital to American 
interests, especially in the face of the growing threat 
posed by Communist expansion. Protection of private 
interests was replaced by considerations of the national 
interest (Bryson 1981, 1). President Truman was faced 
with the unenviable task of not only defining the broad 
outlines of US national interests in the Middle East, but 
of determining how to promote them within a highly 
unstable context.
Truman's presidency served as a turning point in 
U.S.-Middle East relations; he made an actual commitment 
to the region that has been passed on to every 
administration since. While it is true that several 
presidents before Truman expressed interest in the Middle 
East, little of this interest was manifested into actual 
policy. During the first World War, for example, Great 
Britain approached President Woodrow Wilson, seeking 
American support for an official pro-Zionist statement. 
Great Britain saw in such a statement an opportunity to 
encourage Jewish support for the Allies; however, by 
making a pro-Zionist statement, the government would be 
running the risk of alienating recently cultivated 
friendships with Arab nations. This gave Great Britain
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cause for concern, and led British diplomats to seek 
official support from the United States. "A declaration 
of sympathy with Zionism by President Woodrow Wilson would 
dispel the British concern of becoming diplomatically 
isolated on the Palestine issue" (Snetsinger 1974, 2).
In September 1917, Great Britain informally 
approached Wilson on the subject. Wilson, with advice 
from Colonel Edward House, replied that any Allied 
announcement concerning the future disposition of lands 
within the Ottoman Empire would be inappropriate, 
especially at a time when the Allies hoped to persuade the 
Empire to drop out of the war (Snetsinger 1974, 2). The 
State Department, headed by Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing, also advised against any pro-Zionist statements 
(Adler 1948, 305-8; 334).
American Zionists, united under one of their most 
influential members. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, 
launched a campaign to convince Wilson of the need to 
support the Zionist cause*. Soon thereafter, the British 
again approached Wilson regarding the pro-Zionist 
statement. This time, the President offered his support. 
Snetsinger suggests that had Wilson's second response been 
similar to his first, the British might have decided 
against issuing a statement on Zionism. Furthermore, by 
using direct personal intervention to move President
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Wilson from flat disapproval to endorsement of the 
proposed declaration, the Zionists laid the groundwork for 
taking similar steps during the Truman administration, 
"with even more striking results" (Snetsinger 1974, 2-3).
In November 1917, the following statement was issued
in a letter from Great Britain's Foreign Secretary, Arthur
Balfour, to Lord Rothschild:
His Majesty's Government views 
with favor the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for 
the Jewish people, and will use 
their best endeavors to facilitate 
the achievement of this objective, 
it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine, or the 
rights and political status enjoyed 
by Jews in any other country^.
The Balfour declaration, although it contained 
imprecise language, had a profound impact within the 
Zionist ranks; it came to be viewed as the "emancipation 
proclamation" of the movement (Tillman 1982, 10). 
Furthermore, President Wilson's endorsement of the Balfour 
Declaration was interpreted by many as a moral commitment 
to the Zionist cause. Needless to say, this placed Wilson 
in an awkward position, because support for Zionist 
aspirations conflicted with the president's commitment to 
the principle of self-determination. While Wilson was
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sympathetic to the Zionist cause, his peace program was 
based largely on the notion that lasting peace must be 
built upon the self-determination of existing populations 
(Tillman 1982, 11). In fact. Point Twelve of Wilson's 
Fourteen Points called for an "absolutely unmolested 
opportunity of autonomous development" for the peoples of 
the Ottoman Empire®.
In light of the fact that Arabs had inhabited 
Palestine for centuries and that, by the end of World War 
I, Jews comprised no more than 10 percent of the area's 
population, Wilson's apparent support for the Zionist 
cause was inconsistent with his foreign policy 
initiatives. The chances that he would be able to make 
gains in the latter while remaining true to the former 
were very remote. British Foreign Secretary Balfour noted 
"the ambivalence of American foreign policy" toward the 
Middle East at a meeting with Felix Frankfurter and 
Justice Brandeis, held in Paris on June 24, 1919. Balfour 
told both men that "he could not understand how President 
Wilson reconciled his advocacy of Zionism with his 
commitment to the principle of self-determination^."
This inclination of trying to satisfy both sides in 
the developing Arab-Israeli conflict, but satisfying 
neither, would become an all too common characteristic of 
subsequent American Middle East policy.
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After World War I, American Zionists pressured the 
U.S. government to use diplomatic means to persuade 
Britain to implement the Balfour Declaration. British 
forces occupied Palestine, and in April 1920, the Supreme 
Allied Council awarded Britain a mandate for the region at 
the San Remo Conference. The League of Nations approved 
the mandate in July 1922, on the condition that Britain 
create a national Jewish home. The American government 
resisted the pressure to become involved in the situation. 
During the 1920's, in fact, the State Department continued 
to follow the guidelines of non-intervention and sought 
only to protect American interests. For the most part 
Palestine was considered to be a British concern (Bryson 
1977, 90-91).
One of the most controversial issues facing the 
British during the mandatory era concerned Jewish 
immigration. By the 1930's, Arab fears that Jews would 
overrun Palestine had just begun to subside. These fears 
were renewed, however, when Adolf Hitler's rise to power 
in Germany, and the resulting persecution of European 
Jews, caused a rapid upsurge in Jewish migration to the 
United States, Britain and Palestine. A violent Arab 
uprising in 1936 led the British to appoint an official 
investigative body, known as the Peel Commission, to 
determine the causes of unrest. In 1937, the commission
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recommended that Palestine be divided into two states, one 
Jewish and one Arab. This proposal found little support 
from either side. After further violence in 1938, British 
forces found it necessary to restore peace and the British 
government was compelled to re-evaluate its position in 
Palestine (Bryson 1977, 91). To assuage Arab concerns, 
the Foreign Office issued a White Paper in 1939. This 
document extended British rule over the region, limited 
the sale of land to Jews, and most importantly, restricted 
Jewish immigration to Palestine to 75,000 over a five year 
period. Furthermore, immigration after the designated 
five year period would be subject to Arab approval 
(Tillman 1982, 13).
American Zionists, who had been weakened by 
factionalism during the 1920's (Bryson 1977, 91), began to 
coalesce in the face of the threat to European Jews. In 
1938, they launched a campaign urging the Roosevelt 
Administration to persuade Britain to fulfill the promise 
of the Balfour Declaration. Meanwhile, American oil 
interests insisted that support for the Zionist movement 
would endanger American oil holdings. Resisting pressure 
from both groups, the Roosevelt Administration continued 
to regard Palestine as a British sphere (De Novo 1963, 
342-344).
Events that took place during, and to a greater
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extent after, the second World War led to pronounced 
changes in U.S. Middle East policy. During the war.
Allied interest in the region intensified and is perhaps 
best illustrated by the struggle which took place between 
the British, the United States, and the Soviets over the 
sovereignty of Iran. In 1941, the Soviets occupied 
Northern Iran as a means to ensure an open supply route 
into Russia. Meanwhile, the British moved into southern 
and central Iran, also as a strategic measure. In January 
1942, a Tripartite Treaty was concluded, declaring that 
the presence of foreign troops on Iranian soil was not 
intended as an occupation and that these troops would be 
withdrawn within six months of the war's conclusion 
(Lenczowski 1990, 9).
In the years that followed, Roosevelt was 
particularly interested in preserving allied unity, 
despite the increasingly apparent post-war ambitions of 
the Russians. This was not the case during the Truman 
Administration, however. As the war came to a close, the 
desire to project an appearance of allied unity was 
replaced by concern over the evolving relationship between 
the two emergent superpowers (Lenczowski 1990, 8). At the 
Potsdam Conference, held from July to August, 1945, Stalin 
objected to Churchill's proposal that allied troops 
withdraw from Iran ahead of schedule (Truman 1955, 380).
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After Japan surrendered in September, American and British 
forces began to pull out of Iran in accordance with the 
guidelines of the Tripartite Treaty. The Soviets, on the 
other hand, remained in the area past the deadline, set up 
two pro-Soviet separatist regimes in northwestern 
Iran— the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan in Tabriz, and 
the Kurdish Republic in Mahabad— and actually began to 
move their troops southward (Lenczowski 1990, 9-10).
For President Truman the impending threat of a 
Communist coup in Greece, coupled with Soviet actions in 
Iran, "began to look like a giant pincers movement against 
the oil-rich areas of the Near East and the warm-water 
ports of the Mediterranean" (Truman 1955, 523). Truman 
foresaw the potential for grave danger to American 
interests in the Middle East and diplomatic measures were 
taken to discourage Soviet actions and to bolster the 
Iranian position®. Once the Soviets had actually left 
Iran, the American government encouraged the Shah to send 
Iranian troops to the north to remove the last vestiges of 
the pro-Soviet regimes in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan^.
Thus, in the face of a growing perception of a Soviet 
threat. President Truman took the first steps toward what 
would become a substantial commitment to the security and 
well-being of Iran, a strategically important ally because 
of its location and its rich oil supplies. In time, the
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policies toward Iran would expand to include economic and 
technical assistance, strengthening the country's military 
capabilities, and incorporating Iran into a regional 
security system comprised of the northern tier of the 
Middle East and the Persian Gulf (Lenczowski 1990, 13).
The threat of Soviet expansion into Iran was the 
first of several successive episodes which challenged the 
Truman Administration. While issues were still being 
resolved in connection with the Azerbaijan and Kurdish 
republics, situations developed in both Turkey and Greece 
which caused additional concern over Soviet aggressive 
tendencies. To complicate matters, on February 21, 1947, 
the British ambassador in Washington, Lord Inverchapel, 
informed Secretary of State George C. Marshall that 
Britain would no longer be able to ensure the security of 
Greece and Turkey (Lenczowski 1990, 15). This gave the 
administration a very compelling reason to increase 
American involvement in the region.
Truman felt the need for a quick and decisive 
response from the United States (Truman 1955, 98-101). 
Before any action could be taken, however, he had to gain 
congressional and public support for a tougher stance 
toward the Soviets^®. On March 12, 1947, the president 
delivered a message, since referred to as the Truman 
Doctrine, to Congress. This message outlined the
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deteriorating situations in Greece and Turkey, requested 
military advisory aid and economic assistance in the 
amount of $400 million for both countries, and emphasized 
the fact that a global contest had begun pitting the 
United States against the forces of Communist subversion 
(Lenczowski 1990, 17). On May 22, 1947, Congress 
authorized the military and financial aid that the 
president had requested. During the crucial period 
immediately following World War II, the policy of 
containment began to solidify as the primary American 
response to Soviet expansion^^ (Craig and George 1990, 
118). The episodes in Iran, Greece and Turkey proved to 
be early applications of containment. In time, the policy 
would lead to increased American involvement in the Middle 
East and other areas of the world.
Within days of having been sworn in as president on 
April 12, 1945, Truman was under pressure to take action 
in the Zionist matter. Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, chairman of 
the American Zionist Emergency Council, approached Truman 
for help in resettling Jewish refugees and in establishing 
the proposed Jewish homeland in Palestine. Since 1939, 
when the White Paper limited Jewish immigration into 
Palestine, British-Zionist relations had become very 
strained. In 1942, a Zionist Conference held in New York 
established the Biltmore Program with the goal of making
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all of Palestine into a Jewish state. During this 
conference, American Jews asserted themselves and assumed 
leadership of the world Zionist movement, criticizing 
European Jews for having been weak and indecisive. 
Meanwhile, concerted efforts were made to help persecuted 
Jews immigrate into Palestine, in spite of the newly 
imposed restrictions. In the latter stages of the war, 
extremist groups, such as the Irgun Zvai Leumi led by 
Menachim Begin, launched campaigns of terror against the 
British in order to force them to leave Palestine 
(Lenczowski 1990, 22).
Lenczowski suggests that in the initial phase of the 
Palestine problem, Truman was primarily concerned with the 
humanitarian aspects of the issue. Although he was aware 
of the goal to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, he 
was not prepared to support it. On August 31, 1945, 
following the victory of the Labour Party in Great 
Britain, Truman broached the subject of Jewish refugees 
with Premier Attlee, urging him to immediately allow
100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine. The British 
were not prepared to do so and instead proposed to set up 
an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to review the 
Palestine issue and to make recommendations. The 
resulting proposals called for the continuation of the 
British mandate pending the establishment of a United
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Nations trusteeship; immediate approval for 100,000 
Jewish refugees to enter Palestine; and repudiation of 
the limitations on land transfers (Tillman 1982, 15).
Once these proposals were made, a second committee 
was set up to consider how they would best be implemented. 
The resulting report, the Grady-Morrison plan, proposed 
the establishment of a federalized Jewish-Arab state in 
Palestine. In addition, it put forth a requirement that 
Jews and Arabs both consent to further Jewish immigration. 
Naturally, the Zionists were displeased with this plan, 
and President Truman rejected it. On October 4, 1946, he 
sent a new message to Attlee renewing his request that
100,000 Jews be allowed to enter Palestine immediately 
(Lenczowski 1990, 23).
Soon, joint U.S.-British efforts to find a mutually 
acceptable solution to the problems in Palestine broke 
down. Lenczowski suggests that it was at this point that 
the issue of statehood became the primary focus of 
international diplomacy. In April 1947, the British 
submitted the Palestinian question- to a special session of 
the United Nations General Assembly. Throughout the rest 
of the year, the assembly and the Special Committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP) deliberated. In the meantime, Truman 
came to terms with his own position on the issue of Jewish 
statehood (Lenczowski 1990, 24).
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This was not an easy task, primarily because Truman 
found himself at the center of a virtual tug-of-war. On 
the one hand, representatives of the State Department, the 
Department of Defense and the military were vehemently 
opposed to the adoption of pro-Zionist policies, which 
they believed would cause immeasurable damage to the 
national interest by alienating oil-rich Arab nations 
(Snetsinger 1974, 139). On the other hand, Truman was the 
focus of a "relentless" Zionist campaign, designed to 
pressure him into adopting a pro-Zionist stance. This 
pressure became particularly intense after the Palestine 
question had been brought before the United Nations 
(Lenczowski 1990, 28).
Interestingly enough, the pressure came not only from 
well-known Zionist leaders, but from other directions as 
well. Mobilizing non-Jewish leaders and the groups they 
represented was a major goal of the Zionist campaign. 
Advocates included several White House officials, such as 
David K. Niles, adviser on national minorities, and Clark 
Clifford, an assistant to the president. In March 1948, 
his former partner in the haberdashery business, Eddie 
Jacobson, convinced Truman to meet with the head of the 
Jewish Agency for Palestine, Chaim Weizmann (Lenczowski 
1990, 29).
With an election on the horizon, these influential
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presidential aides "convinced Truman of the political 
necessity of catering to American Jews by supporting the 
cause of Israel" (Snetsinger 1974, 11). When the UN 
Special Committee on Palestine proposed that the disputed 
teritory be partitioned into a Jewish and an Arab state, 
with Jerusalem established as an international enclave, 
Truman directed the State Department to support the plan. 
Similarly, on November 29, 1947, the U.S. delegate to the 
UN General Assembly cast the American vote in favor of the 
partition plan. On May 14, 1948, when Israel was 
proclaimed a state during the conflict that followed UN 
acceptance of the partition plan, Truman did not hesitate 
to recognize the newly formed government. He gave de 
facto recognition to Israel within eleven minutes of the 
proclamation. On January 31, 1949, de jure recognition 
was extended to the Jewish state (Lenczowski 1990, 25-26).
Truman's decision to extend diplomatic recognition to 
Israel marked a turning point in his approach to 
Palestine. It was followed by a series of decisions 
designed to support the Jewish state (Snetsinger 1974, 
116), thus committing the United States to the idea of the 
Jewish state's legitimacy^^. This left the tremendous 
responsibility of actually defining the exact nature of 
U.S.-Israeli and U.S.-Arab relations to successive 
American presidents. Although he bore the brunt of
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relentless pressure from several groups which tried to 
influence his policy toward Palestine, and in spite of the 
critical Arab response to his eventual decisions, Truman 
did not have to contend with any major crises in which 
American Middle East interests were seriously threatened. 
Such crises would, however, occur during later 
presidencies. Dealing with these critical situations 
would shape the subsequent evolution of U.S. relations 
with Israel and with the Arab states (Lenzowski 1990, 30).
During the Eisenhower Administration, the Middle East 
continued to receive a great deal of attention, 
particularly in terms of the threat of Soviet penetration 
into the area, the security of oil supplies and the tense 
relationship between Arabs and Israelis. Within the 
context of this broader framework, Eisenhower had to 
contend with four major crises: the Iranian oil crisis;
the Suez crisis, which resulted in the second Arab-Israeli 
war; the civil war in Lebanon; and the revolution in 
Iraq (Lencowski 1990, 31).
In order to address potential Soviet incursions into 
the region, in 1955 the United States sponsored the 
Baghdad Pact, which combined the efforts of Turkey, Iran, 
Pakistan, Britain and Iraq in a defensive alliance against 
the Soviet threat. In spite of this, Soviet penetration 
into the region continued to be a grave concern for the
60
Eisenhower administration. In fact, Bryson suggests that 
the theme of anti-Communism dominated the thinking of the 
administration, especially after President Gamal Abdul 
Nasser of Egypt established closer ties with the Soviet 
Union in the wake of the Suez crisis (Bryson 1977, 204; 
Lenczowski 1990, 40-41).
In dealing with the Suez crisis, and throughout his 
presidency, Eisenhower insisted on an impartial approach 
to the Arab-Israeli dispute. This was demonstrated by his 
refusal to provide arms to Egypt, which ironically drove 
the Egyptians toward their arms agreement with the Soviets 
in 1955, and by his denial of arms to Israel even after it 
became apparent that the Soviet-Egyptian deal threatened 
the balance of power in the region (Altéras 1993, 85; 137- 
140). Whenever possible, Eisenhower sought to use the 
peacemaking apparatus of the United Nations to resolve 
disputes involving the Middle East^®.
In January 1957, following the Suez crisis, 
Eisenhower's concern over Soviet penetration in the region 
had become so great that he requested congressional 
authority to grant military and economic assistance to any 
state that requested it. Furthermore, he requested 
authorization to use military force as required to prevent 
aggression or subversion within the region. After a great 
deal of debate. Congress approved these requests on March
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9, 1957, in what came to be known as the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. This doctrine was intended to complement the 
earlier Truman Doctrine, but was more specifically 
directed toward protecting the Arab states in the core of 
the Middle East (Bryson 1977, 204). In order to be truly 
effective, it required, but did not completely receive, a 
positive response from the Middle Eastern states it was 
intended to protect^*.
In addition to these specific crises, Eisenhower had 
to deal with a growing inter-Arab dispute which eventually 
resulted in two diametrically opposed Arab camps, a 
radical camp that consisted of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen 
and Algeria, and a conservative camp comprised of Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lybia and Morocco. From 1957 to 
1967, inter-Arab relations were characterized by repeated 
attempts at subversion, assasinations, and several coups 
d'etat. During this period of strained relations, known 
as the Arab Cold War, the United States found itself 
drawing closer to the conservative bloc^®.
During his presidency, John F. Kennedy sought to 
change the basic flavor of American foreign policy in 
general, and with specific regard to the Middle East. In 
terms of the latter, Kennedy believed that American policy 
should view the various Arab nationalist movements 
sympathetically. Moreover, stability in the region should
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not be equated with protection of the status quo. In 
fact, he believed that rigid attempts to contain the 
forces which sought change could only lead to violence and 
unrest. In essence, Kennedy linked the acheivement of 
stability in the Middle East with accommodating the forces 
of change (Lenczowski 1990, 76).
In particular, Kennedy sought to restore friendly 
relations with all the states in the region, radical and 
conservative alike. In his view, it would be detrimental 
to American policy for the United States to be continually 
identified with the forces seeking to preserve tradition. 
Instead, he hoped to establish more viable ties with 
progressive Arab leaders, believing that they represented 
the future. To this end, Kennedy viewed American policy 
toward the Arabs in terms of the same general principles 
that were to guide his approach to other parts of the 
Third World; a sympathetic understanding of nationalism 
as a driving force of ex-colonial peoples; acceptance of 
neutralism professed by the emerging nation-states; and 
advocacy of American support for development, reform and 
modernization as the best means to avoid extremism and 
assure stability in less developed societies (Lenczowski 
1990, 68).
Ironically, Kennedy's attempts to restore friendly 
ties with the so-called radical Arab states, and Egypt in
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particular, met only moderate initial success and 
eventually led to further distrust and irritation. 
Furthermore, attempts to encourage the radical camp to 
draw closer to the United States and to distance American 
policy from traditionalist regimes tested the limits of 
America's close identification with many of the 
conservative countries.
The Yemen crisis dealt a severe blow to Kennedy's 
optimistic belief that supporting the forces of change 
would lead to greater stability in the Middle East. On 
September 26, 1962, a coup d'etat led by Colonel Abdullah 
al-Sallal brought down the Yemen monarchy, forcing the new 
king. Imam Ahmed, to flee to the north, where he joined 
loyal tribesmen and launched a guerilla warfare against 
the newly declared republic. Nasser, who at the time was 
trying to export Egypt's revolution as a means to promote 
political unity among the Arab nations, felt that Egypt 
could not stand idly by while events unfolded in Yemen.
He sent troops to join forces with Sallal, causing the 
royalist governments in Saudi Arabia and Jordan to become 
concerned over their own security. Soon, the Saudi 
government was assisting the deposed king by offering 
refuge, supplies, money, arms and medicine. The Arab Cold 
War had developed to such a degree that major players from 
each side, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were engaging in a form
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of conflict by proxy, the primary battlefield being Yemen. 
On occasion, however, the conflict manifested itself into 
direct fighting between Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Lenczowski 
1990, 80).
When it became apparent that the war and subsequent 
foreign intervention threatened to engulf a larger area, 
the United States, through its own diplomatic channels as 
well as those of the United Nations, sought an end to the 
conflict^® (Lenczowski 1990, 87). Ironically, the tide of 
events in Yemen widened the existing chasm in U.S.- 
Egyptian relations. Much to Kennedy's dismay, Nasser 
intensified his military involvement. By November 22, 
1963, when Kennedy was assassinated, little progress had 
been made toward disengagement. In fact, the fighting had 
actually gotten worse. Under Lyndon B. Johnson, the 
United States stopped diplomatic efforts to find a 
resolution to the civil war in Yemen. Soon UN efforts 
also subsided, leaving the matter to be handled by the 
Arab governments, whose efforts to find a peaceful 
solution also met with limited success^^ (Lenczowski 1990, 
87-88).
During Johnson's presidency, foreign affairs became 
increasingly dominated by the United States' growing 
involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Other important 
areas of the world, including the Middle East, competed
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unsuccessfully with Southeast Asia for the Johnson 
Administration's attention. America's position in the 
Middle East, already tenuous because of the contrasting 
signals sent by the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
Administrations, began to deteriorate rapidly in the face 
of two new crises, the dispute over Cyprus and the Arab- 
Israeli war of 1967 (Lenczowski 1990, 90).
President Johnson, who was not particularly 
experienced in foreign affairs in spite of having been 
Vice President for over two years, did not undertake any 
progreuns in the Middle East that differed significantly 
from Kennedy's policies. In general, his policies were 
characterized by attempts to cultivate relationships with 
the Northern tier (Iran, Turkey, Greece and Pakistan), 
fairly close relations with oil-producing Saudi Arabia and 
pro-Western Jordan; and continued attempts to improve 
relations with the so-called radical Arab regimes of 
Egypt, Syria and Iraq (Lenczowski 1990, 91). More 
significantly, Johnson's policies exhibited a very 
protective attitude toward Israel. In fact, the concept 
of using Israel as a strategic asset within the region was 
developed under Johnson (Lenczowski 1990, 115).
While the country was being drawn deeper into the 
quagmire of Vietnam, Johnson's attention was also heavily 
directed toward his ambitious domestic program, the Great
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Society. This left him largely unprepared to deal with 
the crisis which developed over the island of Cyprus^®.
On December 21, 1963, Greek Cypriots attacked a Turkish 
sector in the island's capital, Nicosia. Soon, the island 
was embroiled in a bitter civil war between the better 
armed Greek majority and the weaker Turkish minority. 
Concerned over the threat to the island's Turkish 
population, Turkey reacted swiftly, using both diplomatic 
and military measures (Lenczowski 1990, 93).
As the situation escalated during the following 
months, the challenge for American policy makers was to 
find a peaceful solution to the island's conflict while 
preventing a potential spillover of hostilities to Turkey 
and Greece. Moreover, the Johnson Administration sought 
to prevent the island of Cyprus, under its president. 
Archbishop Makarios, from aligning itself with the Soviet 
Union. The Cyprus crisis persisted for several years and 
tested the relationship between the United States and 
Turkey. By 1967, after several rounds of diplomatic 
efforts involving the guarantor powers, the United States, 
NATO, and eventually the United Nations, Cyrus Vance, 
acting as Johnson's special emissary, succeeded in 
"patching up" the conflict during a mediating mission 
(Lenczowski 1990, 104).
As events in the Cyprus crisis were unfolding, the
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dynamics of the Arab-Israeli dispute were leading toward a 
new outbreak in hostilities. During Johnson's presidency, 
the United States moved from a policy of supplying Israel 
with strictly defensive weapons to one of providing highly 
sophisticated offensive equipment (Rabin 1979, 64-5). The 
Arab-Israeli War of 1967 Ccune about as a result of long­
standing disputes which by the early 1960s were manifested 
by a disagreement over the use of water from the Jordan 
River. The inter-Arab dispute, or the "Arab Cold War," 
was also a contributing factor. In order to defend 
themselves against Nasser's aggressiveness, the moderate 
Arab regimes launched a ceunpaign directed toward 
discrediting the Egyptian leader by emphasizing his 
hypocrisy and cowardice in permitting the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF) to be stationed in Egypt since 1957 
while Israel vehemently refused to allow UNEF on Israeli 
soil. This prompted Nasser, on May 16, 1967, to insist 
that the UN withdraw its forces from the Egyptian-Israeli 
borders.
UN Secretary General U Thant decided to remove the 
entire UN force from the area. As the UN force departed 
from the Gulf of Aqaba in the Sinai Penninsula, Nasser 
proclaimed a blockade of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli 
shipping on May 22. Israeli leaders interpreted the 
blockade as an aggressive act that justified an armed
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Israeli response^^. Serious considerations were given to 
launching preemptive strikes against key Arab targets.
The duality of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle 
East under Johnson is particularly apparent in the 
American approach to the 1967 war. Lenczowski cites four 
broad features of this dualism. First, although they 
officially tried to dissuade Israel from launching a 
preemptive campaign against the Arab states, neither the 
president nor his cabinet members demonstrated clear 
resistance to Israeli intentions. Second, the American 
delegate to the United Nations, Ambassador Arthur 
Goldberg, took a position that was, if not pro-Israeli, at 
the very least ambivalent toward the evolving situation. 
Third, the United States never officially condemned the 
Israeli strikes once they did occur; instead. President 
Johnson labelled Nasser's insistence on the removal of UN 
forces from the Egyptian-Israeli border "illegal." 
Moreover, after the war, the President and Ambassador 
Goldberg adopted the position that a new peace settlement 
was required in lieu of a simple return to the conditions 
established in 1957 which were not "conducive to peace." 
This position can be interpreted as the prelude to support 
for Israel maintaining the territories occupied as a 
result of the war. Fourth, and perhaps most significant, 
in spite of having made a public declaration of an embargo
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against arms shipments to the Middle East, Johnson 
authorized the shipment to Israel of weapons systems along 
with associated parts and equipment in the days 
immediately preceding the war (Lenczowski 1990, 109-115),
Summary
Several key facets of the Arab-Israeli dispute in 
particular, and of the development of American foreign 
policy toward the Middle East, provide the context for a 
more incisive comparison of Mixon and Carter's policies.
By the time Richard Nixon took office, the Arab- 
Israeli dispute had been simmering for decades, 
periodically reaching the boiling point. Several wars had 
been fought, including one precipitated by the creation of 
the state of Israel itself. In fact, after the war in 
1967, the "status quo" had become one of repeated clashes 
punctuating a state of neither peace nor war. The issues 
separating the two sides were not simply geopolitical or 
economic, but highly emotionally charged. The devastating 
losses incurred by the Arabs in June 1967 had a tremendous 
psychological impact on the Arab people who began to 
incorporate the desire to remove the stigma of cowardice 
and failure associated with these losses into their own 
collective sense of identity. The Israeli collective 
identity revolved around a staunch instinct for survival, 
which after 1967 became linked to the notion that loss of
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the occupied territories would place Israel in grave 
danger.
Initial American involvement in the Middle East was 
somewhat distanced from the Arab-Israeli dispute and was 
based largely on the principles of non-intervention, 
protection of private interests, and freedom of trade. 
During the inter-war period, religious and cultural 
interests began to carry less influence in the face of a 
growing competition between the United States and Britain 
for Middle East oil. Soon protection of private 
interests, including economic concerns, gave way to the 
belief that Middle East oil was vital to American national 
interests.
Meanwhile, the worldwide Zionist Movement was gaining 
momentum. Increasing pressure was directed toward the 
United States and Britain to support the creation of a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine. Under Wilson, the United 
States was perceived as having made a moral commitment to 
the Jewish homeland in the form of support for the Balfour 
declaration. As U.S. policy moved toward more specific 
commitments to the Jewish state, conflicting interests 
fostered the development of a Middle Eastern policy that, 
lacking clear direction and focus, suffered from a 
distinct identity crisis. Under Wilson, this crisis 
manifested itself in the desire to support the creation of
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Israel but the inability to clearly reconcile this desire 
with moral commitments to support the self-determination 
of the Arab people.
World War II served as a turning point for U.S.
Middle Eastern policy. Great Britain, exhausted by the 
war, began to decrease its involvement in the region. As 
the extent of the atrocities committed by Hitler against 
Jews became more apparent, the Zionists gained the 
sympathy of the world community. American Zionists 
coalesced into a stronger, more focused organization and 
began an intensive campaign designed to compel the United 
States to support the creation of Israel. In spite of 
growing pressure. President Roosevelt emerged from World 
War II determined to shape a more internationalist policy 
for the United States. His chief concern was to protect 
American interests while preserving Allied unity.
Under President Truman, concern over Soviet expansion 
led to the increased application of the policy of 
containment in the Middle East as well as in other areas 
of the world. Pressure from American Zionists led 
Truman's advisers to urge the President to support the 
creation of Israel in order to avoid the potentially 
devastating political implications of alienating American 
Jews. During this period, a growing disagreement between 
the White House and the State Department became more
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apparent. While the former seemed to lean more toward 
satisfying Jewish interests, the latter worried about the 
implications for American interests if the country were to 
lose access to Arab oil. Truman eventually decided to 
support the creation of Israel and, by recognizing the 
newly formed state, committed the United States to the 
notion of Israel's legitimacy.
This commitment placed successive presidents in the 
position of having to deal with any immediate crises that 
developed in the region while at the same time trying to 
reconcile two diametrically opposed interests, the well­
being of Israel and American access to oil. The pendulum 
that had been swinging back and forth between conflicting 
impulses continued to swing erratically, without the 
predictability or cadence that might enable American 
Middle East policy to stabilize and grow.
President Eisenhower remained committed to the 
protection of national interests in the region, 
particularly oil interests. Above all, he was deeply 
concerned over the threat of Soviet expansion into what he 
perceived as a vital area of the world. When the Suez 
Crisis erupted and during the diplomacy that followed, 
Eisenhower attempted to maintain an impartial approach to 
the Arab-Israeli dispute. In fact, his impartiality often 
angered both sides. During his presidency, a chasm
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developed which separated the Arab states into two major 
camps, one with a radical orientation, the other more 
conservative.
John F. Kennedy sought to change the basic flavor of 
U.S. Middle Eastern policy. In particular, he hoped to 
decrease the tendency for the United States to be 
identified with efforts to maintain the status quo in the 
region. Instead, he believed that by accommodating the 
forces of change, very often associated with the so- 
called radical regimes, he would be able to foster the 
stability necessary to help the region grow. To this end, 
he hoped to improve diplomatic relations with Egypt which, 
in the wake of the Suez crisis, had been drawing visibly 
closer to the Soviet Union. In spite of President 
Kennedy's efforts, relations with Egypt and other radical 
Arab states did not improve. Moreover, relations with 
conservative countries such as Saudi Arabia became 
strained by Kennedy's attempts to distance American 
foreign policy from the traditional powers.
To a large extent, Lyndon B. Johnson continued the 
policies of his predecessor. Under Johnson, however, a 
more protective attitude toward Israel emerged, along with 
the concept of using the country as a strategic ally in 
the region. Accordingly, American policy moved away from 
shipping purely defensive weapons toward one of supplying
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Israel with more offensive systems. Meanwhile, Johnson 
pursued a policy which outwardly appeared to encourage 
military restraint, while covertly supporting the Israeli 
decision to launch a preemptive strike against the Arab 
states in what would become known as the Six Day War of 
June 1967. American prestige among the Arab countries 
declined considerably during Johnson's presidency while 
Soviet influence reached new heights, especially cunong the 
Egyptians and Syrians who began collecting Soviet military 
equipment in preparation for the opportunity remove the 
taint of their soiled military reputations.
Thus, the legacy left for Nixon and Carter by their 
predecessors was a Middle East policy that was 
increasingly complex, yet poorly defined; that was 
expected to cope with long standing disputes, yet was 
continually plagued by immediate crisis; and that was 
subject to pressures from domestic sources, yet 
increasingly crucial in terms of international, 
geopolitical considerations.
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CHAPTER 3
THE HIZOH ADNIHISTRATIOH
As I anticipated becoming President,
I found that I was awed by the prospect 
but not fearful of it. I felt prepared.
I had the advantage of experience and of 
the detachment that comes from being out 
of office. The 'wilderness years' had 
been years of education and growth...I 
had no illusions about either the difficulty 
of the challenge or about my ability to meet 
it. I felt I knew what would not work. On 
the other hand, I was less sure what would 
work. 1 did not have all the answers. But 
I did have definite ideas about the changes 
I felt were needed (Nixon 1978, 361).
Richard Nixon's journey to the White House was long 
and arduous, yet it was also replete with opportunities to 
gain valuable foreign policy experience. As a young 
congressman in 1947, he travelled to Europe with the 
Herter Committee to prepare a report in connection with 
Secretary of State George C. Marshall's foreign aid plan. 
The committee found a continent "tottering on the brink of 
starvation and chaos." Without American aid, the 
committee believed that "Europe would very likely fall 
into a state of anarchy and revolution, ultimately moving 
closer to communism" (Nixon 1978, 49).
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In his memoirs, Nixon credits his work on the Herter 
Committee with having taught him valuable lessons about 
why communism became such a powerful force in postwar 
Europe. First, the communist leaders were strong, 
vigorous and intelligent, whereas most of democratic 
Europe was lacking in strong leadership. Second, they 
understood the power of nationalism and knew how to 
channel it to their advantage. Third, the European 
communist parties were well financed by the Soviets (Nixon 
1978, 52).
As was the case with many of his contemporaries, 
anti-communism became the motif of Nixon's early political 
career. In 1950, he was elected to the Senate, after a 
heated contest with Helen Gahagan Douglass. The key 
issues of the campaign dealt with foreign policy and 
internal security. Each candidate asserted that the 
other's voting record in the House demonstrated more 
support for Communist policies (Nixon 1978, 76-7).
In the spring of 1953, then Vice President Nixon and 
his wife, Pat, embarked on a major diplomatic trip through 
Asia and the Far East, including New Zealand, Australia, 
Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Formosa,
Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Burma, and Pakistan. This 
trip was followed by several others, as President 
Eisenhower relied heavily on his Vice President to help
80
establish and maintain an active foreign policy. This 
extensive foreign travel allowed Nixon to become familiar 
with vital regions throughout the world, while 
establishing contacts with major world leaders. More 
importantly, the Vice President formulated very specific 
opinions regarding the role the United States should play 
in world affairs.
Context
...I was determined to avoid the trap 
Johnson had fallen into, of devoting 
virtually all my foreign policy time 
and energy to Vietnam, which was really 
a short-term problem. I felt that failing 
to deal with the longer-term problems 
could be devastating to America's security 
and survival, and in this regard, I talked 
about restoring the vitality of the NATO 
alliance, and about the Middle East, the 
Soviet Union and Japan. Finally, I metioned 
my concern about the need to re-evaluate our 
policy toward Communist China...
(Nixon 1978, 340-1).
Nixon's perception of American foreign policy during 
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations was that it had 
been "held hostage," first to the Cold War and then to the 
conflict in Vietnam. American policy-makers had succumbed 
to the trap of allowing themselves to become preoccupied 
with only one or two problems at a time. This, according 
to Nixon, had led to a deterioration of policy on all 
levels. To remedy the situation, he sought to use a
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different approach. Instead of identifying any single 
foreign policy priority, he sought to fashion his policy 
around several priorities, "moving in tandem, each 
affecting the others" (Nixon 1978, 343).
Since he would have to start somewhere, however, he 
placed Europe at the top of his list. By bolstering NATO, 
he hoped to establish a position of strength from which 
meaningful dialogue could then be opened with the Soviets. 
In the Far East, relations with Japan, a nation well on 
its way to becoming an economic force to reckon with, had 
become strained. Nixon attributed this primarily to 
doubts about the credibility of America's defense 
commitments. American control of the island of Okinawa 
exacerbated the growing problem. As for China, Nixon was 
disturbed by the "gulf of twenty years of noncommunication 
that had separated the world's most populous nation from 
the world's most powerful nation" (Nixon 1978, 343).
Thus, he intended to re-evaluate America's policy toward 
China, with the goal of establishing meaningful diplomatic 
relations.
The situation in the Middle East had become 
particularly volatile by the end of the Johnson 
Administration. As Nixon waited to take office, he noted 
that the "already explosive area" had been transformed 
into "an international powder keg, that, when it exploded.
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might lead not only to another war between Israel and its 
neighbors, but also to a direct confrontation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union" (Nixon 1978, 343). 
Israel's preemptive strikes during the Six Day War of June 
1967 had led to an uneasy truce with her Arab neighbors, a 
peace which was continually interrupted by intermittent 
fighting carried out under Nasser's "War of Attrition^."
In order to assure the continued survival of Israel, the 
United States seemed committed to providing the country 
with a continued supply of arms. Meanwhile, Egypt and 
Syria, Israel's main antagonists, had begun receiving 
Soviet arms. This superpower rivalry in the bitter Arab- 
Israeli dispute was cause for grave concern.
To better deal with potential crises in the Middle 
East, as well as in other regions throughout the world, 
Nixon announced his plan to overhaul the country's foreign 
policy machinery, primarily by reviving the power of the 
National Security Council (NSC). In his view, the council 
had been forced to remain dormant for too long. Nixon 
intended to make it the central decision-making instrument 
of his administration, using a modified version of the 
staff system used by Eisenhower. Through regularly 
conducted meetings, the council would discuss major 
foreign policy issues, anticipating potential crises and 
developing a full range of options for each contingency.
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Henry A. Kissinger, as Nixon's National Security Adviser, 
would be charged with preparing the agenda for these 
meetings. Kissinger and his staff would also be expected 
to maintain effective lines of communication between major 
governmental officials and the White House, providing the 
President with a carefully structured forum in which to 
deliberate foreign policy issues with access to top 
advisers^. Many analysts regard the foreign policy-making 
apparatus that Kissinger designed to fulfill these 
functions as "by far the most centralized and highly 
structured model yet employed by any president" (George 
1980, 114).
Nixon came to office determined to exert his control 
over the vast foreign policy bureaucracy. The NSC gave 
Nixon an effective means of educating the bureaucracy 
concerning the new themes of his foreign policy, and of 
keeping himself abreast of developments throughout the 
world. Shortly after assuming office. President Nixon 
requested an unprecedented number of policy studies.
These came primarily in the form of National Security 
Study Memoranda (NSSM), that were first discussed by the 
Interdepartmental Group (later called the Senior Review 
Group), then referred to the entire NSC for deliberation. 
Once a decision was made, a National Security Decision 
Memorandum (NSDM) would be issued (Quandt 1977, 73).
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Kissinger designed a novel system containing six 
committees that operated out of the NSC. These included 
the Senior Review Group (responsible for general policy 
issues), the Vietnam Special Studies Group, The Washington 
Special Actions Group (responsible for dealing with 
international crises), the Defense Programs Review 
Committee, the Verification Committee (responsible for 
strategic arms talks), and the 40 Committee (responsible 
for covert action). Each of these committees was chaired 
by Kissinger. The Senior Review Group was further 
compartmentalized into six lower-level departmental groups 
organized on a regional basis and headed by an assistant 
secretary of state. Thus, Kissinger's span of control 
reached not only into the realm of his own staff, but into 
key departments and agencies, including the State 
Department itself^ (George 1980, 114).
Those within Kissinger's staff who dealt with Middle 
Eastern policy included his deputy, Alexander Haig, two 
special assistants, Peter Rodman and Winston Lord, and his 
senior Middle East specialist, Harold H. Saunders. Joseph 
Sisco served as the Assistant Secretary of State for the 
Near East and South Asia. A Democrat, Sisco had developed 
his knowledge of Middle East affairs while serving in 
Washington. In fact, he had never been assigned overseas. 
Alfred "Roy" Atherton worked closely with Sisco, first as
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office director for Israel and Arab-Israeli affairs, and 
later as deputy assistant secretary for the Near East. 
Nixon appointed a close personal friend, William P.
Rogers, to be his Secretary of State. A lawyer, Rogers 
had been Eisenhower's attorney general, and was not 
particularly experienced in foreign affairs (Quandt 1977, 
73-74).
In spite of his desire to conduct foreign affairs 
from the standpoint of a more global orientation, with a 
catalogue of priorities that would necessarily be adjusted 
according to the prevailing circumstances, Nixon himself 
was forced to admit that the "most pressing problem [he] 
would face as soon as [he] became President was the war in 
Vietnam" (Nixon 1978, 347). The seemingly hopeless 
entanglement in southeast Asia had seriously damaged 
American confidence, destroyed consensus over the 
direction that foreign policy should pursue, and 
threatened to erode American resolve concerning the 
importance of playing an active leadership role in world 
affairs. Each of these outcomes, especially the last, 
could potentially cripple Nixon's foreign policy before he 
was able to make the fresh start that he envisioned. 
Moreover, Vietnam had been a major issue during the 
election campaign. Disentanglement was, in many respects, 
a vital pre-condition to generating and maintaining the
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degree of support he would need to carry out his foreign 
policy agenda.
To this end, secret negotiations were initiated in 
Paris between Kissinger and representatives from North 
Vietncun. Simultaneously, a reduction in American forces 
in Vietnam was begun, with the eventual goal of a complete 
military withdrawal. Nixon justified this new policy of 
restraint and withdrawal on July 25, 1969 in a speech 
given on the island of Guam during a tour of Asia. In 
what has become known as the Nixon Doctrine, the President 
stated:
I believe the time has come when the United 
States, in our relations with all of our 
Asian friends, [should] be quite emphatic 
on two points: one, that we will keep our
treaty commitments, for example, with 
Thailand under SEATO; but two, that as far 
as the problems of internal security are 
concerned, as far as the problem of 
military defense, except for the threat of 
a major power, involving nuclear weapons, 
that the United States is going to encourage 
and has the right to expect that this problem 
will be increasingly handled by, and the 
responsibility for it taken by, the Asian 
nations themselves*.
The Nixon Doctrine was specifically directed toward 
Vietnam, but it was applicable to other regions, including 
the Persian Gulf, which since the middle of the nineteenth 
century, had been traditionally defended by Great Britain. 
Like the Suez Canal, the Gulf was considered important as
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a means of gaining access from Britain to India. The 
region consisted of three larger countries, Iran, Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia, and several smaller countries including 
Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman, who were 
too weak to protect themselves from a "determined 
aggressive power" (Lenczowski 1990, 118).
In 1968, Great Britain formally announced its 
intention to withdraw from the Gulf, granting independence 
to the smaller states in the region. This generated 
concern over potential tribal disputes and, more 
importantly, over the "power vacuum" that was likely to 
develop, making the smaller states more susceptible to 
potential Soviet infiltration^. Russia might be tempted 
to expand its influence in the Gulf by conquering several 
of the weaker states, or by simply forming alliances in 
the hopes of establishing bases within close prioximity to 
pro-Western and oil-producing countries such as Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. While Britain prepared to relinquish its 
imperial status in the region and to withdraw its military 
forces by the end of 1971, the question arose as to who 
would be both willing and able to replace Britain as the 
"guardian of the Gulf" (Lenczowski 1990, 118).
American policy-makers faced a dilemma. Although not 
completely dependent upon Persian Gulf oil, American 
interests would best be served by preventing the region
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from falling under Soviet control, if only to ensure that 
allies in Western Europe and Japan, who did depend heavily 
upon Persian Gulf oil, would not lose access to the 
region's reserves. However, caught in the process of 
trying to extricate American manpower and resources from 
Vietnam, officials were leary of involving the United 
States militarily in another region. Under the guidelines 
of the Nixon Doctrine, a more palatable solution was to 
find a country within the Persian Gulf which would assume 
responsibility for the area's defense.
Iran, with adequate manpower and a vested interest in 
preventing Soviet domination in the region, fit the bill. 
However, officials in the State Department feared that the 
Soviets would become alarmed, and perhaps even provoked to 
action, if a neighboring country such as Iran were to 
begin a considerable military build-up. For his part, the 
Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, had come to regard "the Gulf 
as a natural sphere of influence®." During a March 19, 
1969, interview with the New York Times, he announced his 
opposition to United States retention of the naval 
facilities on Bahrein Island after the British 
withdrawal^. Moreover, he insisted that the Persian Gulf 
states be permitted to handle their own problems without 
any attempts by the great powers to fill the vacuum 
created by the British withdrawal®. Determined to assume
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the role of protector within the Gulf, the Shah pressed 
Washington to provide the arms needed to bolster his 
military capability, announcing that if he could not get 
the desired military equipment from the United States, he 
would turn to the Soviet Union.
Defense Department officials were reluctant to 
provide Iran with technologically advanced weapons because 
they could potentially be captured and exploited. After 
initial hesitation, however, the decision was made to 
support Iran in its move to take on the guardian role in 
the Persian Gulf (Lenczowski 1990, 118). Iran's military 
capability was steadily built up "under a billion-dollar 
defense program quietly underwritten by the United States 
and Britain®." In July 1971, negotiations were underway 
between Tehran and Washington for $140-million more in 
1971 credits. This was in addition to $220-million worth 
of aircraft purchases during the preceding two years.
By 1975, when the build-up was expected to be 
completed, Iran would be a major Middle East power, and, 
American officials hoped, a source of stability in the 
region. The modernization and expansion of the country's 
air, land and sea forces would include 135 F-4 Phantoms to 
complement existing F-3 and F-86 squadrons^®, 1,500 
American and British made tanks, over 200 helicopters, 
four 1,200-ton frigates, eight 10-ton armored hovercraft.
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four 50-ton armored hovercraft, and several new air and 
naval bases^^.
The Shah reportedly believed that the key to ensuring 
stability in the region depended on developing a highly 
mobile modern force. In spite of American and British 
assistance, this military “build-up proved to be a major 
drain on Iran's foreign currency reserves. Between 1965 
and 1970, Iranian arms purchases on credit totaled $1.6- 
billion, with $l-billion more expected in 1971 and 1972^^.
Concern over Soviet intentions in the Middle East 
heightened as the British prepared to pull out of the 
area^®. Soviet intentions toward the Middle East during 
this time frame, particularly just prior to the October 
War of 1973, have been subjected to close scrutiny. While 
western scholars are largely in agreement that the Soviets 
did not want another war to break out in the Middle East, 
the literature is divided over whether Soviet leaders 
genuinely tried to foster peace in the region (Breslauer 
1983, 65). In fact, a broad range of interpretations has 
emerged, running the gamut from one position which 
contends that the Soviets preferred to perpetuate the 
status quo of "no war, no peace," to the contrasting view 
that Soviet diplomats sincerely hoped to establish a 
superpower collaborative effort directed toward ending the 
Arab-Israeli conflict^* (Breslauer 1983, 65).
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What is particularly interesting about these 
interpretations is the fact that they are so markedly 
different. Moreover, as Breslauer points out, they do not 
address one another; one author rejects the argument of 
another without even examining the premises upon which the 
argument is based. Breslauer's interpretation not only 
considers other views, but actually incorporates them. In 
essence, he proposes a synthesis of the "no war, no peace" 
hypothesis and the view that the Soviets were committed to 
a peace settlement. He suggests that the Soviet Union was 
a collaborative competitor, "seeking to play the 
competitive game in the Middle East while simultaneously 
attempting to collaborate with the United States in ways 
that would nudge the local actors toward an armed peace" 
(Breslauer 1983, 69). Thus, the Soviets were interested 
in promoting a peace settlement, but not at the expense of 
their own influence in the region. Breslauer develops an 
insightful case study in which he demonstrates that the 
Soviets were willing to pursue a Middle East peace 
settlement "based on superpower collaboration, that would 
simultaneously reduce the probability of military 
confrontation with the United States...advance the cause 
of detente, and create a more stable base of influence for 
the USSR in Middle Eastern affairs." Soviet actions 
between 1967 and 1972 indicate their belief that such
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terms would work to the advantage of their interests, 
regionally and globally (Breslauer 1983, 96).
Breslauer's argument is not only compelling, it 
raises the possibility that Soviet actions with regard to 
the Middle East have been misinterpreted by the scholars 
who have since studied this critical time period, and more 
importantly, by key players within the Nixon 
Administration, particularly the president and Kissinger. 
An examination of Nixon and Kissinger's perception of 
Soviet intentions toward the region provides a great deal 
of insight into the foreign policy choices they made^®.
A recurring theme, interwoven within the pages of 
Nixon's memoirs, reveals his unwavering belief that an 
Arab-Israeli war would inevitably lead to confrontation 
with the Soviet Union^®. Yet, as Lenczowski suggests, 
"nowhere in his writings or public statements did Nixon 
subject [this likelihood] to careful scrutiny or 
analysis." Furthermore, Nixon tended to oversimplify, or 
perhaps even to distort, the actual origins of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict by accepting the premise that the Soviets 
were directly causing Middle East tensions. Yet, as 
Chapter 2 demonstrated, the roots of the Arab-Israeli 
dilemma had a much deeper history, reaching back at least 
to the establishment of Israel, after years of uneasy 
relations between Arabs and Jews, the subsequent
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displacement of thousands of Palestinian Arabs, and the 
series of bitter wars that had been fought since.
The Soviets were indeed making inroads into the 
region, thereby potentially complicating the task of 
finding a Middle East peace settlement, but they were not 
the root cause of the conflict. In fact, Lenczowski 
further suggests that Mixon's view simply "reflected his 
uncritical acceptance of Israel's political line."
Israel's leaders found that by emphasizing the theme of 
Soviet mischief as the underlying cause of the seemingly 
endless conflict, they could count more readily on Mixon's 
support (Lenczowski 1990, 120-21). In time, Mixon became 
convinced that the United States had "an absolute 
commitment...to prevent Israel from being driven into the 
sea" (Mixon 1978, 481; 483).
Mixon's acceptance of Israel's "political line" 
highlights a very interesting aspect of US-Soviet 
competition in the Middle East. The regional actors were 
well aware of it, and perfectly willing to use it to their 
advantage. This was the case when the Shah of Iran 
indicated he would turn to the Soviets if the United 
States proved unwilling to meet his weapons requirements, 
and when Masser "struck a sensitive chord in Soviet 
leaders by threatening to resign in favor of a pro-United 
States government" in January 1970^^ (Breslauer 1983, 81).
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While decision-makers were struggling with the issue 
of who would fill the void left by the withdrawal of 
British forces from the Persian Gulf, the dynamics of the 
Arab-Israeli dispute were undergoing critical changes that 
ultimately led to another conflict. The devastating 
losses incurred by Arabs in June 1967 had had a tremendous 
psychological impact on the Arab people (Aker 1985, 20). 
When Anwar Sadat became the Egyptian president in 1970, 
the mood of his people "reflected a desire to remove the 
stigma of cowardice and military ineptness left over from 
the Six Day War" (Shazly, 1980: 222). Clashes along the 
Suez Canal were becoming commonplace. Arab deployments 
were regularly mounted to fulfill three purposes. First, 
as harassment in order to prevent or delay the 
construction of military installations on land taken by 
the Israelis in 1967; second, to repeatedly frighten 
Israel into full scale alerts— taking people away from 
their regular jobs, forcing extra defense expenditures and 
causing Israeli leaders to lose credibility; finally, 
these measures were employed to generate a false sense of 
confidence in Israels' defenses, while the Arabs quietly 
prepared to attack. (Aker 1985, 9)
Equipment that had been lost in 1967 was replaced 
with more modern Soviet armament, and integrated air 
defense systems were installed in both Egypt and Syria to
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prevent ground troops from ever again having to be at the 
mercy of Israeli aircraft, as they had been in 1967. 
Regularly scheduled maneuvers were conducted, well within 
view of Israeli observers, and designed to appear as 
completely defensive tactics. Meanwhile, offensive 
maneuvers were practiced at designated hidden locations 
with simulated Israeli targets, "including a mock-up of 
the Suez Canal itself" (Aker 1985, 10). Egyptian 
aircraft were placed in Soviet-designed hangarettes to 
prevent heavy losses from air strikes. These miniature 
hangars were fortified to lessen the effects of bomb 
blasts, and ceunmouflaged to look like hills, complicating 
visual acquisition from the air as well as intelligence 
gathering activities (Katz 1973, 10). Advanced Soviet 
bridging vehicles were assembled to facilitate the 
impending assault accross the Suez. Specific plans had 
not yet been made, however, Arab preparations continued in 
the fervid belief that it was just a matter of time before 
their offensive began. These preparations reflected an 
intense desire to profit from the costly lessons of the 
Six Day War. As time passed, the Arab people became 
increasingly impatient, to wipe the taint off their soiled 
collective military reputation, and to test the 
effectiveness of the improved armament they had been 
receiving from the Soviets.
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As in the Arab case, psychological factors were a 
strong motivating force for the Israelis. Virtually 
surrounded by belligerent nations, Israel had been 
fighting the Arabs, in formal conflicts and in border 
skirmishes, for more than two decades. Whereas the Arab 
identity had become heavily tied to regaining the 
territory and self-esteem lost in 1967, the Israeli 
identity revolved around the instinct for survival. Loss 
of any given conflict carried high stakes, perhaps the 
very destruction of the Jewish state. The desire for 
collective security thus became the steel band which held 
the nation together, and had a marked influence on the 
official posture of Israel. Because of what they 
perceived as Arab "obstinacy," the Israelis believed they 
must establish and maintain completely defensible borders, 
a goal which was better served by retaining the 
territories under dispute.
Relations with Jordan were considered to be 
relatively secure. This made the extensive deployment of 
Israeli forces and the construction of defensive 
installations along the Jordanian border a low priority.
In fact, it was deemed unnecessary. The situation along 
the Syrian border was another matter. The loss of the 
Golan Heights had deprived Syria of one of its best 
locations for shelling northern Israeli settlements.
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Several measures were taken to prevent this strategic area 
from being retaken. Small villages which had once been 
inhabited by Arabs were left deserted. Fortified Jewish 
settlements were established to serve as a deterrent to 
guerillas. Finally, a collection of antitank obstacles 
was built, consisting of mine fields, a line of reinforced 
concrete bunkers, and fixed tank emplacements with 
overlapping fields of fire. There were only four roads 
from this area into Israel (Aker 1985, 6).
In the Sinai, terrain characteristics were used to 
augment man-made deterrents. Massive sand ramparts, which 
were high enough to stop armored vehicles, were built 
along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. A series of 
fortifications was then built a short distance from these 
ramparts to enable the Israelis to maintain a constant 
surveillance of the Egyptian side with minimal exposure to 
the artillery barrages which had become quite frequent. 
This line of fortifications was rebuilt three times, 
becoming stronger and larger with each reconstruction. It 
became known as the Bar-Lev Line, after its creator. 
General Bar-Lev^® (Aker 1985, 7).
The cost of building and maintaining the defenses 
adjacent to the canal was over $90 million. An additional 
$150 million was spent constructing roads to protect and 
supply these installations. There were two major roads
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which paralleled the canal, running north and south. The 
rest of the road complex was sparse, but vital, since 
"whoever controlled the roads would dominate the entire 
peninsula" (Aker 1985, 8). In spite of the extensive 
measures and enormous expenditures devoted to defense, 
Israel still sustained significant casualties along the 
Egyptian border, especially after 1969. In that year, 
construction of an electronic distant-early warning system 
was begun in the Sinai's central mountain mountain ridges. 
The intent was to use this sophisticated equipment (heat 
sensors, infrared photo scopes, seismic detectors and 
magnetic sensors) to scan the desert for hostile 
activityl9.
The state of Israel was a virtual fortress. Safe and 
secure inside strong defensive "walls," the country 
developed a strategic concept of attack. Any Arab state 
that became too arrogant faced the threat of an air attack 
from Israel's powerful air force. On the ground, punitive 
campaigns were launched into adjacent territories to 
subdue Arab governments that threatened to get out of 
hand. The Israelis knew that Egypt and Syria had been 
successful in securing Soviet arms, but when Russian and 
Czech advisers were ejected from Egypt in July 1972, 
Israeli analysts determined that Egypt would be unable to 
handle newly acquired sophisticated equipment without
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Soviet assistance^®. This led to estimates that attack 
from Egypt would be highly improbable before late 1975. 
Intelligence reports further indicated that increased 
military activity that had been observed was of a 
defensive rather than an offensive nature. The Israelis 
developed a self-image of invulnerability which was 
closely linked to the belief that the territory gained in 
1967 provided secure borders.
Michael Brecher's account of the 1967 and 1973 wars 
provides further insight into why Israel let its guard 
down, leaving itself vulnerable to surprise attack. He 
attributes this largely to a "shared psychological setting 
among Israel's decision-makers and advisers during the 
1973 pre-crisis period." Two factors combined to make up 
this setting. The first was a pervasive general 
definition of the situation, which Brecher calls the 
"Conception." Two "pillars" formed the foundation of the 
Conception: (1) Egypt would not launch an attack against
Israel unless it had superior air power, that is, 
sufficient to attack Israel in depth and dislocate its Air 
Force and principal air fields; (2) Syria would not 
initiate a war against Israel unless Egypt were actively 
involved. Therefore, the Arabs would not attack Israel. 
Misperceptions underlying these assumptions, about Arab 
capabilities, the regional balance of power and the
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security provided by the occupied territories, increased 
the Israeli propensity to discount the possibility of 
attack (Brecher 1980, 55).
In time, the belief that Egypt would not launch an 
attack until it had the capability to project its air 
power well into Israel beceune transformed into an Israeli 
dogma, a "truth" which was reinforced considerably when 
Sadat's "Year of Decision" (1971) came and went without 
Egyptian action. Sadat's failure to follow through with 
his announcement that Egypt would resort to war if 
diplomatic channels continued to yield little progress 
convinced Israel's military and political officials that 
future verbal threats need not be taken seriously. 
Moreover, the Israeli intelligence community failed to 
distinguish between all-out war and war conducted for 
limited political objectives. This eventually diminished 
their capability to discriminate genuine signals, clues 
that indicated an adversary's intentions, from background 
noise. In fact. Chief of Staff David Elazar wrote in May 
1975 that the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) Intelligence 
Branch had received over 400 significant items pointing to 
the possibility of war. Most of these were not brought to 
his attention, however, until after hostilities had 
begun^l.
Like Israel, Washington was caught off guard by the
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outbreak of hostilities on October 6, 1973. Officials did 
have some advance notice, however. At approximately 6:00 
A.M. Washington time, a flash cable arrived from the 
American Embassy in Tel Aviv indicating that Israel had 
conclusive evidence that the Egyptians and Syrians planned 
to attack by Noon (Washington time). The message included 
Prime Minister Meir's assurance that Israel would restrain 
from launching a preemptive strike, along with a request 
that American diplomacy be directed toward avoiding war. 
Last minute attempts to avoid hostilities proved 
fruitless. The first indications of fighting were 
received at approximately 8:00 A.M., four hours before 
Israel's estimate (Quandt 1977, 166).
Interestingly, American officials were also privy to 
several earlier indications that the Arabs were moving 
closer to war, including information regarding Egyptian 
military training maneuvers, and a warning from Soviet 
General Secretary Breshnev in June that the Arabs were 
determined to fight. In spite of these indications, 
intelligence estimates continued to report that "there 
were no clear signs of impending hostilities" (Quandt 
1977, 168). Kissinger did, however, become sufficiently 
concerned to request the development of a new contingency 
plan for coping with the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, 
The plan was not completed when war broke out (Quandt
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1977, 167).
The October War of 1973 marked a critical turning 
point in the Nixon Administration's approach to the Middle 
East. In fact, several aspects of American policy prior 
to 1973 may have actually fueled Arab frustrations and 
indirectly reinforced the Arab decision to resort to war. 
Thus, it is important to understand Nixon and Kissinger's 
foreign policy goals, in general, and with respect to the 
Middle East.
Foreign Policy Objectives
As they worked for disengagement in Vietnam, Nixon 
and Kissinger focused their foreign policy toward 
relations with the other major powers, particularly the 
Soviet Union. The possibility of nuclear war uppermost in 
their minds, both men were drawn toward developing a 
policy they felt would help to ensure global stability and 
minimize the potential for superpower confrontation by 
establishing a new relationship with the Soviet Union 
(Quandt 1977, 76-77). During the Nixon Administration, 
the relatively tight bipolar structure which had 
characterized the 1950s and 1960s began to give way to a 
looser multipolar arrangement. It was within this context 
that Nixon and Kissinger fashioned far-reaching objectives 
for American foreign policy.
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Although their program is often referred to as 
"detente," their goal went far beyond the traditional 
meaning, "a relaxation of tensions," to encompass an even 
more ambitious objective. Nixon and Kissinger "wanted to 
build the foundation— or at least an important part of the 
foundation— for a new international system" (Craig and 
George 1990, 135). They believed that the only countries 
who could realistically be expected to participate were 
the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). Japan was a major industrial 
state, but its emergence as a potential military power was 
neither desireable nor feasible. Western Europe already 
possessed considerable military capabilities, but relied 
heavily on the United States for military support. 
Furthermore, Western European political integration 
remained an obstacle that would have to be overcome before 
the region could take the part of a unitary actor in an 
international system. In light of these assessments,
Nixon and Kissinger sought an alternative to the classic 
five-power balance-of-power system.
The foundation upon which this alternative was to be 
built involved engaging the Soviet Union and the PRC, two 
"archrivals," in a process of detente and accommodation in 
order to moderate the threat to the United States' world 
position posed by either states' policies. More than just
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establishing a triangular relationship, Nixon and 
Kissinger hoped to secure a unique middle position which 
would allow the United States to play the two communist 
countries against one another, gaining the leverage needed 
to protect American interests and to actually induce the 
Soviet Union and the PRC to cooperate with American 
policies. If one appeared reluctant to go along, the 
United States would simply appear to "tilt" its position 
in favor of the other (Craig and George 1990, 135).
In fact, the major impetus behind Nixon's efforts to 
improve relations with China was the desire to gain the 
leverage needed to enable the United States to cultivate a 
more productive relationship with the Soviet Union, which 
was considered to pose the greater potential threat. The 
strategy used by Nixon and Kissinger to draw the Soviet 
Union into a more amicable relationship consisted of four 
major components. First, President Nixon formally 
recognized, in several symbolic ways, that the Soviet 
Union was entitled to the same superpower status as the 
United States. The Russians had been trying to gain this 
sort of prestige since the end of World War II. By 
elevating the Soviet Union to a level of political 
equality, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to foster a 
relationship that would be more conducive to productive 
relations between the two countries.
105
Second, the plan included a conditional willingness 
to accede to the Soviet Union's desire for foinnal 
recognition of divided Europe. Third, Nixon's detente 
strategy sought to promote further mutual cooperation 
between the two superpowers via a series of formal 
agreements offering economic and technical assistance to 
the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger were actually 
willing to make concessions to the Soviets in the economic 
sphere because they believed these agreements would 
eventually create a "web of incentives" that would 
motivate Soviet leaders to exercise constraint in their 
efforts to gain influence in other areas at the expense of 
the United States (Craig and George 1990, 138).
Fourth, Nixon and Kissinger hoped detente would yield 
the long-term benefit of "a new set of norms and rules for 
competition between the two superpowers" (Craig and George 
1990, 138). Crisis prevention was one of the most 
important objectives of the detente policy. In May 1972, 
Nixon and Breshnev signed the Basic Principles Agreement 
during their first summit meeting in Moscow. This 
document presented basic "rules of conduct" that were 
intended to regulate the global competition of the two 
superpowers. The vague language used in the agreement, 
however, coupled with differing perceptions of detente's 
overarching purpose, actually widened the rift between the
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two countries. Soviet leaders tended to associate detente 
primarily with avoiding conflicts that increased the 
danger of war between the two superpowers. Nixon and 
Kissinger's conception went beyond this to include 
emphasis on crisis prevention in those instances when 
Soviet assertiveness in other areas conflicted with U.S. 
interests, even when these crises did not necessarily 
carry the threat of potential U.S.-Soviet military 
confrontation (George 1983, 2-3).
Based on Nixon and Kissinger's definition, American 
leaders and the general public began to expect detente to 
show signs of tempering the Soviet Union's aggressive 
foreign policy. The Russians on the other hand, saw no 
reason why they could not continue to pursue progressive 
policies in the Third World, while continuing to strive 
for peaceful coexistence, as they often referred to 
detente, with the United States (Craig and George 1990, 
139). In light of detente's inability to meet what they 
viewed as a fundamental expectation, many Americans began 
to have serious doubts about the entire strategy. The 
gist of American concern centered around the fear that 
although Nixon and Kissinger were making concesions to the 
Soviets in order to try and draw them into a more 
constructive relationship, the Soviets were taking 
advantage of economic agreements while continuing to
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pursue their own agenda in the Third World and in weapons 
development. Nixon and Kissinger's ambitious detente 
program fell victim to public impatience, failing to pass 
the critical "acid test," of obtaining and maintaining 
domestic supportez (Craig and George 1990, 140).
The basic problem was that, as a long term 
investment, detente required a great deal of time and 
effort. A by-product of dentente was that it tended to 
draw Nixon and Kissinger's attention away from foreign 
policy issues that were not directly related to the 
program. Particularly during Nixon's first term in 
office, relations with the Soviet Union and China, coupled 
with efforts to deal with the Vietnam commitment, were the 
priority concerns to his administration. Each of these 
foreign policy areas was managed almost exclusively from 
the White House, with Nixon providing basic guidance and 
Kissinger working out the specific details of 
implementation (Quandt 1977, 77).
Although Nixon's preoccupation with the Soviet Union, 
in the form of efforts to get detente on track, coupled 
with the lingering situation in Vietnam, left little time 
for him to devote to Middle East issues, the region was by 
no means i g nored^It became the chief area of interest 
for the State Department, headed by Secretary of State 
William P. Rogers. While Nixon and Kissinger thought of
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the region primarily in terms of how it might affect the 
superpower relationship, State Department officials 
perceived greater potential threats to U.S. interests due 
to the erosion of American influence in the area and the 
increased activity of the militant Palestinian fedayeen 
movement^* (Quandt 1977, 80).
The Middle Eastern policy that grew out of these 
circumstances can perhaps best be visualized as a large 
tree with a solid base supporting two very strong 
branches, each with its own set of smaller branches. The 
solid base represents those aspects of policy on which 
there was general agreement between the White House and 
the State Department. The separate branches, however, 
represent the areas where their respective approaches were 
markedly different, leading to specific decisions that, in 
some cases, remained completely distinct from one another; 
while others were hopelessly entangled, never quite 
meshing.
The common ground shared by the White House and the 
State Department was characterized by several features.
The possibility that Israel might acquire nuclear weapons 
worried White House and State Department officials alike, 
and added to a growing perception that mishandling U.S.- 
Israeli affairs might push Israel toward pursuing nuclear 
options. From early 1969 until August 1970, American
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policy toward the Middle East was shaped by the belief 
that the United States should play an active role in 
promoting a settlement based on the guidelines put forth 
in UN Resolution 242^5. Working with the other major 
powers, particularly the Soviet Union, the United States 
worked to establish negotiations between the regional 
parties to define the basic principles of a settlement 
that could then be worked out during talks between the two 
superpowers (Quandt 1977, 80).
Beyond this, however, the White House and the State 
Department held widely disparate views regarding the best 
approach toward the Middle East. For years. State 
Department officials had insisted that the United States 
should remain "even-handed" toward the Arab-Israeli 
conflict^®. This approach urged restraint in supplying 
arms to Israel and tended to favor a US statement opposing 
the Israeli acquisition of territory in June 1967 
(Lenczowski 1990, 123; Quandt 1977, 81).
Nixon and Kissinger, on the other hand, were 
convinced that the military balance of power should be 
maintained in Israel's favor. Only a strong Israel would 
deter the Arabs from resorting to war. Soviet arms 
deliveries to Arab countries were therefore closely 
monitored and met or exceeded by arms aid to Israel^?. 
Israeli officials, who perceived that the even-handed
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approach demanded a great deal from them yet promised 
little in return, were well aware of the divergent 
perspectives of the White House and the State Department. 
Soon, they began to avoid dealing with the latter, 
preferring to deal directly with Nixon and Kissinger 
whenever possible (Quandt 1977, 81).
The Nixon Administration's first in-depth review of 
Middle East policy took place on February 1, 1969^®. The 
National Security Council met and formalized the decision 
to pursue a more active diplomatic role leading to 
superpower talks. Furthermore, should attempts to pursue 
a settlement prove futile, the United States would fall 
back to an option of pursuing objectives which fell short 
of an actual settlement. The basic principles that would 
guide U.S. Middle East Policy included:
1. The parties to the dispute must participate 
in the negotiations at some point in the 
process; the United States would not hesitate 
to move somewhat ahead of Israel, but any final 
agreement would be reached only with 
Israel's participation and consent.
2. The objective of a settlement would be a 
binding agreement, not necessarily in the form 
of a peace treaty, but involving some form of 
contractual commitments.
3. Withdrawal of Israeli forces should take 
place back to the international frontier 
between Israel and Egypt, with a special 
arrangement for Gaza. There should be Israeli 
evacuation of the West Bank of Jordan, with 
only minor border changes.
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4. Some critical areas should be demilitarized.
5. Jordan should have a civilian and religious 
role within a unified city of Jerusalem.
6. There should be a settlement of the refugee 
problem/^.
In general, the diplomatic strategy which would be 
used to achieve the basic objectives outlined above would 
be a "step-by-step" approach. Instead of focusing on the 
entire set of goals at once, different aspects would be 
successively added to the negotiation process. This 
approach would hopefully reduce the potential for 
stalemates that might occur if negotiations were directed 
toward the comprehensive settlement®®. The framework 
within which this strategy would be pursued would begin 
with US-Soviet talks designed to produce a joint document 
that, after being approved by the Four Powers, would be 
given to Gunnar Jarring to be presented to the concerned 
parties in the Middle East (Quandt 1977, 83).
Soon, several different rounds of negotiations were 
begun. Although US-Israeli talks were frequent, in order 
to assuage the Israeli government's fears, the U.S.-Soviet 
negotiations remained the centerpiece of American efforts. 
The objective of this first round of negotiations, 
conducted from March 18 to April 22, was simply to 
determine if sufficient common ground existed on general 
principles to support pursuing a joint proposal (Quandt
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1977, 84).
These negotiations were carried out against the 
backdrop of mounting, tensions in the Middle East.
Fedayeen attacks, and the subsequent Israeli retaliation, 
became more severe. In April, the same month that 
President Nasser declared his "War of Attrition," Lebanon 
declared a state of emergency after repeated clashes with 
the fedayeen left the government in a complete state of 
disarray (Quandt 1977, 85).
In early May, Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of 
State for the Near East and Asia, presented the basics of 
the American proposal to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly 
Dobrynin. The Soviets replied with a counterproposal in 
June. In July, Sisco returned to Moscow with a new 
document that incorporated several of the Soviet points in 
June. With their respective positions developed®^, the 
United States and the Soviet Union each began to insist 
that further progress would depend upon the other 
superpower's willingness to make concessions. In 
particular, the Soviets sought a more specific delineation 
of the final border between Egypt and Israel. The United 
States countered with the claim that such details depended 
upon more specific information regarding the Egyptian 
commitment to be peace and should not be dealt with until 
the process included direct negotiations®^.
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The United States and the Soviet Union had reached a 
major roadblock. Each remained firm in its position. 
Meanwhile, clashes along the Suez Canal had become more 
frequent. Israel began to turn increasingly toward the 
United States, requesting fighter aircraft and related 
equipment, particularly since France had decided to cut 
off deliveries of all military equipment and spare parts 
to Israel in January 1969®®. In early September, King 
Idris of Lybia was overthrown by a coup led by radical 
young army officers, causing many within the 
administration to suspect that Arab frustration over the 
lack of progress in the peace talks was leading to 
extremism. The first American F-4 Phantoms reached Israel 
during this time. Although their delivery had been agreed 
upon eight months earlier, the timing of their arrival 
exacerbated Arab frustrations and came to symbolize 
American support for Israel. The Arabs launched a 
concerted effort to prevent further weapons deliveries 
(Quandt 1977, 88).
By October 28, 1969, the American position had 
evolved into a proposal, referred to as the Rogers Plan. 
Its preamble called "for the conclusion of a final and 
reciprocally binding accord between Egypt and Israel, to 
be negotiated under the auspices of UN Ambassador Jarring 
following procedures used at Rhodes in 1949" (Quandt 1977,
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89). The rest of the plan consisted of several points 
calling for Israel and the United Arab Republic to agree 
to officially end their state of war, to set a timetable 
for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territory, to 
establish secure and recognized borders specified on maps, 
to identify demilitarized Zones such as Sharm al-Shaykh 
and the Gulf of Tiran, to guarantee freedom of navigation 
to all states through these waterways and through the Suez 
Canal, and to recognize each other's sovereignty. 
Furthermore, the plan stipulated that the final agreement 
would be detailed in a document signed by both sides and 
ratified by the UN Security Council which would assume a 
certain amount of responsibility for insuring that both 
sides adhered to the provisions of the agreement. The 
final agreement would then be filed with the UN®*.
Although the Soviets helped to negotiate the terms of 
the Rogers Plan, they declined to cosponsor it, preferring 
to allow the United States to offer it to the local actors 
as a U.S.-sponsored initiative. The plan failed to 
generate support from any of the relevant parties. Nasser 
rejected it on November 6; Israel on December 21. Two 
days later, the Soviet government also formally rejected 
the Rogers Plan. The Soviet's apparent "diplomatic 
backtracking," viewed within the context of their growing 
military involvement in the Middle East, led some American
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officials, particularly Kissinger, to look for ways to 
deemphasize the superpower collaborative approach and to 
look for ways to negotiate with Egypt unilaterally 
(Breslauer 1983, 84). Thus, the Nixon Administration's 
first Middle East peace initiative ended abruptly, an 
apparent failure.
Throughout the negotiation process, relations between 
the White House and State Department became more distant. 
Their respective views regarding the Middle East came into 
direct conflict over one issue, arms to Israel (Quandt
1977, 104). Israeli leaders continued to exert tremendous 
pressure on Washington to provide them with the caliber of 
weapons required to maintain a military advantage in spite 
of the Soviet weapons being supplied to Egypt and Syria. 
Interestingly, President Nixon decided to postpone delivery 
of twenty-five F-4s and eighty Skyhawk fighters to Israel 
in March 1970 because he feared that conducting major arms 
deals with Israel might jeopardize the peace process.
This decision elicited strong protests from the American 
Jewish community and several members of Congress (Nixon
1978, 481). Nixon's resolve concerning arms deliveries 
was tested several months later by a crisis in Jordan 
(Lenczowski 1990, 125).
The underlying causes of the Jordan crisis stemmed 
from the increasing division of the Arab world into
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radical and conservative camps, and the growth of 
increasingly militant factions of Palestinian Arabs 
seeking to regain their lost homeland. These Palestinians 
operated mainly out of Jordan, where they defied King 
Hussein's rule and established a virtual "state within a 
state." In early September 1970, one of these groups 
hijacked four airliners, brought them to Jordan and 
eventually blew them up. This incident sparked a civil 
war in Jordan between the Palestinian guerillas and King 
Hussein's government forces. Syria saw the conflict as an 
opportunity to depose King Hussein and establish in Jordan 
a more radical government. Soon, approximately one 
hundred Syrian tanks entered Jordan, heading directly 
toward the center of the country. At least two hundred 
more tanks followed (Lenczowski 1990, 125).
Kissinger's description of the situation reveals a 
great deal about the administration's perception of 
American interests in the Middle East; "It looks like the 
Soviets are pushing the Syrians and the Syrians are 
pushing the Palestinians. The Palestinians don't need 
much pushing" (Nixon 1978, 483). Nixon felt compelled to 
prevent what he perceived as a Soviet inspired rebellion 
from overthrowing King Hussein. On September 18, the 
Soviet government sent a message to Washington stating its 
intention to refrain from intervention and requesting the
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same of the United States. However, as new information 
revealed Syria's growing military involvement, Nixon faced 
the dilemma of determining an appropriate American 
response (Lenczowski 1990, 126).
In lieu of direct American involvement, Nixon chose 
to turn to a regional actor. Through Kissinger, Nixon 
informed Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Ambassador, that the 
United States "would be fully in support of Israeli 
strikes on Syrian forces in Jordan if this became 
necessary to avoid a Jordanian defeat" (Nixon 1978, 485). 
Ambassador Rabin responded that Israeli officials believed 
air strikes would not suffice, suggesting ground action 
instead. After initial hesitation, Nixon decided to 
approve the use of ground troops, provided King Hussein 
were consulted in advance (Lenczowski 1990, 126).
Two Israeli brigades advanced into the Golan Heights, 
where they would be in a good position to deter Syrian 
troops heading toward Jordan. Meanwhile, President Nixon 
placed 20,000 American troops on alert and ordered 
additional American naval assets into the Mediterranean. 
With the stakes rising dramatically, Soviet leaders 
exerted pressure on Syria to avoid becoming entangled in a 
risky military operation. Haffez Assad, then commander of 
the Syrian Air Force, refused to provide air support to 
the advancing Syrian tanks, leaving them vulnerable to
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attack from Jordanian fighters. Syrian losses were 
sufficient to compel them to withdraw, making the use of 
foreign intervention to protect King Hussein's government 
unnecessary (Lenczowski 1990, 127).
Although neither American nor Israeli intervention 
proved necessary, the Jordanian crisis was a significant 
milestone in the Nixon Administration's Middle Eastern 
policy for several reasons. First, the crisis prompted 
the beginning of a new strategic relationship between the 
U.S. and Israel (Quandt 1977, 119), that would actually 
surpass the relationship established during the Johnson 
Administration. This new closeness ended a period of 
particularly strained relations caused by Nixon's 
continued restraint in responding to Israeli arms requests 
and by the U.S. negotiated August 7 cease-fire, which the 
Israelis believed should have included qualified terms 
based on indications that Egypt was not abiding by the 
standstill provisions of the agreement (Quandt 1977, 106). 
During the crisis, Nixon authorized $500 million in 
military aid to Israel and agreed to accelerate delivery 
of eithteen F-4s (Quandt 1977, 114).
As the relationship between the White House and 
Israel grew closer, the State Department was moved 
increasingly toward the periphery of American Middle East 
policy formulation. Quandt suggests that Nixon and
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Kissinger were angry with the State Department for not 
anticipating the need to identify potential violations of 
the cease-fire agreement. Israeli intelligence produced 
evidence of the violations which the United States had no 
means to verify. "Israel's credibility at the White House 
was by now greater than State's, and soon Nixon and 
Kissinger were beginning to alter the thrust of United 
States policy" {Quandt 1977, 107).
In a manner reminiscent of Eisenhower, the Jordanian 
crisis demonstrates the fact that Nixon and Kissinger 
allowed the U.S.-Soviet perspective to dominate their 
thinking (Quandt 1977, 106). This reduced their ability 
to separate a regional dispute from the confines of their 
Cold War framework. Both men were convinced that the 
Soviet Union was behind Syria's attempt to overthrow King 
Hussein. This perception persisted in spite of the 
Soviets' insistence that they did not intend to intervene.
Finally, the administration's apparent success in 
handling such a dramatic international crisis could not 
have come at a better time. Congressional elections were 
less than two months away and Nixon's popularity had been 
sagging due to the deteriorating situation in Vietnam and 
lack of clear progress in building a constructive 
relationship with the Soviet Union (Quandt 1977, 105). 
Jordan became the first of several "foreign policy
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spectaculars," including the opening to China, the SALT 
agreement and eventually the Vietnam War negotiations, 
that boosted the President's prestige and Kissinger's 
reputation as a skilled negotiator. These achievements 
placed them on the crest of a wave of popularity that 
helped carry them toward reelection in 1972 (Quandt 1977, 
120).
The period between the Jordanian crisis and the 
October War of 1973, although it appeared relatively 
stable, was not especially productive in terms of American 
foreign policy toward the Middle East. Based on their 
apparent success, Nixon and Kissinger allowed themselves 
to become caught "in a perceptual trap" forged out of a 
series of misinterpretations; of Syria's motives in 
entering Jordan, of the reasons for their subsequent 
withdrawal, of the global dimension of the crisis, and 
finally, of the degree to which the crisis was averted due 
to United States action (Litwak 1984, 156-158; Quandt 
1977, 124-125). After the Jordanian crisis, the 
perceived "key" to stability in the Middle East, 
maintenance of the balance of power, became an even more 
vital component to Nixon and Kissinger's strategy.
Jordan, which would be relied upon to help promote 
stability in the small oil producing Gulf states once the 
British departed in 1971, and Israel joined Iran as
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"regional peacekeepers." By providing arms to these 
countries, the United States hoped to deter aggression by 
Soviet supported states, while reducing the potential 
necessity for United States direct intervention (Quandt 
1977, 123). Upon reaching this conclusion, Nixon and 
Kissinger's willingness to provide any amount of support 
to the logic of the "even-handed" approach evaporated 
(Quandt 1977, 121). The relative stability that followed 
the Jordanian crisis contributed to the shared sense of 
complacency between the United States and Israel.
Lacking any sense of urgency, U.S. support of 
diplomatic efforts to promote a peace settlement appeared 
to cool considerably. The U.S. sponsored cease-fire was 
due to expire in November, 1970. Sadat agreed to a three 
month extension, expecting the Jarring talks to resume.
On December 28, Prime Minister Meir announced Israel's 
return to the talks, but meaningful progress between the 
two sides remained elusive. In February, Sadat agreed to 
an additional one month extension. The prospects for 
reaching a settlement continued to look bleak however. On 
February 8, Jarring presented both sides with a document 
calling for "parallel and simultaneous commitments." The 
issue of territory proved insurmountable. Israel balked 
at the stipulation that it agree in principle to withdraw 
to the former boundary between Egypt and the British
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Mandate for Palestine, refusing to establish such a 
withdrawal as a prior condition for negotiations. Upon 
hearing this, Egypt declared that Israel's unwillingness 
to accept the principle of full withdrawal was itself an 
unacceptable prior condition. Under these circumstances, 
the Jarring talks collapsed in February 1971 (Quandt 1977, 
135-136).
Perhaps because he suspected that the latest round of 
Jarring talks might lead to yet another diplomatic 
impasse, Sadat launched his own peace initiative by 
announcing on February 5, 1971 that in return for a 
partial Israeli withdrawal, the Egytians would clear and 
reopen the Suez Canal, which Egypt had closed to all 
traffic, in part to attract world attention to the 
situation's (Aker 1985, 15; O'Ballance 1978, 3-4). Golda 
Meir, not especially interested in a partial agreement 
such as this, responded that she was unwilling to pull 
Israeli troops back from existing cease-fire lines until 
an overall settlement had been reached (Quandt 1977, 136- 
137). Sadat launched a diplomatic campaign to get the 
United States to support the initiative. One month later. 
President Nixon instructed the State Department to begin 
working out the details of an interim agreement (Quandt 
1977, 138). To encourage Israel's earnest consideration 
of the agreement, the United States used arms as an
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inducement. On April 19, officials announced that twelve 
more F-4s would be sent to Israel (Quandt 1977, 139).
Rogers and Sisco, acting as intermediaries, 
encountered difficulties in keeping each side focused on 
the areas covered by the canal settlement. In 
negotiations, each wanted to know the other's position on 
a wider range of issues. When these were discussed, as 
past experiences had proven, the distance between the two 
sides became even more vast, particularly when the subject 
of territory was broached. Rogers and Sisco were unable 
to bridge the gap between the evolving Egyptian and 
Israeli positions. In fact, by portraying each side's 
position in the most favorable light, hoping to coax more 
flexibility out of the other party, Rogers and Sisco lost 
credibility, leaving the Egyptians and the Israelis 
feeling as though they had been deceived. White House 
support for Rogers dried up (Quandt 1977, 139-141).
The failure of the interim canal-settlement agreement 
effectively signalled the end of Rogers and Sisco's 
control over the directions of Middle East policy (Quandt 
1977, 143). If there were any new initiatives, Nixon and 
Kissinger would provide direction. Yet this was a remote 
possibility. With the American election looming just over 
the horizon, secret negotiations with North Vietnam 
underway in Paris, and the dramatic opening to China about
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to become a reality, the Middle East, where success seemed 
to continually elude negotiators, was allowed to fade into 
the background. This "process of deferral had a net 
effect of transforming policy into the very kind of 
shallow exercise which Kissinger had scorned as an 
academic— that is the projection of the future as an 
extrapolation of the past" (Litwak 1984, 157).
In April 1972, three months before announcing the 
expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt, Sadat opened a 
secret channel to Washington. Kissinger suggests that 
this was due, at least in part, to Sadat's growing 
dissatisfaction with Soviet support. In spite of the 
steady supply of arms, Kissinger's sources revealed that 
Egypt was pressuring Moscow for more support. Kissinger 
believed, however, that the "Soviets were holding Sadat at 
arm's length, fearful of the risks of all-out support," 
and hoping to avoid "going to the brink" with the United 
States over the challenge to Israel's survival (Kissinger 
1979, 1293). Sadat proposed that Kissinger meet 
confidentially with his own national security adviser, 
Hafiz Ismail, to discuss "mechanisms for shifting the 
peace process off dead center." Kissinger's heavy 
involvement in the Paris negotiations during the latter 
half of 1972 caused this meeting to be postponed until 
February 1973, however (Litwak 1984, 158).
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The sense of urgency that had steadily decreased 
regarding the Nixon Administation's Middle Eastern policy 
would return in early October 1973. Beyond fundamental 
concerns for Israel's survival, however, the main thrusts 
of this urgency centered around the possibility that this 
regional conflict might cause a superpower confrontation. 
Sadat astutely recognized the relationship that had 
developed between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
He was well aware that a conflict between the Arabs and 
Israelis would have ramifications which extended well 
beyond the region. In fact, one of his primary objectives
in launching the October War was to "spark" an
international crisis. He reasoned that increased 
superpower involvement, which would most assuredly result, 
would help him bring about some of the changes he 
envisioned. He hoped that their mutual desire to avoid a 
nuclear confrontation would lead the superpowers to force 
Israel into "reasonable" concessions (O'Ballance 1978, 15).
Soon after the coordinated offensives began, while 
non-Arabs struggled to recover from the initial shock, the
attention of the world community began to focus on the
United States and the Soviet Union. Basic American policy 
focused on two goals, announced at a United Nations 
Security Council meeting convened on October 8 at the 
United States' request. First, hostilities should be
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brought to an end as quickly as possible. Second, the 
U.S. called for restoring conditions in the area which 
would be conducive to settling longstanding differences 
(Rugh 1976, 1-2).
By adopting this basic posture, calling for a 
ceasefire but nothing else, American policymakers hoped to 
give quiet diplomacy a chance at success. They did not 
want to raise controversial issues in an open public 
forum. This might lead to complications, making it more 
difficult for Washington to fulfill its mediating role.
Even the statement of U.S. policy made before the United 
Nations was kept as general as possible to avoid 
generating public debate. American representatives chose 
not to call for a vote in the Security Council because, as 
Kissinger later explained in a press conference, they 
"realized that no majority was available and [they] did not 
want sides to be chosen prematurely" (Rugh 1976, 4).
The first order of business was to get the fighting 
to stop. This would not be possible, however, until the 
overwhelming momentum gained by the Arabs in the initial 
stages of the conflict could be slowed. On the day the 
war began, Kissinger convened the Washington Special 
Actions Group (WSAG), the Administration's official 
crisis-management body. One of the first issues discussed 
was whether or not the United States should supply
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additional arms to Israel. Surprisingly, the issue 
sparked a great deal of debate within the administration, 
delaying the much-needed resupply. Meanwhile, the Arabs 
benefited from a nearly continuous supply of Soviet 
equipment (Alroy 1975, 73).
Foreign policy analysts are divided over whether or 
not arms were withheld from Israel for several days as 
part of a larger political strategy. Alroy suggests that 
Kissinger orchestrated the pretense of disagreement among 
key administration officials as a delaying tactic^®. This 
pretense was allegedly motivated by the belief that a 
long-range political settlement would be facilitated if 
the Arabs and Israelis made each other s u f f e r ^ ?  (Alroy 
1975, 77). Lenczowski, on the other hand, contends that 
Kissinger genuinely and actively supported sending arms to 
Israel, insisting that if the United States refused aid, 
Israel would no longer have any incentive to conform to 
American views in postwar diplomacy (Lenczowski 1990,
130) .
Each of these positions has a certain degree of 
merit. There is little doubt that the United States could 
not afford to let the Arabs prevail in the conflict. The 
American commitment to Israeli security could not simply 
be put aside. However, a decisive Israeli victory could 
perpetuate, and perhaps even intensify, Arab resentment
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(Nixon 1978, 921). Moreover, it would very likely cause 
Israel to become even more entrenched, both politically 
and physically, within the relative security offered by 
the status quo. In short, the war presented an 
opportunity to make progress through diplomatic channels, 
an avenue that up to this point had led nowhere^®. The 
situation could not be allowed to get out of hand, 
however. Thus, when Golda Meir sent appeals to Washington 
for American aid, indicating that Israel would use every 
means at is disposal to ensure its national survival, a 
potential reference to the use of nuclear weapons, the 
administration moved quickly to establish an "air bridge" 
between the United States and Israel (Litwak 1984, 160).
Putting aside the issue of why the United States 
delayed the airlift, the fact remains that this resupply 
gave Israel a vital boost, turning the tide of the war. 
Once the order for the airlift was given, the amount of 
aid was quite substantial. Within days, the United states 
was supplying Israel with over one thousand tons of 
weapons and equipment per day (Litwak 1984, 160; Nixon 
1978, 927). A total of 550 American missions to Israel 
carried out the task of supply and resupply, an operation 
that surpassed the Berlin airlift of 1948-9 ( Lenczowski 
1990, 130; Nixon 1978, 927-929).
Thus, during the second week of the war, the United
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States became more directly involved in the conflict by 
providing arms to Israel. Arab accusations that the U.S. 
was otherwise intervening in the conflict were denied. 
Nonetheless, on 17 October, the ministers of 11 nations of 
the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC) met in Kuwait, announcing that they had agreed to 
cut oil production by 5% per month until Israel withdrew 
from the occupied territories and agreed to respect the 
rights of Palestinian refugees. Over the next few days, 
oil cuts would become progressively higher, and would 
target the United states directly in an attempt to force 
it to change its pro-Israeli policies (Rugh 1976, 31-34).
Bolstered by the resupply, Israel launched 
counteroffensives on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. 
On October 15-16, Israeli troops crossed into "African" 
Egypt. Meanwhile, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin consulted 
with Sadat in Cairo, urging him to accept a Soviet 
proposal that linked a standstill ceasefire to an Israeli 
agreement to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders. When 
Kosygin departed from Cairo on 18 October, he had Sadat's 
commitment to work for an immediate ceasefire. Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin quickly informed Kissinger of the
O  Qproposal**̂ . Kissinger agreed to pass the terms on to Tel 
Aviv (Litwak 1984, 160-161).
On 19 October, in a move that surprised many within
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the Nixon Administration, Brezhnev invoked the newly 
established consultative mechanisms created by the June 
1973 accords to invite Kissinger to Moscow to discuss the 
situation in the Middle East (Golan 1977, 112-115; Nixon 
1978, 931). While en route to Moscow on October 20, 1973, 
Kissinger was advised that Saudi Arabia had joined the 
other OAPEC states in declaring a total oil embargo 
against the United States. This embargo coincided with 
President Nixon's decision to request $2.2 billion in 
emergency military aid for Israel*® (Litwak 1984, 161).
During the Moscow talks, the Soviets reiterated their 
proposal for an immediate ceasefire accompanied by a 
return to the provisions of UN Resolution 242. Kissinger 
sought to fashion an agreement that also included peace 
negotiations. By October 21, both the Soviets and the 
Egyptians had accepted Kissinger's formulation. The 
following day, a UN cease-fire resolution was drafted and 
adopted as UN Resolution 338. Meanwhile, the Israelis 
launched a counteroffensive that elicited an angry protest 
from Ambassador Dobrynin on October 23. Over the next 24 
hours, the Israelis continued to advance, managing to 
press forward to the outskirts of Suez City and to 
encircle the Egyptian Third Army, comprised of 
approximately 20,000 troops, east of the Suez Canal*
Sadat responded by sending urgent requests to the United
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States and the Soviet Union, asking for armed troops to 
enforce the second ceasefire, negotiated on October 24 
(Lenczowski 1990, 130-131; Litwak 1984, 162; nixon 1978, 
937) .
The period that followed was characterized by tense 
diplomatic efforts by the United States and the Soviet 
Union to balance their respective interests while meeting 
the immediate needs of the situation. Within hours of 
Sadat's request, Dobrynin conveyed a message from Brezhnev 
denouncing Israel for violating the cease-fire and 
reiterating Sadat's request for a joint peace-keeping 
f o r c e * 2 .  Brezhnev's message ended with an indication, 
which many U.S. officials perceived as a threat, that if 
the United States did not support the joint effort, the 
Soviet Union would be forced to act unilaterally to 
prevent cease-fire violations*®.
On October 25, a group of government officials 
described by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger as the 
"abbreviated" National Security Council met in the 
Situation Room of the White House to determine the United 
States' next course of action**. They decided unanimously 
to place all American conventional and nuclear forces on 
military alert. Nixon, who was not present at the meeting, 
approved the plan. He then sent a message to Brezhnev in 
which he denied that Israel had violated the cease-fire
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agreement. Furthermore, he cautioned Brezhnev against 
taking any sort of unilateral action (Lenczowski 1990,
131) .
At a press conference on October 25, Kissinger 
explained the administration's decision to place American 
troops at a higher state of readiness by emphasizing the 
United States' opposition to the use of a joint Soviet- 
United States force in the Middle East, a move which 
Kissinger and Nixon believed might risk "transplanting" 
the great-power rivalry into the region. Moreover, he 
pointed out that the United States was even more opposed 
to the unilateral deployment of troops by any great power, 
particularly any power possessing nuclear capability*®.
While fighting continued between Egypt and Israel, 
American officials pursued a new cease-fire agreement that 
would ultimately lead to a lasting disengagement.
Providing relief to the beleaguered Egyptian Third Army 
was also a high priority (Lenczowski 1990, 131). On 
October 26, the crisis fueled by Soviet-American 
disagreement over the placement of troops in the Middle 
East abated. The Soviet Ambassador stopped insisting on 
superpower participation in the Sinai peace-keeping force, 
and President Nixon announced that American troops had 
returned to their normal state of readiness*®.
On November 5, 1973, Kissinger initiated what has
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since been labeled "shuttle diplomacy" by traveling to 
Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi 
Arabia, Algeria and Russia to serve as an intermediary 
among the interested parties. During this period, he 
facilitated an agreement concerning the resupply of the 
Egyptian Third Army and, on November 11, an agreement 
between Egypt and Israel calling for an end to 
hostilities. This agreement, signed on "Kilometer 101" of 
the Cairo-Suez road, also stipulated an interim 
disposition of forces (Lenczowski 1990, 131-132).
The next phase of diplomacy took place on December 
21-22 at an international conference convened in Geneva in 
response to a formal request by the UN Secretary General. 
The conference was cochaired by the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Egypt, Israel and Jordan attended, while 
Syria chose to boycott the meeting. The Geneva Conference 
consisted of a ceremonial dinner and one inaugural session 
of negotiations. As such, it was not expected to serve as 
a forum for dealing with the full range of substantive 
disagreements between the belligerents; rather, it served 
as a springboard for successive rounds of negotiations 
that took place first between Egypt and Israel, and later, 
between Israel and Syria, with the United States acting as 
intermediary. These negiotiations eventually led to 
separate disengagement agreements on January 18, 1974 and
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May 31, 1974, respectively*^ (Lenczowski 1990, 132-133).
The final months of the Nixon Administration were 
characterized by Kissinger's increasing involvement.in 
American foreign policy toward the Middle East. President 
Nixon, on the other hand, was forced to devote more and 
more attention to domestic concerns, particularly the 
cancerous effects of the Watergate break-in on his 
administration, his popularity, and his status as 
president. On August 8, 1974, Nixon announced his 
resignation as President of the United States, effective 
noon the following day (Nixon 1978, 1083).
Summary
The Soviet-American approach that literally dominated 
Nixon and Kissinger's thought processes casts a very 
interesting complexion over American Middle Eastern policy 
during the Nixon Administration. When Nixon first entered 
office, in spite of his announcement that the Middle East 
would be among his chief concerns, he was not particularly 
interested in devoting a great deal of time to the region, 
which did not appear to hold the promise of any real 
progress. The president's desire to revitalize the 
National Security Council and to play a significant 
personal role in foreign policy formulation led him to 
reserve the more "dramatic" foreign policy arenas for the
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White House. Working to extricate the country from its 
involvement in Vietneun, establishing a more constructive 
relationship with the Soviet Union, and opening relations 
with China were much more appealing projects to Nixon and 
Kissinger.
Meanwhile, Nixon allowed his Secretary of State, at 
least officially, to take the lead in Middle Eastern 
policy formulation for several years. Under State 
Department influence, at the beginning of the Nixon 
Administration, the desire to find a solution to the Arab- 
Israeli dispute emerged as a very high priority. As such, 
efforts to lauch two-power and four-power talks to 
establish the framework of a potential settlement were 
begun in earnest. During this period, however, the 
conflicting goals of promoting Israeli security and 
maintaining reliable access to oil vied with one another 
for preeminence, often thwarting attempts to find a 
solution to the Arab-Israeli dilemma. The evolving 
struggle between the State Department, which generally 
favored protecting U.S. access to oil, and the White 
House, which favored supporting Israel militarily to 
maintain the balance of power in the region, complicated 
matters even more. Israel in particular perceived the 
growing divergence between these regionally and globally 
oriented approaches, and began to deal increasingly with
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the White House. In Nixon and Kissinger's view, 
meanwhile, the highest priority for American foreign 
policy, the Middle East included, was to prevent the 
expansion of Soviet influence. This outlook colored Nixon 
and Kissinger's perceptions of significant events in the 
Middle East, often causing them to misinterpret critical 
regional developments such as those which precipitated the 
Jordan crisis in 1970.
Soon, circumstances caused Nixon and Kissinger to 
perceive that the Middle East was taking on increased 
importance in the Soviet-American competition. Secretary 
Rogers, meanwhile, did not seem to be having much success 
in getting the parties any closer to a settlement. 
President Nixon allowed the support he had been giving to 
his Secretary of State to gradually dissipate, until it 
was eventually depleted after the futile attempt to 
sponsor an interim canal settlement in early 1971. This 
period saw little meaningful diplomatic activity and led 
the Arabs, particularly Sadat, to become increasingly 
frustrated.
In addition to the Soviet-American competition, one 
of the most interesting contextual features of the Nixon 
Administration's Middle Eastern policy centered around 
Arab and Israeli self-perceptions. The Arabs became 
increasingly impatient to regain self-esteem lost in 1967,
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while the Israelis became overconfident because of their 
decisive victory in the Six Day War. Arab frustrations at 
the lack of diplomatic progress were fueled by the 
increasingly apparent pro-Israeli stance of the Nixon 
Administration. The situation culminated in the 
coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attacks of October 1973, which 
caught both Israel and Washington off-guard. More 
importantly, however, the war provided Kissinger with the 
opportunity to seek gains in the diplomatic arena because 
it changed a vital component of the contextual 
environment. The Arabs no longer felt powerless and the 
Israelis no longer felt invulnerable. Finally,
Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy," although primarily 
directed toward establishing an end to hostilities, was 
very important in terms of setting the stage for later 
developments in the Middle East, particularly those that 
led to the agreements at Camp David during President 
Carter's Administration.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CARTER ADMIHISTRATIOH
We were sure that ours was a nation of the 
ballot, not the bullet, until the murders of 
John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin 
Luther King, Jr. We were taught that our 
armies were always invincible and our causes 
always just, only to suffer the agony of 
Vietnam. We respected the Presidency as a 
place of honor until the shock of Watergate.
We remember when the phrase "sound as a dollar" 
was an expression of absolute dependability, 
until ten years of inflation began to shrink 
our dollar and our savings. We believed that 
our nation's resources were limitless until 
1973, when we had to face a growing dependence 
on foreign oil. These wounds are still very 
deep. They have never been healed (Carter 
(1982, 120).
On Sunday, July 15, 1979, Jimmy Carter addressed the 
nation from the Oval Office after having spent an intense 
week at Camp David meeting small groups of key advisers 
reassessing his administration in light of reports that 
his popularity had "dropped to a new low" (Carter 1982, 
114). He believed, among other things, that the people of 
America had lost faith in themselves and in their country. 
This lost confidence could be restored if Americans were 
willing to work together to solve major problems (Carter 
1982, 121). Although his announcement was prompted by
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Carter's "reassessment" of his administration, it did not 
reflect a significant change in his personal beliefs.
Carter came to the presidency seeking to promote a 
revival of American support for the government by 
convincing "the people that the barriers between them and 
the top officials in Washington were being broken down" 
(Carter 1982, 26). He was well aware of the damage to the 
public's perception of the presidency caused by Watergate, 
and was determined to regain the American trust (Carter 
1982, 22). Thus, Carter's presidency was, in many 
respects, a departure from previous administrations. In 
Carter's view, it was more accurately a return to the 
basic values that had been conspicuously lacking in 
previous administrations (Carter 1977, 196).
The need to foster a renewed sense of morality in 
domestic and foreign affairs served as the basic motif of 
Carter's presidency. It translated into several 
fundamental concerns, which he believed embodied the most 
important American values— "human rights, environmental 
quality, nuclear arms control, and the search for justice 
and peace" (Carter 1982, 20). In his memoirs. Carter 
stresses his admiration for two past presidents, Wilson 
and Truman. In Wilson, Carter admired the quality of 
idealism, a characteristic which he believed had been 
absent from American foreign policy for far too long
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(Carter 1982, 142). He dismissed the notion that foreign 
policy was largely a choice between the realist and 
idealist approaches, insisting that "the demonstration of 
American idealism was a practical and realistic approach 
to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best 
foundation for the exertion of American power and 
influence" (Carter 1982, 143).
Ironically, the quality Carter most admired in Truman 
was his willingness "to be unpopular if he believed his 
actions were best for the country" (Carter 1982, 66).
This image embodied Carter's view of an elected official's 
role, that once citizens make their opinions known, public 
officials must ultimately "decide what actions to take for 
the public good" (Carter 1982, 80). This view, which is 
reminiscent of Morgenthau's belief that statesmen should 
not be too responsive to the forces exerted by public 
opinion, is particularly interesting in light of the 
potential inherent contradictions between it and the 
idealsitic approach described above. In essence.
President Carter's image of his role as a statesman, and 
of the role the United States should play in world 
affairs, were directly responsive to both of the 
conflicting impulses that had driven American foreign 
policy during the post war era.
Carter believed that he could achieve a balance
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between these two impulses. In practice, however, this 
goal would prove elusive. As he undertook specific 
foreign policy initiatives. Carter found that 
circumstances inevitably drove him to choose one approach 
over the other. This is not particularly surprising.
Even Truman, whom Carter admired for making choices based 
on the nation's interests, eventually bowed to political 
pressure in supporting the creation of Israel. Moreover, 
Wilson, who typified the idealistic approach, made several 
pragmatic decisions that would later prove difficult to 
reconcile with his own desire to promote the self- 
determination of the Arab people.
What is interesting, however, is the impact that 
Carter's personal impressions of the United States' 
responsibilities had on foreign policy in general and 
particularly on the situation in the Middle East.
Context
I am proud to meet with a group of men and 
women with whom I share a total commitment to 
the preservation of human rights, individual 
liberty, and freedom of conscience...I would 
like to talk to you about my view of how our 
nation should encourage and support those 
priceless qualities throughout the world.
This is, as you know a difficult question.
It requires a great deal of balancing 
between idealism and realism, of our 
understanding of the world as it is and 
our understanding the the world as it ought 
to be...The question, I think, is whether 
in recent years officials have not been too 
pragmatic, even cynical, and as a consequence
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have ignored those moral values that have 
often distinguished our own country from other 
nations around the world^(Carter 1977, 166).
Carter's perception of American foreign policy during 
the Nixon-Ford years was that it had been allowed to 
become too narrowly defined in terms of the Soviet- 
American competition in the Cold War. In dealing with 
other governments, this led policy makers to place too 
much emphasis on whether a particular country "espoused 
the anti-communist line," without regard for the nature of 
that country's own government. In effect, oppressive 
governments might receive U.S. support and protection from 
internal political movements as long as they were willing 
to side against the "evildoers" (Carter 1982, 142-143).
In Carter's view, the United States had a basic 
responsibility to promote freedom and democratic 
principles. In fact, the nation had been "strongest and 
most effective" during those periods when freedom and 
democracy were most clearly emphasized in its foreign 
policy (Carter 1982, 142). Thus, in choosing the 
priorities for his foreign policy. Carter was determined 
to focus on those countries where people were imprisoned, 
tortured, or otherwise deprived of human rights (Carter 
1982, 146). Opportunities for such emphasis abounded.
The situation in the Middle East was not nearly as 
volatile as it had been when Nixon entered office, yet
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unresolved issues still caused perpetual tensions. The 
prospects for a lasting peace still seemed remote after 
the 1973 war, but there were several contextual changes 
that indicated that progress might be possible at last. 
Once the fighting had ended and the peace process was 
renewed, many within the United States and the world 
community began to wonder if, perhaps, the high costs of 
the war would lead Arabs and Israelis alike to recognize 
their mutual interest in a compromise peace^.
As for the Arab side of the equation, several 
encouraging signs of a "changing Arab attitude" fueled 
hopes that meaningful negotiations could begin in earnest. 
In fact, the Arabs' willingness to begin direct peace 
negotiations with Israel at Geneva was heralded as the 
most fundamental manifestation of their evolving attitude. 
This newfound willingness to negotiate was largely an 
outgrowth of the Arabs' military performance in the 
October War, which had lessened the sense of shame and 
defeat that had permeated the Arab atmosphere since 1967. 
Moreover, the realization during the war that oil could be 
used as a "weapon" for coercive diplomacy, or at least as 
leverage in bargaining, eliminated the Arabs' long­
standing fears that they would be negotiating from a 
position of weakness in direct talks. This renewed sense 
of honor and the discovery of a certain amount of
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bargaining power, coupled with the recognition that, in 
spite of initial setbacks in the recent war, Israel still 
possessed formidable military capabilities, led Sadat,
King Hussein and other Arab leaders to announce their 
willingness to formally acknowledge the existence of 
Israel, within its 1967 borders^.
The events of 1973 forced the Israelis to grapple 
with realizations about their Arab neighbors and, more 
importantly, their own growing isolation within the world 
community. The high number of casualties sustained, and 
their failure to win a decisive victory in the conflict 
severely damaged the Israelis' self-image of 
invulnerability. Furthermore, the heavy economic burden 
of constant preparedness for war, the recognition of the 
potential power of the Arab oil weapon, and the increasing 
sense of dependence on the United States, led to a sinking 
impression that even another military victory would do 
little to bring the country closer to peace. Mounting 
dissatisfaction and criticisms of the Israeli military's 
performance in the early stages of the war quickly led to 
a governmental crisis, which undoubtedly amplified the 
general perception of instability within the country. The 
Labor Party lost several critical seats in the 
parliamentary elections on December 31, 1973. After 
repeated attempts to form a new government, Golda Meir
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relinquished premiership. She was succeeded by Yitzhak 
Rabin, the army chief of staff responsible for planning 
the highly successful preemptive strikes in 1967. As 
Prime Minister, Rabin continued to maintain an Israeli 
"hard line" in peace negotiations.
In spite of this official posturing, several 
prominent Israelis were compelled to reassess their Arab 
neighbors in the period following the 1973 war. Israeli 
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, for example, contrasted the 
recent war with previous conflicts:
This time they marshalled all their resources, 
including oil, to achieve their purpose. They 
took the international climate into account, 
the role the Russians would play, the importance 
of detente between Americans and the Russians. 
They realized it was a changed world in 1973, 
and we have to realize it too*.
One of the most compelling aspects of the "changed 
world" facing Israel after 1973 was the country's growing 
isolation within the world community. The threat of an 
Arab oil boycott had forced countries such as Japan, 
dependent on Arab countries for 45 per cent of its oil, 
and several western European governments, also heavily 
reliant on Arab oil imports, to adopt a decidedly pro-Arab 
stance during the war. In fact, on November 6, 1973, the 
European Economic Community issued a resolution calling on
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Israel to "end the territorial occupation which it has 
maintained since the conflict in 1967^."
Israel's increasing isolation beccune a trend which 
continued for several years, setting the stage for the 
circumstances under which the Carter Administration would 
have to operate. Interestingly, the trend expanded beyond 
admonitions expressed by individual governments to include 
increasing pressure from the United Nations. On January, 
12, 1976, for example, the UN Security Council opened its 
Middle East debate by voting 11 to 1 with 3 abstentions to 
allow the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate 
with speaking rights as a member. On May 26, 1976, the 
Security Council closed its debate on the Middle East with 
a majority statement deploring Israeli measures to alter 
the demographic character of the occupied territories.
The United States disassociated itself from this 
statement. On November 11, the Security Council, in a 
consensus statement, denounced the establishment of 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and 
declared the annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel to be 
"invalid." On November 24, the General Assembly approved 
by a vote of 90 to 16 with 30 abstentions, the report of 
the Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
People proclaiming the right of Palestinian refugees to 
establish their own state and to reclaim former properties
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in Israel®.
Prior to becoming president, Jimmy Carter's exposure 
to the Middle East had been quite limited. In fact, in 
his own estimation, his perspective needed broadening.
Most of what he knew stemmed from religious studies, which 
led Carter to feel a certain bond with the Jews in the 
region. These feelings were strengthened by his belief 
that prior to 1967 many of the holy places in the Middle 
East had been closed to visits by Christians.
Furthermore, Carter felt that Jewish survivors of the 
holocaust "deserved their own nation" and the right to 
live peacefully among their neighbors.
Carter had an opportunity to learn more about the 
"land of the Bible" and to see Israeli defense 
requirements first-hand in May 1973 when, as Govenor of 
Georgia, he and his wife were invited by Golda Meir to 
take an extended visit to Israel. This visit strengthened 
Carter's sense of responsibility toward Israel to such a 
degree that he made a special point of mentioning his 
support when he announced his candidacy. In essence. 
Carter's "moral and religious beliefs made [his] 
commitment to the security of Israel unshakable" (Carter 
1982, 274).
While many of his initial impressions of Israel grew 
out of his own religious convictions. Carter's early
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perceptions of the Arab states were colored by his 
reactions to Arab oil policy. Carter viewed the denial of 
oil as "political blackmail" that had enabled the Arab 
states to force vulnerable consumer nations to change 
their foreign policies during the critical period from 
1973 to 1974. Carter was determined, therefore, to 
develop a comprehensive energy policy that would reduce 
the United States' susceptibility to coercion and, in 
fact, much of his domestic policy revolved around his 
efforts to increase public and congressional awareness of 
the "energy problem" (Carter 1982, 92; Lenczowski 1990, 
159) .
Carter's comprehensive energy program, which he 
described as the "moral equivalent of war" (Carter 1982, 
91), consumed a great deal of the president's time and 
efforts. In fact. Carter felt that he struggled with 
Congress in "bloody legislative battles" over energy 
legislation throughout his entire term. Carter's 
objectives included energy conservation, more domestic 
fuel production, development of alternative sources of 
energy, and reduction of oil imports. To meet these 
goals, he proposed deregulation of oil prices, a windfall 
profits tax on oil companies and the establishment of a 
government owned "Synthetic Fuels Corporation" (Lenczowski 
1990, 159).
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Carter divided his time between this ambitious energy 
program and major foreign policy initiatives. This is 
evident in his description of a brief working vacation to 
the Grand Tetons in August 1978 during a temporary lull in 
congressional activity. While there. Carter hoped to 
study the complicated dynamics of the Middle East in 
preparation for the upcoming Camp David talks. However, 
he was "forced to return early to Washington because of 
the imminent threat of losing the natural-gas bill"
(Carter 1982, 106; 320).
Carter eventually succeeded in getting the bulk of 
his energy program through Congress, but his success was 
not without a price. The president had to work very hard 
to achieve his own objectives while maintaining an 
effective working relationship with Congress. Ironically, 
he was not particularly successful. Many of his fellow 
Democrats failed to support him because they felt his 
programs did not adhere clearly to partisan lines (Carter 
1982, 68-73). In addition to the energy program, one of 
the biggest "legislative battles" Carter fought with 
Congress centered around the Panama Canal Treaty. The 
President eventually emerged victorious, but lost a good 
deal of public and congressional support in the process.
Along with his repeated efforts to establish a viable 
working relationship with Congress, the Soviet-American
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aspect is one of the most interesting features of the 
context in which Carter operated. Detente, bereft of real 
support from Congress and the public, had virtually faded 
into the foreign policy background. What would now 
become the defining characteristic of the Soviet-American 
relationship? This question was uppermost in the minds of 
many American and Soviet leaders. The Soviets were 
especially uncertain about how Carter's human rights 
emphasis would affect the superpower relationship^.
Within the Carter Aministration, this question was 
open to a great deal of interpretation and, in fact, the 
source of a certain amount of dissension. Carter felt the 
need to move away from allowing the Soviet-American Cold 
War competition to be the defining characteristic of 
American foreign policy. Human rights dictated a more 
diffuse approach, one that focused on areas such as Africa 
and Latin America, for example. Decisions to support 
governments would be based on how their leaders dealt with 
social, economic and other developmental aspects within 
their society. Ideally, this determination would be made 
without consideration for how these governments stood in 
relation to the Soviet-American competition, yet. Carter 
was aware of the fact that American involvement in these 
areas could lead to superpower confrontation. In 
discussing the Middle east, for example. Carter wrote:
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I recognized the legitimate needs of the 
Israelis to protect themselves against 
terrorism. But we needed to resolve the 
underlying problems rather than see continued 
violence, which threatened to spread beyond 
the Middle East and involve the superpowers 
(Carter 1982, 277).
This "duality" in Carter's approach toward the 
Soviets, the notion that their actions were an important 
consideration in crafting his foreign policy, yet not to 
be afforded the seune emphasis as in the past, established 
an atmosphere of uncertainty in the administration which 
was most readily apparent in the context of the State 
Department-National Security Council competition for 
preeminence in foreign affairs. Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski 
had several substantive disagreements over foreign policy, 
especially regarding matters that required an assessment 
of Soviet intentions to determine the best strategy for 
dealing with the Soviet Union. Eventually, when 
"jockeying" and competing with one another to sway 
Carter's position on the issues failed to yield a clear 
winner, the controversy spilled out into the open.
(George 1980, 118). Brzezinski, who favored a less 
optimistic view of the Soviets, began to make public 
statements that, intentionally or not, had the net effect 
of undermining Vance's position®.
In spite of his desire to change the basic tone of
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the Soviet-American relationship, or to at least reduce 
its effects on American policy toward third countries. 
Carter found it necessary to deal with the Soviets on 
several critical issues, most notably SALT. Carter viewed 
these strategic arms talks as a means to "reduce the 
nuclear threat to human survival" while also stabilizing 
the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Vance agreed with the 
president and encouraged him to make SALT a high priority 
in the administration because it offered an opportunity to 
establish more "cordial" relations with the Soviet Union. 
Brzezinski, on the other hand, supported SALT as a means 
of "publicly testing Soviet intentions and, if the Soviets 
responded favorably, for halting the momentum of the 
Soviet buildup®."
To deal with the Middle East as well as other foreign 
policy issues. Carter designed a foreign policy machinery 
combined elements of a "collegial approach," based on 
teamwork and shared responsibility among talented 
advisers, and a "formalistic approach," characterized by 
an orderly policy-making structure with well-defined 
procedures and hierarchical lines of communication (George 
1980, 109). Carter sought to avoid the extreme 
centralization of power acquired by Kissinger as special 
assistant for national security affairs during Nixon's 
first term, yet he sought to "restore the power and
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prestige of the NSC staff following the brief eclipse that 
occurred during the Ford years (1974-1977) when Kissinger 
was Secretary of State" (George 1980, 117). In fact, at 
his first Cabinet meeting. Carter gave his National 
Security Adviser Cabinet status, setting a precedent that 
was not followed by later administrations (Brzezinski 
1983, 60).
There is little doubt that Carter intended to rely
heavily on the NSC in formulating foreign policy.
Responding to warnings that Brzezinski "might not be
adequately deferential to a Secretary of State," Carter
wrote in his memoirs:
Knowing Zbig, I realized that some of these 
assessments were accurate, but they were in 
accord with what I wanted: the final
decisions on basic foreign policy would be 
made by me in the Oval Office, not in the 
State Department (Carter 1982, 52).
As his Secretary of State, Carter chose Vance, who 
had been Secretary of the Army under Kennedy and Deputy 
Secretary of Defense under Johnson, for his extensive 
background in military affairs and his equally impressive 
experience in foreign affairs. Vance had served as a 
"troubleshooter" for various presidents during crises in 
Cyprus, Korea and Vietnam (Carter 1982, 50). Warren 
Christopher, a Los Angeles attorney, was selected to be 
Vance's Deputy Secretary of State.
Brzezinski designed his NSC staff to be lean and
160
efficient, "not a small state department" (Brzezinski 
1983, 4). David L. Aaron was chosen to sezrve as his 
deputy assistant for National Security Affairs. In 
addition to several administrative positions, the rest of 
the staff was divided into "geographical clusters," 
focusing on West Europe, East Europe and the Soviet Union, 
the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and China, 
South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America 
(including the Caribbean). Six "functional clusters" 
dealt with defense coordination, intelligence 
coordination, international economics, global issues, 
science, and freedom of information issues. Three men 
comprised the staff of the cluster responsible for the 
Middle East: William Quandt, Robert Hunter and Gary
SicklO.
Carter was well aware of the fact that he was coming 
to Washington as an outsider. He brought with him several 
close friends to serve as advisers, most notably Hamilton 
Jordan, who would eventually be named White House Chief of 
Staff, and Jody Powell, who served as Press Secretary. To 
"provide some balance of experience" to the 
administration. Carter had chosen Walter Mondale, a member 
of Congress, as his running mate. He determined to rely 
on his Vice President as his "second in command, involved 
in every aspect of governing" (Carter 1982, 35-39).
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Carter began each day as president with Brzezinski, 
who would provide him with the Presidential Daily Briefing 
(PDB)ll, an update on current intelligence (Carter 1982, 
51) .
Foreign Policy Objectives
The Carter Administration has often been criticized 
as having lacked a central strategy to tie the various 
strands of its foreign policy together. From the 
beginning, however, the administration did have a set of 
clearly defined objectives that actually emerged during 
the transition phase when Brzezinski, Henry Owen and 
Richard Gardner developed a memorandum outlining the goals 
the new administration should pursue in foreign policy 
(Brzezinski 1983, 50). These goals were refined during 
the first informal NSC meeting conducted on January 5, 
1977. With the help of Harvard Professor Samuel 
Huntington, Brzezinski prepared a forty-three page 
document designed to give the Carter Administration a 
sense of strategic priorities.
The document outlined ten basic goals. First, the 
new administration hoped to promote wider macroeconomic 
coordination between the United States, Western Europe, 
Japan and other advanced democracies to facilitate the 
move toward a stable and open monetary trade system. The
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second and third goals were directed at improving 
political and economic relations with "emerging regional 
'influentials,'" and developing North-South relations to 
promote greater economic stability in the Third World. 
Fourth, the administration would push for strategic arms 
reduction talks with the Soviets while working to 
cultivate a more stable relationship between the two 
superpowers. This relationship would be based on a "more 
comprehensive and reciprocal" application of detente. 
Furthermore, Soviet ideological expansion would be 
countered by "a more affirmative American posture on human 
rights" (Brzezinski 1983, 52-54).
The fifth goal addressed normalization of U.S.- 
Chinese relations as a key stabilizing element in the 
administration's global strategy. Sixth, a comprehensive 
Middle East peace settlement would be pursued as a means 
of preventing further radicalization in the Arab world and 
Soviet re-entry into the region. The seventh goal sought 
to facilitate the peaceful transformation of South Africa 
toward a biracial democracy and, by establishing a 
coalition of moderate black African leaders, to eliminate 
the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa while lessening trends 
toward radicalization. The administration's eighth 
objective was to restrict the level of global armaments, 
both unilaterally and through international agreements.
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The ninth was directed toward increasing U.S. sensitivity 
to human rights and influencing other countries to observe 
these rights through various multilateral and bilateral 
incentives. Finally, the administration sought to 
maintain a defense posture sufficient to deter the Soviet 
Union from using strategic, conventional or political 
force against the United States or its allies (Brzezinski 
1983, 54-55).
Collectively, these ten goals comprised an ambitious 
foreign policy agenda. In fact, Brzezinski suggests that 
a more appropriate criticism of the Carter 
Administration's foreign policy is that it was "overly 
ambitious" and that officials failed to demonstrate 
effectively to the public the degree to which they "were 
motivated by a coherent and well-thought-out viewpoint" 
(Brzezinski 1983, 57).
The Middle East, along with the future disposition of 
the Panama Canal, emerged as one of the highest foreign 
policy priorities of the Carter Administration. In fact, 
the Middle East dominated foreign policy during all four 
years of the Carter presidency (Carter 1982, 429) largely 
because Carter believed that conditions in the region held 
important ramifications for United States interests. In 
spite of the disengagement agreements between Israel and 
Egypt and Israel and Syria that had been concluded during
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the Ford Administration, the Middle East situation 
remained tense (Lenczowski 1990, 160). Carter noted that 
many of his predecessors, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and 
Ford among them, had avoided becoming actively involved in 
Middle Eastern disputes until circumstances, in the form 
of some sort of crisis, forced them to take action. He 
resolved to break the perpetual stalemate, which he 
believed would inevitably lead to another conflict, 
perhaps with even greater U.S.-Soviet involvement 
(Brzezinski 1983, 83). In broad terms. Carter sought a 
means to provide peace and stability to the region while 
preventing the expansion of Soviet influence. In this 
regard, he viewed Israel as a strategic asset (Carter 
1982, 274-275).
Carter was well aware of the potential difficulties 
in trying to forge a Middle East peace settlement. In his 
memoirs, he notes the hard work and effort that culminated 
in the Rogers Plan during the Nixon Administration, only 
to have the proposal rejected by virtually all of the 
interested negotiating parties. Many of his security 
advisers urged him to avoid the Middle East, where it 
"seemed that all the proposed solutions had been tried and 
failed" (Carter 1982, 279). He determined to approach the 
region "with great caution" lest failure to bring about 
tangible results create an "image of fumbling
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incompetence." Yet, his commitment to human rights, his 
sense of responsibility toward Israel, his desire to 
protect American interests by promoting stability in the 
region...all of these factors compelled Carter to forge 
ahead toward some form of Arab-Israeli peace settlement 
(Carter, 1982, 275-277).
Largely due to domestic considerations, Brzezinski 
urged Carter to move as rapidly as possible, taking 
advantage of the greater leverage he would enjoy during his 
first year in office to strive toward a Middle East 
breakthrough (Brzezinski 1983, 87). As such. Carter and 
his key advisers decided to pursue an "activist" approach 
toward the Middle East, which was actually a reflection of 
their ambitious larger foreign policy. With the possible 
exception of the president himself, the individual who 
"took the lead on the Middle East" was Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance (Brzezinski 1983, 38). During the informal 
NSC meeting conducted on January 5, 1977, the decision was 
made to send Vance to the Middle East as early as 
February. Vance believed it was important to meet with 
the key players in the region as early as possible 
(Brzezinski 1983, 51).
The basic approach the Carter administration would 
take toward the Middle East was formulated during three 
meetings: an informal session on January 30, attended by
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Carter, Brzezinski, Vance, and Andrew Young; a formal 
Policy Review Committee meeting chaired by Vance on 
February 4; and a formal NSC meeting held on February 23, 
following Vance's return from a week long Middle East fact­
finding visit. President Carter chaired this third 
meeting, during which a target date was set for convening 
the Geneva Conference in September of 1977^^. (Brzezinski 
1983, 86-87)
In a departure from the two previous administrations. 
Carter and his top advisers believed that American policy 
should be directed toward achieving a comprehensive 
Middle East peace settlement. Any agreement between 
Israel and its Arab neighbors should simultaneously 
address all of the major problems affecting the region.
As such, the settlement should not be limited to separate 
agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan or Syria 
(Lenczowski 1990, 160). Similarly, the Carter 
Administration believed that the idea of pursuing small, 
interim steps as a means of drawing the parties closer to 
an eventual agreement had lost its usefulness. In short, 
there were no more "small steps" left to be taken 
(Brzezinski 1983, 83).
In Carter's view, the extremely complex issues 
surrounding the Arab-Israeli dispute "seemed to boil down" 
to three major points of contention: Israeli security.
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ownership of territory, and Palestinian rights (Carter 
1982, 279). At least two legacies from the Nixon-Ford 
years posed potential problems, however. First, Carter 
believed that the Geneva Conference forum, established 
under the auspices of the United Nations during Nixon's 
presidency, was burdened by a cumbersome format. "If ever 
convened, it was to be headed jointly by the United States 
and the Soviet Union, with participation by the Israelis 
and their Arab neighbors-— and the Palestinians." This 
arrangement lent itself to its own unique set of problems 
which not only "defied solution," but prevented 
negotiators from dealing with more substantive issues.
Second, Carter's freedom to maneuver with regard to 
the Palestinian question, which he believed to be the 
"central, unresolved, human rights issue of the Middle 
East" (Vance 1983, 64), was greatly restricted by 
Secretary of State Kissinger's promise to Israel on 
September 1, 1975 that the United States would not 
recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it acknowledged 
Israel's right to exist and had accepted UN Resolution 242 
as the basis for resolving Middle East disputes. The 
issue of communicating with the PLO remained so sensitive 
throughout Carter's presidency that in March 1977, when 
Carter decided to stand in the receiving line and to shake 
hands with the PLO representative after having given an
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address to the United Nations, it caused "quite a flap" 
(Carter 1982, 281).
Carter's desire to try a new and innovative approach 
to break the Middle East stalemate was translated into the 
rough outlines of a settlement plan by March 1977. His 
plan called for Israeli withdrawal to approximately the 
1967 borders, creation of a Palestinian homeland," and the 
establishment of real, lasting, permanent peace between 
Israel and its Arab neighbors^^. Carter believed that the 
peace process should be based on UN Resolution 242, which 
emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of 
territory by war, and that it should include a broad 
definintion of peace, including open borders and free 
trade (Carter 1982, 290). His decision to include the 
concept of a Palestinian "homeland," later referred to as 
an "entity," was a first among American presidents that 
led to shocked protests from Israelis and prominent Jewish 
Americans.
Having established the basic outlines of a proposal. 
Carter "plunged heavily into the negotiating process 
himself" with an intense schedule of meetings with Middle 
Eastern heads of state. He was visited first by Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on March 7-8, followed on 
April 4-5 by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Carter then 
met with King Hussein of Jordan on April 25-26, President
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Assad of Syria on May 9, and Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia on May 24 (Brzezinski 1983, 89). During these 
meetings. Carter adopted what would become a customary 
habit of conducting frank, private discussions upstairs at 
the White House with his visitors to urge them to consider 
his proposal's. Carter found his discussions with Sadat, 
King Hussein, Crown Prince Fahd and Assad particularly 
encouraging, but he would soon discover that peer pressure 
led many of the Arab leaders to give private assurances 
which were widely disparate from their public comments. 
Only one Arab leader, Anwar Sadat, seemed willing to 
publicly admit that he was willing to deal with Israel^® 
(Carter 1982, 286).
Shortly after Carter concluded his first round of 
meetings with Middle East leaders, Yitzhak Rabin announced 
his resignation, leading to the surprise victory of 
Menachem Begin, leader of the conservative Likud 
coalition. Carter's meetings with Rabin had not been 
especially promising, but Begin's revisionist program, 
which called for territorial annexations and intransigence 
toward the Arabs, added a new dimension of uncertainty to 
the peace process (Lenczowski 1990, 164). Begin's 
statements during an "Issues and Answers" interview to the 
effect that the West Bank was an integral part of Israel's 
sovereignty which had been "liberated" during the 1967 Six
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Day War, and that a Jewish majority with an Arab minority 
would be established there caused Carter concern. The new 
Prime Minister's views did not bode well for the upcoming 
peace talks (Carter 1982, 288). Meanwhile, Begin's 
election caused increased anxiety within the American 
Jewish community, leading to more pronounced public and 
congressional criticism of Carter's policies. Carter 
eventually became so concerned about deunage to his 
"political base among Israel's friends" that he solicited 
and received public support from Senator Hubert Humphrey, 
the "one man who was trusted by everyone as a friend of 
Israel." Carter also held sessions with Jewish and 
congressional leaders from around the United States to 
explain his policies (Carter 1982, 288-290).
President Carter met with Prime Minister Begin on 
July 19, 1977 to outline his proposals. Begin indicated 
that he could agree to all of them except for the 
establishment of a Palestinian "entity." During private 
discussions. Carter felt he might have made some headway 
in getting the Prime Minister to consider changing his 
position, but his hopes were literally dashed when Begin 
returned to Israel and immediately recognized as permanent 
several settlements on the West Bank (Carter 1982, 291).
The weeks following Begin's election were 
characterized by meetings and statements that appeared to
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constitute diplomatic steps forward, but which tended to 
elicit reactions that increased the distance between the 
negotiating parties, keeping the Geneva Conference 
perpetually out of reach. Israel's establishment of new 
settlements in the West Bank posed a serious threat to the 
peace process, as did disagreement'over Palestinian 
participation in the Geneva talks (Lenczowski 1990, 165).
While diplomatic progress with Middle Eastern leaders 
remained somewhat elusive, the United States and the 
Soviet Union took what administration officials hoped 
would be a significant step forward. On October 1, in 
their capacities as co-chairmen of the Geneva Peace 
Conference, the two countries issued a joint statement 
calling for: a comprehensive settlement of the Arab- 
Israeli dispute based on Isreali withdrawal from the 
occupied territories; ensuring the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people; ending the state of war and 
establishing normal relations; respect for the principles 
of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence; ensuring the security of borders by using 
demilitarized zones, UN personnel, and international 
guarantee; and Soviet-American agreement to guarantee the 
peace settlement (Vance 1983, 463). The joint statement 
caused great concern among the American Jewish community, 
congressional leaders and, of course, the Israelis^?.
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On October 4, Carter met with Egyptian Foreign 
Minister Ismail Fahmy and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe 
Dayan to convince each of them of the necessity of 
compromise. By mid-October, in spite of reports that 
Dayan had prevailed over strong opposition when he 
presented the American proposals to the Israeli cabinet. 
Carter began to see indications that the peace process was 
breaking down. He was not convinced that the disputing 
parties would agree to come together. On October 21, 
Carter thus decided to play his "only hole card" by 
sending a direct personal appeal to Sadat urging him to 
publicly endorse the Soviet-American proposal. Sadat 
responded on November 9, by announcing to the Egyptian 
Parliament that he was willing to go to Jerusalem to 
further the peace process. His announcement was followed 
on November 15 by an invitation from Begin, sent through 
Carter, to address the Israeli Knesset. On November 19- 
21, Sadat visited Jerusalem, where he addressed the 
Knesset, offering Israel recognition and permanent peace 
based on an agreement that would lead to the return of 
Arab occupied territories including Arab Jerusalem, 
recognition of the Palestinian right to statehood, and 
secure borders subject to the necessary safeguards and 
international guarantees^® (Sadat 1977, 330).
In short, Sadat took the unprecedented step of
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agreeing to Israel's requests "in one fell swoop" (Carter 
1982, 307). Sadat's unexpected announcement created both 
uncertainty and excitement in Washington. Although the 
announcement carried the prospects for peace, officials 
were unsure how to proceed (Carter 1982, 298). These 
doubts were soon exacerbated by the realization that Sadat 
and Begin were still far apart on several substantive 
issues. This disparity was particularly apparent after 
Begin's visit to Ismailia in late December. He proposed a 
plan that seemed almost diametrically opposed to Sadat's 
position^^. As the relationship between Begin and Sadat 
became increasingly strained. Carter and Sadat reached 
nearly complete agreement concerning the substance of the
onpeace agreement^ .
By March of 1978, the Geneva Conference seemed more 
distant than ever. Begin had shown little evidence that 
he was willing to change his position, particularly 
concerning the West Bank, which he referred to by the 
Biblical names "Judea and Samaria" (Carter 1982, 334) The 
Israelis were continuing the policy of building up 
settlements in the occupied territories, causing Arabs to 
become more frustrated, and leaving Sadat increasingly 
vulnerable to attacks from other Arab leaders. Repeated 
Israeli incursions into Lebanon to retaliate against 
terrorist attacks made matters even worse, prompting
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Carter to send "a stream of fairly harsh messages" to 
Begin in Israel (Carter 1982, 304-305). The situation 
reached a critical point on March 14, when Israel invaded 
Lebanon as a reprisal against a PLO attack on the Israeli 
coast in which thirty-five people were killed.
Sadat's position within the Arab community had 
already been severely damaged by his decision to visit 
I s r a e l i i .  Carter was so worried about the Egyptian 
leader's growing isolation from the rest of the Arab 
community that he repeatedly tried to generate public 
support from other Arab leaders. These attempts were 
unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that several leaders 
were privately willing to express support (Carter 1982, 
300-301). By May, 1978, Sadat's frustration caused him to 
pull back from the peace effort, and he "even spoke 
publicly of going to war" (Carter 1982, 315).
Democratic leaders urged Carter to back out of the 
Middle East situation and to "repair the damage" he had 
done to the Democratic party and to United States-Israeli 
relations. Instead, Carter decided to "go all out" by 
inviting Sadat and Begin together for an extensive 
negotiating session at Camp David. Both leaders 
"enthusiastically" agreed to attend (Carter 1982, 316).
The official announcement that there would be a 
trilateral summit meeting at Camp David between Egypt,
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Israel and the United States was made on Tuesday, August
8. For the most part, the administration was able to keep 
the meeting a secret, so the "news took the public 
completely by surprise" (Brzezinski 1983, 252). Carter 
was determined to establish an atmosphere at Camp David 
which would encourage the negotiating teams to work with 
one another freely, without concern over public reactions. 
This meant that there had to be a "minimum of posturing by 
Egyptians or Israelis." Public statements had to be 
avoided because, once made, they would very likely become 
"frozen positions that could not subsequently be changed." 
For this reason. Carter decided to exclude the press 
during the Camp David negotiations (Carter 1982, 317-318), 
choosing to rely on Press Secretary Jody Powell to update 
the media on developments.
To prepare for the upcoming meetings. Carter not only 
reviewed the relevant issues, he also studied 
psychological analyses of Sadat and Begin, the two 
protagonists in the on-going diplomatic struggle. He 
recalled the American Ambassadors to Egypt, Herman Eilts, 
and Israel, Sam Lewis, to provide him with added insight 
(Carter 1982, 320-321). The American negotiating team 
also included Brzezinski, Vance, Jordan, Powell, Harold 
Saunders, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East 
Affairs, Alfred Atherton, Ambassador at large, and William
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Quandt from the NSC Staff. Walter Mondale and Secretary 
of Defense Harold Brown remained in Washington, but 
travelled to Camp David as their schedules permitted.
Although he deliberately tried to play down 
expectations. Carter hoped to emerge from the Camp David 
negotiations with a written agreement for peace between 
Egypt and Israel, including a timetable for implementation 
(Carter 1982, 321). From the beginning, however, it was 
apparent that Sadat and Begin sharply differed on several 
key issues which would transform the Camp David process 
from the planned three day meeting into "thirteen intense 
and discouraging days." (Carter 1982, 322). The 
negotiating teams arrived on September 5, 1978 and 
remained until September 17, despite repeated threats by 
Sadat that lack of progress compelled him to leave.
The Egyptian team consisted of President Sadat, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Ghali, Under 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Osama el-Baz, Ambassador to 
the United States Ashraf Ghorbal, Director of the Foreign 
Minister's Cabinet Ahmed Maher, and three members of the 
Foreign Ministry including Legal Director Nahib el-Araby 
(Carter 1982, 326). Throughout the negotiations, Sadat 
seemed willing to compromise on several issues in order to 
facilitate a larger agreement, while the members of his
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staff were less willing to do so. In fact, the 
differences between Sadat and his advisers became so great 
that at one point, on the ninth day. Carter became worried 
about his friend's safety, "and directed that the security 
around Sadat's cottage be strengthened and kept alert" 
(Carter 1982, 389).
During his first full meeting with Carter, on 
September 6, Sadat presented the Egyptians' opening 
proposal, which was "extremely harsh and full of all the 
unacceptable Arab rhetoric." After discussion, however, 
Sadat revealed that he was willing to make concessions on 
all but two issues. The first was land, the second was 
sovereignty (Carter 1982, 339-340). Like Carter, Sadat 
wanted a firm framework for establishing peace. He 
insisted, however, that he was not interested in 
concluding a separate Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Thus, he 
insisted on addressing the issues of Palestinian self- 
determination and the West Bank (Lenczowski 1990, 173).
Begin, on the other hand, came to Camp David seeking 
to outline general principles to serve as the basis for 
future negotiations (Carter 1982, 330). If an agreement 
were to be made, however, the Prime Minister preferred 
that it address Egyptian-Israeli relations first, leaving 
the issue of the Palestinians and the West Bank for later 
discussions (Carter 1982, 334). The Israeli team
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consisted of nine members, including Begin, Foreign 
Minister Moshe Dayan, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, 
Attorney General Aharon Barak, Major General Avraham 
Tcunir, Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz.
Legal Adviser Meir Rosene, Public Affairs Adviser Dan 
Pattir, and Elyakim Rubenstein, Assitant Director,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As with the Egyptian team, 
it became apparent that there were sharp disagreements 
among the Israelis. In this case, however. Begin tended 
to take the hard line, while other members, such as Dayan 
and Weizman, tended to be more flexible^^ (Carter 1982, 
395) .
Carter began the Camp David process by meeting 
individually with Sadat and Begin to develop a sense for 
their respective positions and to encourage them to 
compromise as much as possible. By the third day.
Carter's hopes of simply observing while Sadat and Begin 
conducted negotiations had evaporated and he found himself 
playing "referee" to keep the discussions on track (Carter 
1982, 353). Eventually, he realized that meetings of all 
three leaders were counterproductive. The negotiating 
process evolved into Carter meeting separately on issues 
with the two Middle Eastern leaders (or their designated 
representatives), until the "best possible compromise" had 
been reached. At this point, the three leaders and their
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advisers met together (Carter 1982, 368).
When neither the Israelis nor the Arabs appeared to 
be able to produce proposals that satisfied the other 
party. Carter put forth compromise proposals. In the 
process, he complied with President Ford's promise, 
contained in a presidential letter of December 1975, that 
the Israelis be allowed to see any American proposal 
before it was offered to the other parties concerned.
From the outset. Begin insisted on this procedure (Carter 
1982, 333; 373).
Several issues caused a great deal of debate between 
the negotiating teams, but the most divisive issue by far 
concerned Israeli settlement policy. In the Sinai, Sadat 
insisted that the settlements must be abandoned by the 
Israelis. He viewed this as an issue of sovereignty and 
could not allow the Israelis to stay. On a related point, 
Sadat would not allow any form of militairy control over 
Egyptian territory by Israel, the United States, or any 
other nation (Carter 1982, 357). For his part, throughout 
the entire negotiations process. Begin argued that he 
could not agree to remove the Israeli settlements in the 
Sinai because of the potential threat to Israeli security, 
particularly in the Gaza^® (Carter 1982, 347; 359).
The deadlock over how to deal with the Sinai was 
complicated by disagreements over Jerusalem, Palestinian
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rights and settlement policies in the West Bank and Gaza. 
At several points in the negotiating process, Carter 
believed that the talks had broken completely down (Carter 
1982, 360; 365; 391). Eventually, however, as the 
president was preparing to go back to Washington, 
contemplating how he would minimize the damage of Ceunp 
David's inability to generate any sort of substantial 
agreement. Prime Minister Begin created a "breakthrough" 
by announcing his willingness to submit the Sinai 
settlements issue to the Israeli Knesset. Believing this 
concession to be enough for Sadat, Carter hastily put his 
staff to work finalizing the agreements (Carter 1982, 396- 
398). Two agreements, the Framework for Peace in the 
Middle East and the Framework for Conclusion of a Peace 
Treaty Between Egypt and Israel were signed at 
approximately 10:15 p.m. on September 17, 1978 (Carter 
1982, 403).
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East included a 
preamble which specified that UN Resolution 242 would serve 
as the basis for peace between Israel and its neighbors^*. 
In Part A, the signatories agreed that Egypt, Israel,
Jordan and "the representatives of the Palestinian people" 
should work together to resolve the Palestinian problem. 
Furthermore, it outlined provisions for Palestinian self- 
government in the West Bank and Gaza, accompanied by a
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transitional period of not more than five years 
(Lenczowski 1990, 175). In Part B, Egypt and Israel 
agreed not to use force against one another, and to work 
toward a peace treaty which would serve to govern future 
Egyptian-Israeli relations. Part C addressed the rules 
that were to be applied to Israel's relations with each of 
its neighbors, under the aegis of the United Nations 
Security Council (Lenczowski 1990, 176).
The second document, the Framework for the Conclusion 
of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel stipulated that 
a peace treaty should be concluded within three months. 
Furthermore, it contained provisions regarding the 
following; implementation of the treaty after its 
signing; Israeli military withdrawal from the Sinai; the 
future disposition of airfields left in the Sinai, that 
would be used for civilian purposes only; freedom of 
navigation and overflight for Israel through the Suez 
Canal, the Gulf of Suez, the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf 
of Aqaba; construction of a highway linking the Sinai and 
Jordan through Israeli territory; and specific military 
dispositions regarding the placement of Egyptian, Israeli 
and UN troops in high interest areas. The agreement also 
stipulated that following the conclusion of the peace 
treaty, normal diplomatic relations would be established 
between Egypt and Israel (Lenczowski 1990, 176-177).
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The signing of the Camp David agreements marked a 
significant turning point in Egyptian-Israeli relations. 
Yet it also placed Egypt, Israel and the United States at 
the beginning of a new journey, to make the envisioned 
treaty a reality. Both Begin and Sadat came under heavy 
pressure from other players on their respective sides of 
the diplomatic fence. In one incident, Israeli right-wing 
extremists demonstrated their opposition to the proposed 
treaty by throwing eggs and tomatoes at Begin's 
automobile. Sadat faced even greater pressures that would 
eventually lead to Egypt's isolation from the rest of the 
Arab community. Arab moderate states joined the 
"rejectionists" in condemning the Camp David Accords 
(Carter 1982, 410). Carter appealed to the Soviet Union 
to urge the Syrians and Palestinians to participate in 
future talks. The Soviets, however, responded that this 
was not likely because "the Israelis had gained everything 
and Sadat had gained nothing" in the Camp David talks ^5 
(Carter 1982, 406-407).
As the presidential election grew closer. Carter felt 
increasing pressure to bring the Egyptian-Israeli treaty 
to fruition. Begin, by his words and deeds, however, 
seemed to be moving further away from agreement with 
Sadat, causing Carter to speculate that he was trying to 
delay the process until after 1980, when a new
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administration might be at the helm of United States 
foreign policy (Carter 1982, 418). As he had several 
times during the Camp David negotiations. Carter decided 
to intervene personally to help bring the two parties 
closer to agreement. In early March 1979, he traveled to 
the Middle East with a draft treaty, shuttling between 
Egypt and Israel until the provisions were deemed 
satisfactory. On March 26, 1979, Begin and Sadat signed 
the Egyptian-Israeli treaty during a ceremony in 
Washington (Carter 1982, 427). Five days later, Egypt was 
formally suspended from the Arab League^® (Lenczowski 
1990, 182).
While President Carter's attention was almost 
completely devoted to the Camp David agreements and 
subsequent treaty negotiations, events in Iran had already 
begun to build toward the Islamic Revolution and the 
American "hostage crisis." From the moment he took 
office, Iran presented Carter with a moral, ethical and 
political dilemma that defied easy solution. In order to 
fully appreciate the scope of this dilemma, certain key 
facets of the historical context must be kept in mind.
The Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, had a long­
standing relationship with the United States. In fact, in 
November 1977, during the Shah's first visit to the Carter 
White House, the new president noted that Iran's leader
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had personally known the seven previous U.S. presidents 
(Carter 1982, 434). This is not particularly surprising 
since the growth of American political involvement in Iran 
coincided with the beginning of Mohammed Reza Pahlevi's 
rule. During the British-Russian occupation of Iran 
during World War II, Reza Shah, the former Persian Army 
officer who had founded the Pahlevi dynasty in 1926, was 
sent into permanent exile. His son, Mohammed Reza Shah, 
beceune the new sovereign. After the war. President 
Roosevelt exerted American influence to compel the British 
and Russians to remove their forces. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the British complied, while the Soviets 
initially refused to withdraw their forces. Soviet 
activities in the Middle East soon became a matter of 
grave concern to the United States, making Iran "the first 
battlefield" of the Cold War (Rubin 1980, 28). These 
concerns were amplified, and perhaps appeared to be 
justified, by the emergence in Iran of a nationally based 
and highly ideological communist movement, the Tudeh 
Party, formed in 1941 (Farhi 1989, 93).
The Iranian-American relationship that evolved over 
the next few decades was therefore primarily affected by 
two factors: Iran's valuable oil supply and Soviet 
involvement in the region. The Shah quickly learned that 
either of these two interests, particularly the latter.
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afforded him a certain amount of leverage in negotiations 
with the United States. Meanwhile, the post-World War II 
period was one of the most agitated periods in Iran's 
political history. Members of the intelligensia and the 
emerging middle class found the Tudeh Party attractive, 
not necessarily because of its communist underpinnings, 
but as a means of challenging the central government. In 
1949, after an attempted assassination of the Shah, the 
Tudeh Party was declared illegal. The Shah declared 
martial law, and began to consolidate his power. This set 
the stage for a new movement to challenge the Shah's 
authority, the National Front, led by Mohammed Mossadeq 
(Farhi 1989, 93-94).
Among other things, the National Front objected to 
the growing level of foreign intervention in Iran, 
typified by the heavily slanted oil concessions Iran had 
given to the British^^. Internally, Mohammed Reza Shah 
continued to consolidate his power, yet he was reluctant 
to challenge the British over the oil issue. Mossadeq 
gained popularity, became Prime Minister in 1951, and 
promptly challenged the Shah's authority. A few months 
later, the Iranian oil industry was nationalized and 
Mossadeq learned a costly fiscal lesson when Iran was 
forced to suffer the consequences of "an almost universal 
shipping boycott of Iranian oil" (Farhi 1989, 95).
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The events of this tumultuous period were brought to 
an abrupt end in August 1953, when the United States, 
fearing that instability in Iran would open the door to 
the insidious spread of communism^®, helped the Shah and 
his supporters overthrow Mossadeq. This CIA-sponsored 
military coup placed the Shah firmly back in power (Rubin 
1980, 55-58), allowing him to continue consolidating his 
authority while eliminating opposition. In 1957, a new 
secret police, SAVAK (the National Security and 
Information Organization), was established under CIA 
supervision. The Shah used this instrument to move 
decisively against the working class and intellectuals, 
effectively neutralizing the Tudeh Party in the process 
(Farhi 1989, 96). Meanwhile, with the exception of a 
package of reform programs dubbed the "White Revolution," 
which were enacted largely to placate progressive 
modernizers within Iran^9 (Farhi 1989, 97), and to keep up 
appearances with the United States (Rubin 1980, 108-112). 
Little substantial progress was made toward resolving the 
"underlying problems of political legitimacy and economic 
crisis that had plagued Iran for many decades" (Rubin 
1980, 191).
While serious social and political problems were left 
to fester, American military aid to Iran, approximately 
$500 million between 1953 and 1963, coupled with
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substantial oil revenues, allowed the Shah to expand his 
armed forces from 120,000 to over 200,000 men by 1963. 
During this time frame, annual military expenditures grew 
from $80 million to nearly $183 million®® (Farhi 1989,
96). U.S. military aid and arms sales grew even more 
substantially during the Nixon Administration, when the 
Shah was essentially given "a blank check for arms," 
establishing a trend that would become consistent U.S. 
policy (Lenczowski 1990, 184).
When Carter became president, his outspokenness in 
favor of human rights and arms reductions engendered 
expectations among Americans and Iranian secular-liberal 
opposition leaders that he would immediately change the 
direction and substance of American relations with Iran. 
Carter was aware of the dissension in Iran caused by 
dissatisfaction among the country's growing middle class, 
well-educated students and strong religious community® ̂ .
In fact. Carter felt enough concern that, during the 
Shah's November 1977 visit, he broached the subject of 
human rights in Iran, suggesting that the Shah consider 
changing some of his more restrictive policies. The Shah 
simply replied that Iranian laws were necessary to combat 
communisim and could not be changed (Carter 1982, 436).
While cautiously raising the issue of human rights in 
private (laonnides 1984, 25), Carter publicly reaffirmed
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the United States' support for the Shah in remarks made at 
a dinner given by the Shah in Iran on December 31, 1977. 
Carter effectively commended the Shah for his leadership, 
calling Iran "an island of stability in one of the more 
troubled areas of the world" (Carter 1982, 437). His 
glowing comments were made in spite of the fact that the 
Shah had already been condemned by Amnesty International 
for repressive policies that included the use of torture 
(Salinger 1981, 3-5).
In tandem with his aggressive military build-up, the 
Shah sought to promote rapid modernization in Iran. In 
time, however, the country could no longer support the 
heavy burden of military expenditures and the costs of 
modernization. In 1975-1976, a recession began that 
quickly stripped the veneer from the apparently "stable" 
structure of the Shah's regime. Widespread poverty, 
unsanitary conditions and corruption involving members of 
the royal family were among the negative aspects of the 
Shah's rule that became more visible during the period of 
economic strain. Resentment toward the Shah continued to 
build and now expanded to include the large numbers of 
foreign technicians brought into Iran during the 
modernization period. Within a year, several opposition 
groups, including elements of the National Front liberal- 
democratic intelligentsia, the bazaar merchants. Leftist
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groups and the Shiite clerical strata began to channel 
their efforts toward a common goal, removing the Shah from 
power (Lenczowski 1990, 186-187).
In January 1978, incited by an article in the Teheran 
daily newspaper Etelaat which criticized Iran's religious 
leadership, a group of theological students in Qom 
launched a demonstration. Several of the demonstrators 
were killed, leading to a chain reaction of violence. 
Violence erupted every forty days, coinciding with the 
Shiite custom of mourning the dead at forty day intervals. 
The cycle of violence continued throughout 1978, reaching 
a fevered pitch. In August, a suspicious fire in a movie 
theater in Abadan claimed over 500 lives (Lenczowski 1990, 
189-190). On September 7, following the Shah's 
declaration of martial law, several hundred people were 
killed by bursts of machine-gun fire during a deadly clash 
between security forces and a crowd of demonstrators in 
Tehran (Carter 1982, 438).
In a move that has been characterized as too little, 
too late, the Shah tried to satisfy his people's demands 
for a greater voice in governing, but instead of reducing 
unrest, his actions aroused more disatisfaction®^. In one 
attempt to pacify the dissidents, the Shah granted amnesty 
to several opposition leaders, including Ayatollah Ruholla 
Khomeini, who had spent the past fifteen years in exile
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(Carter 1982, 438). Meanwhile, he tried to avoid 
confrontation with his more radical opponents by 
reconciling with moderate opposition leaders including 
Karim Sanjabi and Gholcun Hossein Sadeghi of the National 
Front. This attempt proved unsuccessful. (Lenczowski 
1990, 190).
Attempts to satisfy anti-Shah forces by changing the 
nature of the government also met with little success. At 
one point, the Shah created a "military government," to be 
headed by General Gholam Reza Azhari. However, because 
the Shah distrusted his military leaders, he retained 
tight control over their activities (Lenczowski 1990,
190). Carter observed that the Shah "seemed unwilling to 
grant anyone else enough real authority to govern." By 
the end of the year, however, he appointed a Prime 
Minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar. The new Prime Minister 
quickly called for the Shah to leave Iran, the secret 
police to be abolished, those responsible for shooting 
demonstrators to be tried, and for civilians to be put in 
charge of foreign affairs (Carter 1982, 442).
During this tulmutuous period. Ayatollah Khomeini 
emerged as an identifiable leader of the heretofore 
fragmented opposition movement. While in Paris®®, he sent 
taped messages to the Iranian people calling for general 
strikes, overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of an
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Isleunic republic. A general strike began in Iran during 
the latter two months of 1978 (Carter 1982, 440).
Ayatollah Khomeini clearly had the support of the people, 
and he refused to give his support to Bakhtiar.
On January 16, 1979, Bakhtiar announced that the Shah 
would leave Iran. On February 1, Khomeini flew to Tehran 
and was welcomed by thousands of supporters. In the brief 
power struggle that ensued, Bakhtiar had the support of 
the military, but it fell apart in the face of sustained 
opposition. On February 11, Bakhtiar and the members of 
the Iranian parliament resigned, leaving Khomeini to place 
his choice for Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, in power 
(Carter 1982, 446-450).
While the members of the Carter Administration did 
their best to keep up with the rapidly changing 
developments in Iran, Carter received conflicting advice 
from his top-level officials. The administration became 
divided into two camps. The first was composed of Cyrus 
Vance and members of the State Department, which was noted 
for its opposition to the Shah. The second camp, which 
included National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, viewed the Shah as an 
important ally in the Middle East. As such, they believed 
preservation of his rule was vital to U.S. national 
interest. Carter remained torn between Iran's strategic
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importance and his commitment to human rights. As the 
political situation deteriorated in Iran, however, he 
adopted Brzezinski's view and expressed his support for 
the Shah (Lenczowski 1990, 192-193).
As events changed, a more pronounced rift developed 
between the White House and the U.S. Ambassador to Iran, 
William Sullivan. Carter asserts that on October 28, 
1978, Sullivan sent a cable to Washington advocating U.S. 
support for the Shah as the best means of maintaining 
stability in the region. In line with this. Carter chose 
to pledge to the Shah "all the support the United States 
could properly give him, short of direct intervention" 
(Carter 1982, 439). By January 1979, Ambassador Sullivan 
had begun to recommend that the United States insist on 
the Shah's immediate departure and try to establish some 
form of relations with Khomeini. Carter, however, 
preferred to maintain the policy of supporting the Shah. 
Moreover, he sent General Robert Huyser, Deputy Commander 
of United States Forces in Europe, to Iran, ostensibly to 
strengthen the resolve of the Iranian miliatary, but also 
to provide him with updates on the situation independent 
of Sullivan (Carter 1982, 443-444).
Once the Khomeini regime took power, efforts were 
made to establish a semblance of normalcy in Iranian- 
American relations. This process met with moderate
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initial success and culminated in a meeting between 
Brzezinski, Premier Bazargan and two other Iranian 
ministers on November 1, 1979. Serious complications 
arose several days later, however, when the Shah was 
admitted to the United States to undergo medical 
treatment. Up to this point, the Shah had been living in 
various other countries including Egypt, Morocco, the 
Bahamas and Mexico. Iranian revolutionary leaders 
suspected that the United States was planning to restore 
the Shah to power. His entry into the United States 
heightened this concern. On November 4, a group of 
demonstrators took control of the American embassy, 
capturing sixty-six people (Lenczowski 1990, 199).
The ensuing hostage crisis quickly revealed that the 
Bazargan government, which was taken by surprise by the 
hostage seizure, was only a facade, and that the real 
power lay in the hands of Khomeini and the clergy.
Khomeini praised the captors for their deed and used the 
embassy take over as a means to mobilize the population by 
stirring up anti-American sentiments (Darius 1984, 104). 
Attempts by the Bazargan government to guarantee the 
hostages' release proved futile. Bazargan resigned, 
virtually eliminating the secular influence on Iran's 
political processes (Lenczowski 1990, 200).
The hostage crisis cast a shadow over the final year
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of Carter's presidency. The growing division between 
Vance on the one hand and the president and Brzezinski on 
the other became even more apparent, and was resolved only 
when Vance resigned after abortive hostage rescue attempt 
in April 1980^^.
While American efforts were heavily directed toward 
resolving the situation in Iran, Soviet troops entered 
Afghanistan, touching off yet another crisis in the Middle 
East. The Soviets entered Afghanistan in the winter of 
1979, during a period of domestic upheaval. The 
republican government headed by Daoud Khan since 1973 had 
recently been overthrown in favor of a communist regime 
led by Mohammed Taraki. Taraki's successor, Hafizulla 
Amin, inspired opposition among religious and tribal 
elements, who soon began to fight against the 
revolutionary government. Known as mujahadeen (warriors 
for the faith), this group of fighters took control of 
large areas in the countryside and waged war against the 
regime and its Soviet supporters (Lenczowski 1990, 205). 
President Amin was assassinated shortly after the Soviet 
invasion, and replaced by a rival member of the Communist 
Party, Babrak Karmal.
In response to the Soviet entry into Afghanistan, 
President Carter sent a message to Brezhnev labeling the 
Soviet action as "a clear threat to the peace," adding
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that it "could mark a fundamental and long-lasting turning 
point" in Soviet-American relations. Brezhnev replied two 
days later, indicating that the Soviet presence had been 
requested by Afghan leaders (Brzezinski 1983, 429-430). 
Carter interpreted the Soviet action as an aggressive 
attempt to expand their sphere of influence. The 
strategic implications of a potential Soviet take-over 
were disturbing. From their new vantage point, the 
Soviets posed an immediate threat to the rich oil fields 
and vital waterways in the Persian Gulf region.
While the Soviets became embroiled in a conflict that
has since been compared to Vietnam, Carter pledged that the
United States would defend the Persian Gulf region:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An
attempt by any outside force to gain control 
of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded 
as an assault on the vital interests of the 
United States of America, and such an assault 
will be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force (Carter 1982, 483).
Carter chose from éunong his military, economic and 
political means to respond to the situation in 
Afghanistan, "the most serious international development" 
that had occurred since he became president (Carter 1982, 
473). Direct military action was ruled out unless it 
became absolutely necessary. Instead, the administration 
initiated support to the Afghan "freedom fighters" (Carter 
1982, 475). Moreover, a special military command, the
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Rapid Deployment Force, was developed in case American 
intervention in the Persian Gulf region did become 
necessary35 (Brzezinski 1983, 457; Lenczowski 1990, 207). 
Economic actions against the Soviet Union were also taken, 
including a highly controversial grain embargo, denial of 
fishing rights and an interruption of high technology 
equipment transfers (Carter 1982, 475).
With the exception of the grain embargo, which 
critics argued placed an unfair burden on American 
farmers. Carter's most controversial response to the 
Afghanistan crisis was his decision to boycott the 1980 
Olympics, scheduled to be held in Moscow. Carter believed 
that pulling out of the games, which were "much more than 
a sporting event" for the Soviets, would have a serious 
psychological and economic impact on the Soviet Union 
(Carter 1982, 474-475). While this may have been true, it 
is undeniable that his decision held similar ramifications 
for the United States.
In the political realm, while messages were sent back 
and forth between Carter and Breshnev, the United States 
pushed hard to obtain a vote of condemnation in the United 
Nations. These efforts were eventually successful. "This 
was," Carter wrote, "the first time such action had ever 
been taken against one of the leading nations of the 
world" (Carter 1982, 475). The crisis in Afghanistan also
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gave the Carter Administration an opportunity to improve
relations with the Pakistani government, headed by
President Zia ul-Haq. These relations would eventually be
used as a means of channeling supplies to the mujahadeen.
y
The crisis in Afghanistan was not solved before 
Carter's presidency ended. The lack of resolution in this 
area, coupled with the burden of the hostage crisis that 
lasted well over a year, caused Carter to leave the White 
House on a very low note. As he prepared for the 
transition, he learned a crucial lesson that would become 
even more clear in the weeks to come. His "power as a 
defeated president was not equal to that of one who is 
expected to remain in office." Ironically, he reached 
this conclusion after a meeting on November 13, 1980, 
during which he and Prime Minister Begin were to discuss 
remaining Middle East issues. The discussions yielded 
little substance and it was apparent that the Israelis 
preferred to wait until the new administration entered 
office before continuing top-level negotiations (Carter 
1982, 575-576).
Summary
The Carter Administration entered the White House 
determined to help America regain the sense of direction 
that had been lost during the Vietnam War and Watergate
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periods. In Carter's view, this could best be 
accomplished by returning to basic values and moral 
principles, not only within the United States, but in 
relations with other nations as well. This, coupled with 
the president's own religious and moral convictions, led 
Carter to attempt to build his foreign policy around the 
guiding principle of promoting human rights.
Within the general framework of this ideal. Carter 
and his staff fashioned an ambitious foreign policy agenda 
that was complemented by equally ambitious domestic 
programs. The Middle East, more specifically the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, served as the centerpiece of Carter's 
foreign policy, at times to the exclusion of other 
regions. Carter was the first president to break the 
cycle of waiting until a crisis had erupted before trying 
to effect some sort of change in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. He felt compelled to meet the situation head-on 
because of strategic concerns, human rights issues, and his 
own personal beliefs.
Carter's motives in dealing with the Middle East 
epitomize a very important aspect of his administration's 
foreign policy. It was driven by inclinations toward 
several conflicting impulses, trying to satisfy many of 
them simultaneously. Carter believed that he could 
reconcile the realistic demands of statecraft with the
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idealistic spirit of American democracy. His National 
Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski believed ideals were 
important, but if a conflict should ever develop between 
power and principles, strategic concerns should prevail 
(Brzezinski 1983, 49). Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, on 
the other hand, was typically more inclined to urge 
restraint when dealing with other nations, including the 
Soviet Union. Vance's belief that diplomatic means should 
be fully explored before resorting to force eventually 
compelled him to resign after the abortive rescue attempt 
in Iran.
The differences of opinion within the Carter 
Administration became highly publicized and detracted from 
its ability to establish a sense of cohesiveness and 
direction in its larger foreign policy. As various crises 
developed, particularly the hostage crisis in Iran and the 
Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, Carter began to make 
decisions that were more in accordance with Brzezinski's 
views, but an overarching sense of direction was still 
conspicuously absent from Carter's foreign policy.
More than this, however, the administration lacked an 
effective policy planning and coordinating mechanism to 
prevent the foreign policy machinery from becoming 
overloaded, or to prevent fragmentation of foreign policy. 
In essence, such a mechanism would have helped Carter
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identify potential problems and assisted him with the 
difficult task of choosing among conflicting policy 
intiatives by determining which were higher priorities 
(George 1980, 118). The fact that their goals were too 
ambitious notwithstanding, the Carter Administration's 
primary deficiency was that it lacked the means to execute 
its plans and, once various initiatives were underway, to 
ensure its efforts were channeled in the same direction.
Foreign policy did become fragmented during the first 
year of Carter's presidency. Furthermore, it was 
characterized by overactivism, a tendency to initiate 
policies without having given full consideration to their 
feasability, poor conceptualization of overarching 
strategy, and a failure to recognize when individual 
policies ran counter to one another (George 1980, 118). 
Carter's habit of intervening personally in important 
policy matters emerged as another characteristic of his 
administration.
Ironically, it was within the context of this larger 
framework and, one has to admit, largely due to the 
personal intervention of Carter, that an extremely 
significant change occured in the complexion of the Middle 
East. The Camp David agreements and subsequent 
negotiations, while they may have fallen short in terms of 
resolving the critical issues of Palestinian rights, and
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the West Bank and Gaza, established an unprecedented 
degree of relations between Egypt, the United States and 
Israel. Moreover, Arab reactions to these negotiations, 
neunely the isolation of Egypt, caused the dynamics of the 
equation to be dramatically altered, pushing Arab-Israeli 
relations past the perpetual stalemate that had lasted for 
decades, into a new stage of development.
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Chapter 5 
THE ESSENCE OF A DUXMNA
Recent events, such as the Gulf War and the historic 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization demonstrate that the Middle East continues to 
be one of the most important regions in the world from the 
standpoint of American foreign policy. A brief survey of 
the development of American Middle Eastern policy 
illustrates the difficult nature of dealing with the 
competing interests that have arisen in the region.
Initially, when American involvement was driven 
primarily by philanthropic and commercial interests, the 
United States was able to remain distanced from the 
internal affairs of the Middle East. After two world 
wars, however, the previous discovery of large oil 
reserves in the region precipitated a shift in American 
involvement from protecting commercial concerns toward 
considerations of national interest. Although not yet 
heavily involved politically in the Middle East, the 
United States began to develop a vested interest in 
maintaining stability in the region.
206
207
It was precisely at this critical juncture that 
President Truman was compelled to carry Wilson's moral 
commitment to the Zionist cause a step further by 
supporting the creation of Israel. Ironically, this very 
development had a pronounced de-stabilizing effect on the 
region, and placed future presidents on the horns of a 
dilemma that has since plagued American foreign policy 
toward the Middle East. How can the United States 
reconcile its need to maintain vital access to the 
region's oil with commitments to the security of Israel?
What makes this dilemma particularly intriguing is 
that it has served as a major battlefield for the 
conflicting impulses that have driven American foreign 
policy for over 200 years, the Jeffersonian ideal of 
promoting democracy throughout the world, and the 
Hamiltonian perspective, which asserts that foreign policy 
should promote the national interest. Experience has 
shown, however, that even taking a strict national 
interests approach creates problems in terms of 
prioritization. Few policy makers would dispute that 
American policy must be directed toward maintaining 
reliable access to oil, ensuring the security of Israel, 
addressing strategic issues, and attempting to promote 
peace. Determining which of these objectives is most 
important, however, has proven to be quite difficult.
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Successive presidents have approached the Middle 
Eastern dilemma differently, each leaving his own unique 
imprint. The Nixon Administration serves as an exaunple of 
the application of a realist-oriented approach, whereas 
the Carter Administration was strongly motivated by 
idealistic impulses. The preceding case studies highlight 
three basic themes which merit specific attention: the
differences in Nixon and Carter's ability to discern vital 
regional developments while reconciling them with 
geopolitical considerations; the effects of crises on 
foreign policy formulation, and the potentially 
debilitating effects of bureaucratic rivalries on American 
foreign policy.
Comparative Analysis
In a broad sense, this comparative analysis reaffirms 
the importance of contextual factors in foreign policy 
formulation. Policy-makers need mechanisms to identify 
the salient contextual features surrounding an issue, and 
the means to stay abreast of current developments, of 
changes in the broad contours of the decision-making 
environment. The ability to identify changes in context 
may be the key to recognizing opportunities to achieve 
important objectives. A program or initiative that might 
not have been successful under one set of circumstances 
may prove quite successful under different conditions.
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Likewise, the inability to appreciate the historical and 
contemporary underpinnings associated with a particular 
event may lead to missed opportunities, or even worse, to 
unexpected crises.
When President Nixon entered the White House, the 
most prominent foreign policy issue was Vietnam. The need 
to repair the domestic consensus and to re-establish 
support for an active American role in world affairs was 
so great during this period that Nixon had to make 
disentanglement from Vietnam his highest priority. His 
personal experiences on the Herter Committee and as 
Eisenhower's Vice President caused him to approach his 
foreign policy from a staunch anti-Soviet perspective. 
Detente, the desire to establish a more constructive 
relationship with the Soviet Union while capitalizing on a 
potential triangular relationship with China, was the 
cornerstone of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy. In essence, 
it was a new form of balance-of-power politics that 
eventually gave way to the Cold War international system.
This approach caused Nixon and Kissinger to view the 
Middle East through lenses that were shaped by a global 
strategic emphasis. While clearly focusing on the Soviet 
Union and China, Nixon and Kissinger often had a distorted 
image of the Middle East. Such was the case in 1970, when 
Nixon was convinced that events in Jordan were caused by
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Soviet intrigue instead of being the result of regional 
developments. Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger were caught 
off guard by the Arab offensive in 1973. Had they been 
more in tune with mounting Arab frustrations, they might 
have realized that a new crisis was imminent.
Once the war did break out, however, Kissinger 
recognized the potential to make advances in the 
diplomatic arena, particularly in light of a direct line 
of communication that had recently been opened to Egypt. 
Furthermore, Kissinger's recognition that Arab willingness 
to negotiate would be severly hampered by a decisive 
Israeli victory demonstrates at least some understanding 
of the prevailing Middle Eastern context. If Kissinger 
had not succeeded in negotiating relief for the encircled 
Egyptian Third Army, for example, the Arab attitude after 
the war would have been markedly different.
The Nixon Administration's change in focus after the 
October War of 1973 suggests that crises, particularly if 
they occur unexpectedly, can cause decision-makers to re­
examine their foreign policy priorities. Prior to the 
war, Nixon and Kissinger's global focus had several 
effects on Middle Eastern policy. First, Nixon did not 
particularly want to become involved in the region, which 
was a hotbed of emotional nationalism and really appeared 
to be a "no-win" situation. This led Nixon to reserve more
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interesting and dramatic foreign policy areas for the 
White House, while allowing Secretary of State Rogers to 
pursue an elusive Middle East peace settlement. Second, 
however, when Britain announced its intention to withdraw 
from the Persian Gulf by 1971, potentially endangering the 
stability of the region by creating a power vacuum, the 
Middle East became more important from a global 
perspective and, thus, received more of Nixon and 
Kissinger's attention. Interestingly, the British 
withdrawal coincided roughly with the Jordanian crisis, 
leading Nixon and Kissinger to strengthen the American 
commitment to both Israel and Iran, primarily in the form 
of arms shipments.
During this period, Israel's status as the United 
States' only strategic ally in the region crystallized. 
Every effort was made to keep the regional balance-of- 
power in Israel's favor, a goal that for several years 
constituted the heart of Nixon's Middle East strategy and 
eventually threatened to undercut the State Department's 
efforts. The Arabs meanwhile, were visibly drawn toward 
the Soviets, making the Middle East appear even more 
important as a potential arena for superpower 
confrontation.
In the initial phases of Nixon's Administration, 
which for the purposes of this study will be classified as
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the period prior to the Jordanian crisis, it is difficult 
to tell which American interest in the Middle East was 
considered preeminent. However, once Nixon and Kissinger 
began to perceive that the region was gaining importance 
for the United States from a global standpoint, the Nixon 
Administration's priorities began to develop specific 
hierarchical guidelines. Their first priority was to 
prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the region, 
thereby preserving Western access to oil. Israel was 
perceived as vital to this process, complicating the issue 
of choosing between the American commitment to Israeli 
security and promoting relations with the oil producing 
Arab states. After the Jordanian crisis, the belief that 
Israel was a vital partner in the Soviet-American 
competition caused Nixon and Kissinger to place Israeli 
concerns above Arab relations. This made attempts to find 
a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict especially 
problematic and led to a policy of favoring the status quo 
as the best means of promoting American interests.
This priority scheme persisted until the October War 
of 1973. When Nixon and Kissinger recognized the 
potential threat of superpower confrontation inherent in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the issue of promoting a 
settlement was brought back to the fore. This time, 
however, the issue received Kissinger's personal attention
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with the president's support.
In terms of structure, the Nixon Administration 
suffered from the ailment that has afflicted many foreign 
policy bureaucracies since the National Security Act of 
1947, the struggle between the State Department and the 
National Security Adviser for primacy in foreign affairs. 
During Nixon's first term, Kissinger's span of control 
reached beyond the National Security Council into several 
areas of the Department of State. As foreign policy 
beceune more centralized in the White House, the State 
Department's position became even more tenuous. During 
Nixon's second term, the issue became a moot point when 
the president appointed Kissinger as his Secretary of 
State, expecting him to fulfill both functions.
Nixon and Kissinger believed that foreign policy 
should be developed with minimal constraints on 
presidential authority. Furthermore, they understood the 
advantages of well-timed foreign policy initiatives. To a 
large extent, they were able to use their foreign policy 
successes to help generate a certain degree of domestic 
support, in spite of the crisis of conscience caused by 
Vietnam. The draunatic announcement of an opening to 
China, the Paris negotiations, and the successful 
mitigation of the Jordanian crisis, combined to help Nixon 
win re-election.
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Carter, in a departure from the previous two 
administrations, felt the need to move away from the heavy 
Soviet-American emphasis that had typically characterized 
American foreign policy. This desire, coupled with his 
personal studies of the Middle East, led him to take a 
more regionally-oriented approach to the area. In spite 
of his awareness of the strategic importance of the 
region, he was strongly motivated by a personal desire to 
create an Arab-Israeli settlement. When Carter became 
president, the Middle East, because of the October War and 
subsequent disengagement talks, was eunong the highest 
foreign policy concerns of the departing administration.
In this respect, it is not surprising that Carter felt 
compelled to deal with the Arab-Israeli dispute, just as 
it was understandable that the Mixon Administration felt 
compelled to deal with Vietnam.
Like Kissinger, Carter recognized the contextual 
changes in the Arab-Israeli equation brought about by the 
October War. The Arabs had a newfound sense of honor, 
while the Israelis had a newfound sense of vulnerability. 
Unlike Kissinger, who used American diplomacy to deal 
primarily with the effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Carter determined to deal with specific causes of the 
dilemma. In so doing, he was able to take advantage of 
the diplomatic ties established with Egypt during the Nixon
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Administration. Carter genuinely believed that a solution 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict was possible. Thus, he 
determined to make the Middle East a priority concern for 
his administration in spite of warnings from his advisers 
that it might prove politically costly.
His tight focus on specific issues related to the 
Arab-Israeli dilemma allowed Carter to be caught off guard 
by successive crises during the latter stages of his 
administration. Ironically, these crises occurred in Iran 
and Afghanistan, within striking distance of the area that 
received Carter's primary attention. Carter's foreign 
policy, while very proactive in terms of Arab-Israeli 
issues, was decidedly reactive in many other areas, 
including other Middle Eastern issues. This had the net 
effect of causing his policy to be dominated by one major 
issue after another, without an overarching sense of 
direction.
Beyond Carter's desire to promote peace in the Middle 
East through an Arab-Israeli settlement, it is difficult 
to determine which of the other three priorities carried 
more emphasis. Carter was aware of the region's 
importance from the standpoint of oil and the Soviet- 
American competition and he felt a certain sense of 
commitment toward Israeli security. Yet, his initial 
approach to the Middle East did not give any indication
216
that Carter viewed any one of these interests to be more 
important than the others. After the crisis in Iran, 
Carter shifted his focus from the Arab-Israeli dispute to 
considerations of regional stability. After the crisis 
precipitated by the Soviet deployment into Afghanistan, 
however, the prevention of Soviet expansion into the 
Middle East emerged as Carter's highest priority.
The degree of commitment Carter felt toward Israel 
remains somewhat unclear. The establishment of closer 
diplomatic ties with Egypt, coupled with Carter's 
friendship with President Sadat, reduced the perception 
that Israel was the United States' only potential ally in 
the Middle East. Because Carter did not appear to attach 
as much importance to Israeli security as the Nixon 
Administration, he ran the risk of losing the support of 
the American Jewish community. Moreover, his conviction 
that both sides needed to make compromises in the 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute exacerbated this 
loss of domestic support.
Carter's idealistic support of human rights, which 
had been so appealing during the election, eventually 
caused him to suffer widespread criticism. Detente, 
although it too eventually lost domestic support, had the 
advantage of being highly structured. Human rights 
dictated a much more diffuse approach and engendered a
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great deal of expectation among various groups who felt 
their causes were worthy of specific attention. Carter 
could not possibly address all of these issues. Moreover, 
at times, situations developed that forced Carter to 
choose one element of human rights over another or, 
equally challenging. Carter had to face the dilemma of 
reconciling his idealistic goals with his perceptions of 
the national interest. Thus, in much the same way that 
Wilson found himself torn between support for the Zionist 
cause and the desire to promote self-determination among 
the Arab people. Carter faced difficult choices regarding 
Israeli security and Palestinian rights. As the situation 
in Iran deteriorated. Carter was forced to choose between 
a policy of recognizing the Shah's abuses of power and 
supporting his regime in the name of regional stability.
The impression that his policy was moving several 
different directions at once was amplified by the 
bureaucratic dispute that developed between Brzezinski and 
Vance. Unlike Nixon, Carter did not side clearly with 
either his National Security Adviser or his Secretary of 
State until very late in his presidency. Carter's own 
indecision was at times magnified by conflicting advice 
from his top-level advisers. As he faced successive 
crises in short periods of time, however. Carter began to 
move away from his own basic policy of promoting human
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rights toward one of promoting American interests. This 
gradual transformation is evident in National Security 
Adviser Brzezinski's observation that the basic directions 
of Carter's foreign policy were set quite firmly after the 
crisis in Afghanistan (Brzezinski 1983, 35).
The structural difficulties encountered by the Carter 
Administration's foreign policy machinery highlights a 
crucial lesson. Without going into the larger debate of 
whether it is more appropriate for the State Department or 
the National Security Adviser to preside over foreign 
policy formulation, it is absolutely essential that the 
president provide clear direction through his own 
initiatives, or by giving primacy to one organization or 
the other. Furthermore, he must remain consistent in his 
choice. The rivalry between the State Department and the 
National Security Adviser was significant, but not 
debilitating, to the Nixon Administration, because Nixon's 
views were more clearly in line with Kissinger's. The 
high degree of centralization that occurred during Nixon's 
second term, however, represents the other extreme, which 
must also be avoided.
As the nation's head-of-state, the president must 
exert firm control over the foreign policy bureaucracy to 
ensure that specific undertakings are in line with his 
larger framework. In general terms, this requirement would
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also dictate that the president avoid becoming too deeply 
involved in any one foreign policy matter to the exclusion 
of others. Thus, Carter's decision to become deeply 
involved in negotiating a solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict should represent the exception rather than the 
rule. Moreover, any president who does choose to delve 
into one issue to this degree, must do so consciously, 
after considering the potential costs in other foreign 
policy areas. It cannot be denied that Carter's personal 
involvement helped move the Arab-Israeli conflict to a new 
stage of development. However, by devoting so many of his 
resources toward this one purpose. Carter placed his 
administration in a vulnerable position. Without a long- 
range perspective. Carter became preoccupied by one issue 
after another.
Toward Future Policy
The findings presented above suggest that American 
policy toward the Middle East be re-evaluated in light of 
recent contextual developments. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union requires a re-definition of basic foreign 
policy along both geopolitical and ideological lines in 
order to re-prioritize remaining interests. The Nixon- 
Kissinger formula of viewing the Middle East as an arena 
for Soviet-American competition is simply no longer
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appropriate. Geopolitical concerns still exist, however, 
as the Gulf War aptly demonstrated. Now, more than ever, 
it is essential that the United States devote the 
resources of its foreign policy machinery toward 
continually assessing the international context, both 
regionally and globally. This task, instead of becoming 
more simple, has actually become much more complicated due 
to the loss of the tenuous Cold War framework.
With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, this 
development will have far-reaching effects in terms of the 
Arab countries' willingness to cooperate with the United 
States, with Israel and with one another. Furthermore, it 
requires that the United States re-examine its commitment 
to Israel to insure that it is not simply continuing the 
Cold War oriented policy of providing unquestioned 
support. By moving away from the perspective that Israel 
is the United States' only ally, toward one of continuing 
to cultivate relations with other countries in the region, 
American policy may actually help to further progress 
toward an Arab-Israeli settlement.
The recent negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization are also quite 
significant because they demonstrate the degree to which 
contextual changes may have already opened the door to 
opportunities. The loss of the Cold War rivalry, which
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for years allowed the Israelis and Arabs to play their 
respective sponsors against one another, has forced 
players on both sides to reassess their own situations, 
making them more amenable to attempting a settlement. It 
is also important to note that these negotiations were not 
conducted under the United States' watchful eye, but took 
place quietly, under Norwegian sponsorship. This raises 
the question of the role of the United States in future 
world affairs.
In dealing with this question, it is going to become 
increasingly vital that American policy-makers address the 
issue of how to blend the elements of realism and idealism 
into a more cohesive, consistent foreign policy. Too much 
reliance on the realistic aspects of power politics may 
desensitize policy makers to important regional 
developments. Too much reliance on the idealistic 
elements may lead to a foreign policy that lacks a sense 
of direction. The challenge of future presidents will not 
only include aspects of those faced by Nixon and Carter, 
but will include the resurgence of a new dilemma. Policy­
makers will not be expected to simply choose between 
national interests and idealistic endeavors, they will be 
expected to combine aspects of them, without allowing 
either impulse to throw American foreign policy off track.
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